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This thesis answers the question of how South Africa ought to regulate ownership of 
patentable employee-inventions within the prevailing patent system. It is concerned with 
developing a South African legal regulatory framework for an optimal default allocation of 
ownership in patentable inventions made by employee-inventors in the private sector. It 
approaches this concern from the perspective that the law relating to ownership of 
employee-inventions should align with the purpose of patents as tools for encouraging 
private sector investment in technological innovation.   This perspective is informed by a 
theoretical framework based on assumptions about, amongst other things, the role of 
patents as individual incentives, the nature of inventorship, and the likely incentive effect of a 
grant of a patent on employers’ and employee-inventors’ contributions to inventive activity. 
 
The core of the thesis is an analysis of the South African law relating to the allocation of 
ownership of patentable inventions between employers and employees to determine 
whether and how it supports the incentive function of the patent system.  This includes a 
consideration of the ownership of intellectual property which may arise as a consequence of 
the inventive activity and which attract statutory protection in the form of copyright, industrial 
design rights, and plant breeders’ rights. In the absence of international guidance and a 
dearth of sources about the South African approach, an examination of the British and 
American approaches provides insight into divergent legal regulatory responses to the same 
issue.  
 
A key conclusion is that the prevailing South African law does not provide for an efficient 
legal framework for the allocation of patent rights between employers and employees when 
reviewed against the purpose of the patent system in the innovation context.  Based on this 
and other conclusions about the factors which ought to inform the regulation of the 
allocation, recommendations for a new legislative framework which is responsive to the 
purpose of patents as individual incentives, but which is also cognisant of the dynamics of 
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1.1 WHAT THIS THESIS IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT  
 
This thesis develops a legal regulatory framework for the allocation of ownership of 
patentable inventions1 made by inventors employed in South Africa. It approaches 
this task from the perspective that an optimal allocation is one which aligns with the 
purpose of the patent system as a tool for encouraging inventive activity to drive 
technological innovation.   It is not a thesis on innovation theory, nor does it test the 
legitimacy of the patent system as a driver of technological advancement. The 
research question asks how South Africa ought to regulate ownership of patentable 
employee-inventions between employers and their employees within the confines of 
the current patent system. In order to provide a context in which to answer this 
question, various assumptions about the peculiarities of employee-inventorship and 
the role of patents as individual incentives underpin the research and inform the 
particular conceptualisation of what an optimal allocation should comprise. The result 
is a recommendation for legislative reform to introduce a regulatory framework which 
facilitates a default allocation of ownership and aligns with the purpose of the patent 
system in South Africa. 
 
This chapter serves as a guide to the thesis. It explains the reason for the research, 
the nature of the enquiries undertaken in answering the research question, the scope 
of the endeavour, and very importantly, the assumptions which underpin this work. 
 
                                                          
1 References to ‘invention’ are to patentable inventions unless the context indicates otherwise. A 
patentable invention is one which meets the criteria for patent protection. The rights in such an 
invention include the right to apply for the patent and the patent itself. In this thesis no distinction is 
made between references to ‘ownership of patents on employee-inventions’ and ‘ownership of 
patentable employee-inventions’. The term ‘employee-inventor’ refers to an individual who meets the 
statutory definition of ‘inventor’ and who is employed. It is used interchangeably with ‘employed 
inventor’, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND  
 
Globalisation, coupled with the increasing value placed on knowledge-intensive 
goods, has resulted in growing concern about the effect of intellectual property rights 
on trade flows of such goods. Patents are arguably the most contentious of the 
recognised intellectual property rights. Sometimes welcomed, at other times vilified, 
they are private rights which have a profound public effect. Cornish describes them 
as ‘the most basic, the most valuable, and to competitors, potentially the most 
dangerous, of all intellectual property’.2  
 
Conventional rhetoric holds that the patent system is a driver of economic 
development through the role it plays in stimulating innovation. It is somewhat ironic 
that the exponential increase in the use of the system since the start of the industrial 
revolution, has also attracted increasing criticism.3 The nature of the vilification 
varies depending on both its source and its target.4  It includes the rejection of claims 
that increased patents result in enhanced economic growth,5scepticism that the 
system benefits  developing countries,6 concerns about patent thickets stifling 
innovation,7 and criticism of the inflated price of patented goods. A befitting 
testimony to the identity-crisis in which the system finds itself, is the European Patent 
Office’s (‘EPO’) project to identify various scenarios for the development of the 
patent system in a way that will ensure that it can ‘provide those crucial incentives to 
innovators developing new answers to today’s problems’ while ‘also ensuring that 
the interests of society – of all societies in the world – are also served’.8 
                                                          
2 Cornish W, Llewelyn D & Aplin T Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights 8ed (2013) 8. See also Teljeur E Intellectual Property Rights in South Africa: An economic 
review of policy and impact (2002/3) 11; Pouris A & Pouris A ‘Patent and economic development in 
South Africa: Managing  intellectual property rights’ (2011) 11/12 S Afr J Sci 107 1. 
3 See Straus J ‘Is there a global warming of patents?’ (2001) 11 Journal of World Intellectual Property 
Law 58; Lerner J ‘The patent system in a time of turmoil’ (2010) 2(1) WIPO Journal 28. 
4 See European Patent Office Scenarios for the Future (2007) 13. 
5 See, for example, the discussion in Dutfield G & Suthersanen U Global Intellectual Property Law 
(2008) 6. 
6 Dutfield & Suthersanen (n5) 8-9. 
7 See, for example, EPO (n4) 17. 




Although the patent system is the site of ongoing contestation, it shows no sign of 
waning. 9 Despite the obvious disparities in how the patent system is experienced 
and perceived, it remains linked to its role as a driver of economic development. 
Therefore, while national patent filings may fluctuate depending on domestic drivers, 
the statistics on the use of the Patent Co-operation Treaty (‘PCT’) for 2013-201410 
show that patenting activity generally has increased and reflects a growth in 
international patent applications. 
 
The basis for national patent systems is found in two international instruments: the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property11 (‘Paris Convention’) and 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights12 (‘TRIPS 
Agreement’).  Although there is no single worldwide system for the registration of a 
‘global’ patent, adherence to these instruments means that national systems reflect 
certain commonalities. The nature of a patent in all countries which have adopted the 
system, is therefore similar. Simplistically, a patent is a state-granted dispensation 
which secures for the patentee economic control over certain technological 
inventions to the exclusion of others.   In exchange for a limited period of economic 
exclusivity, the state imposes substantive and procedural requirements – in 
particular that the invention be new, not obvious, and that it be disclosed to the 
public. Once the patent has been granted it is generally left to the patentee’s 
discretion to decide how, if at all, to commercialise the invention. The most common 
                                                          
9 See for example on worldwide patent surges in Fink et al 'Exploring the worldwide patent surge' 
WIPO Economics and Statistics Series 2013 Working Paper No 12. The authors observe that 
between 1982 and 1995 patent filings were between 800 000 and one million a year but then grew to 
2.14 million in 2011. See also Grandstrand O ‘Intellectual property rights for governance in and of 
innovation systems’ in Andersen B (ed) Intellectual property rights: Innovation, governance and the 
institutional environment (2006) 315-6 on the emergence of stronger intellectual property rights even 
in the face of criticism. 
10 WIPO ‘Patent Cooperation Treaty Yearly Review’ 9-10. See also yearly review for 2015 available at 
http://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=3923. 
11 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, as amended. 
12 Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Annex 1C to the Marrakesh 




justification for the creation of this ‘monopoly’ sees the system as an incentive 
mechanism to encourage technological advancement, ultimately to the benefit of the 
public. Ownership of the patent serves as an inducement for the producers of 
inventions to engage in inventive activity.  
 
Ownership of the patent is, however, not dictated in either the Paris Convention or 
the TRIPS Agreement, although they both recognise an inventor’s right to be 
identified as such.13  Neither instrument explains how inventorship is to be 
determined. The paradigmatic approach has been both to associate the inventor with 
the individual responsible for the intellectual conception of the subject matter of the 
invention, and to vest initial entitlement to the patent in him or her. The reality, 
however, is that most inventive activity happens in the corporate context and 
patentees are corporate bodies.14  In many cases the individual inventors are or 
were employed by the corporate patentees15who have invested in the research 
which resulted in the patentable invention. For these corporate investors, patenting is 
a mechanism through which they are able to recoup their expenses and profit from 
their investment in innovative activities.  
 
However, the paradigmatic model which associates inventorship with individual 
intellectual work, ignores the resource contribution made by corporates.16 
Consequently, corporate patent ownership depends on acquisition of title to the 
invention from the employee-inventor.  This precipitates the dual dynamic which 
characterises issues of ownership of employee-made inventions. On the one hand 
the employer must negotiate with the employee to be able to recoup its investment in 
the invention – a situation which inevitably attracts transaction costs given that the 
                                                          
13 Paris Convention (n11) art 4ter incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. 
14 See for example, Dratler J ‘Fixing our Broken Patent System’ (2010) 14 Marquette Intellectual 
Property Law Review 50. 
15 See similar sentiment by Simmons J ‘Inventions made for hire’ (2012) 2 NYU Journal of Intellectual 
Property and Entertainment law 2. 
16 See Cherensky S ‘A penny for their thoughts: Employee-inventors, preinvention assignment 
agreements, and personhood’ (1993) 81 California Law Review 595 who described it at 626 as an 
‘antiquated and rigid conception of inventorship’; Dratler (n14) 50. 
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employee holds the invention as a bargaining chip.17  On the other hand, any 
disadvantage to the employer may be eliminated by the inequality in bargaining 
power between the parties which arises from the employee’s ongoing dependency 
on the employer for work. In the latter case, the grant of the patent to the employee-
inventor does little to incentivise the individual if he or she is not sufficiently 
compensated for the dispossession.   
 
This disjuncture between inventorship and default ownership is not resolved in the 
international instruments.18 However, the tensions which arise as a consequence of 
this misalignment of first ownership and the incentive function of patents have  
spurred many countries to deviate from the archetypal recognition of the inventor as 
the default owner and to recognise the role of corporate investment in the 
development of inventions.19 This notwithstanding, there is no standard response 
and the deviations are nuanced by domestic ‘historical, economic, political, cultural, 
and social characteristics’20 which shape the local conceptualisation of the issue of 
employee-inventions. This is evidenced by the diversity of emphasis in the range of 
scholarly literature dealing with employee-inventions in various jurisdictions, and the 
                                                          
17 See discussion in Merges R ‘Autonomy and independence: The normative fact of transaction costs’ 
(2011) 53 Arizona Law Review 1. 
18 Takenaka T & Reboul Y ‘Employee invention system: Comparative law perspective’ in Takenaka T 
(ed) Intellectual Property in Common Law and Civil Law (2013) 366. See also BIRPI (WIPO) Model 
Law for Developing Countries on Inventions 1965 Geneva (‘WIPO Model Law 1965’) 12; Greenberg S 
‘The WIPO Model Laws for the protection of unpatented know-how: A comparative analysis’ (1985) 
Int'l Tax & Bus Law 52-55. See also the work of the AIPPI from the 1960s to 2004 on employee-made 
intellectual property. The AIPPI is a private international organisation dealing with intellectual property 
issues generally and mainly from the rightsholder’s perspective. It passed a Resolution in 2004 on the 
issue of employee-made intellectual property. See AIPPI Resolution Question 183 ‘Employer’s right to 
intellectual property’ 2004 and further documentation on the various resolutions (eg in 1967 as well) 
on related concerned. See www.aippi.org. 
19 This is not a recent phenomenon with the first employee-invention regulation probably having been 
adopted as early as 1897 in Austria. Countries which have amended their legislation or passed new 
legislation to deal with the ownership in employee-inventions, include  Argentina, Austria, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Philippines, China, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, 
Britain, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Columbia, and Singapore.  
20 Lo V ‘Employee inventions and works for hire in Japan: A comparative study against the US, 
Chinese, and German systems’ (2002) 16 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 280. 
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tendency to offer general expositions in preference to integrated comparisons 
between systems.21 Takenaka and Reboul posit that the ideal system is one which 
‘is based on a fine balance between interests of employers and inventors for giving 
inventors incentive to invent while guaranteeing their employers enough rewards for 
commercialization’.22  
 
There is little, if any, likelihood that an international default rule to regulate employee-
inventions will be on the international agenda of either intellectual property or labour 
law fora in the foreseeable future. This is perhaps inevitable in light of the complexity 
arising from the implication of multiple areas of law, and is captured by Lee and 
Langley: ‘In patent law ownership of inventions is granted to inventors. In labour law, 
on the other hand, the product of employees’ labour belongs to employers. Contract 
law provides a further ingredient in that parties are free to bind themselves as they 
see fit, and obtain the benefit any bargains reached.’23 
 
In South Africa the government has identified innovation as a key economic driver 
and has affirmed the patent system as a tool for economic growth. The need to align 
the system with the innovation goals is clear from the introduction of legislation to 
regulate the allocation of rights in publicly-financed intellectual property.24However, 
even though a substantial proportion of research and development is undertaken by 
corporates in the private sector, with patentable inventions being made by employee-
inventors. Interestingly, a similar deviation from the archetypal default allocation of 
inventor-ownership in relation to privately financed patentable inventions, has not 
been introduced.   
 
It is against this background that I explore the South African legal regulatory 
framework for the allocation of ownership in patentable inventions between 
                                                          
21 The references in Chapters 2 and 5 provide ample examples of these phenomena.  
22 Takenaka & Reboul (n18) 368. 
23 Lee Y & Langley M ‘Employees’ inventions: Statutory compensation schemes in Japan and the UK’ 
(2005) 27 EIPR 250. 
24 See Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act 51 of 2008 
which came into effect in 2010.  
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employers and employees to determine whether it supports the incentive function of 
the patent system.   
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION, AIMS, AND OBJECTIVES 
 
This thesis is a response to the research question: How ought South Africa to 
regulate the allocation of first ownership in privately-funded patentable inventions 
between employers and employee-inventors? The underlying hypothesis is that the 
allocation of ownership in patentable inventions must align with the purpose of the 
patent system, and that if the current regulatory model fails to do so, then an 
alternative regulatory model is required.  
 
The aim is to develop a default legal regulatory framework for the allocation of 
ownership in employee-made patentable inventions which can be applied across 
employment sectors. In order to achieve this aim, five main objectives inform the six 
chapters which make up the body of the thesis. 
 
The first objective is to develop a theoretical framework through which to 
conceptualise the challenges associated with the allocation of ownership in   
employee-inventions. This framework serves as an employee-invention specific 
paradigm through which to conduct the analysis of the South African and selected 
foreign systems.  
 
The second objective is to analyse the South African approach to entitlement to 
employee-inventions in the context of the employee-invention paradigm which has 
been constructed. 
 
The third objective is to provide a national context through an examination of the 
ownership of employee-made intellectual property which arises as part of the 
inventive process or which serves as an alternative to the Patents Act25 (‘PA 1978’). 
This examination is instructive of the types of regulatory response to ownership 
allocation of intellectual property rights adopted by the legislature.  It also provides 
                                                          
25 Act 57 of 1978. 
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an opportunity to consider the potential problems which accompany those types of 
response.    
 
The fourth objective is to explore the responses of two foreign systems which are 
similarly plagued. The British and American systems serve as examples of 
innovative countries which have adopted different approaches to the allocation of 
employee-inventions. Their experiences provide a basis for evaluating the potential 
value of similar responses being followed in South Africa. The reason for selecting 
these jurisdictions is explained in 1.6. below. 
 
The final objective is to draw conclusions from the preceding chapters and to offer 
recommendations for the development of a regulatory framework for the allocation of 
ownership in patentable inventions made in the employment context based on those 
conclusions.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH BY CHAPTER 
 
The five objectives are met in the following way. 
 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the substance and structure of the research.  
Importantly, it establishes the assumptions that have been made in the thesis and 
how the scope of the research has been limited.  
 
Chapter 2 constructs a theoretical framework through which to conceptualise 
entitlement to patents for employee-made inventions.  The chapter opens by 
establishing a link between the goals of innovation and the patent system, and sets 
out the assumptions as to the purpose of patents on which this thesis is built. More 
specifically, it explains how the incentive function in the patent system must be 
conceptualised. It then introduces the main characteristics of the patent system 
which affect the realisation of the incentive function. Inventorship is identified as a 
key determinant of entitlement.  
 
Once this general patent paradigm has been introduced, the challenges posed by 
the corporate inventive context are factored in to offer an alternative view of the 
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system which will serve as a basis for determining the features of an optimal default 
allocation. This is done by establishing a link between inventorship, the employment 
relationship between the corporate investor and the inventor, and the allocation of 
rights in the patent.  By revisiting the incentive function as construed in the first part 
of the chapter – but now in the context of employee-inventions – a number of 
assumptions are introduced into the framework. These relate to the legal conditions 
most likely to support the incentive function in the patent system by fostering both 
individual and corporate contributions. It is against this conceptualisation of the 
incentive function that the conclusions and recommendations are finally made in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the South African legal regulation of ownership in patentable 
inventions made by employees.  There are two aspects to this. The first is to 
understand the underlying policy considerations that inform the development of the 
patent system; the second is an analysis of the current South African system for 
allocating ownership in employee-inventions to determine whether it suits its purpose 
in light of the employee-invention paradigm established in Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 4 accomplishes the third objective by surveying the allocation of ownership 
in intellectual property under the Copyright Act (‘CA 1978’),26the Designs Act (‘DA 
1993’),27the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act (‘PBRA 1976’), 28and the Intellectual Property 
Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act (‘IPPFRD Act’).29 In 
the course of the development of an invention, the preparatory material produced 
may constitute non-patentable intellectual property. Therefore, compilations of data 
and general written documentation, for example, may be eligible for protection as 
literary works under copyright legislation, while technical drawings could constitute 
artistic works. Industrial research may also give rise to intellectual goods which may 
be protected by alternative registered intellectual property rights, such as industrial 
designs and plant varieties. In addition, even where patents are granted, their 
                                                          
26 Act 98 of 1978. 
27 Act 195 of 1993. 
28 Act 15 of 1976. 
29 Act 51 of 2008. 
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ownership will depend on whether they have been created under conditions which 
attract the IPPFRD Act. 
 
Chapter 5 offers an exposition of the British and USA patent systems to provide 
insight into alternative national responses to the entitlement to patents in the 
employment context.  The basis for selection of these specific countries is explained 
in 1.8. and the scope of their use in 1.6. below. 
 
Chapter 6 is made up of two parts: Conclusions and Recommendations. First, a 
number of observations from the preceding chapters are made and from these, 
conclusions are drawn as to the state of the South African system and what would 
contribute to an optimal regulatory framework.  Secondly, the chapter offers 
recommendations for improving the system, if necessary, in light of the conclusions. 
Here I suggest a statutory amendment which aligns ownership in employee-
inventions and the purpose of the patent system in a way that takes account of the 
dynamics of the employment context. I consequently review the provisions of the 
existing South African system against the indicators of an optimal allocation, 
conceptualised in Chapter 2, to determine the suitability of the current regulatory 
approach. The observations made in Chapters 4 and 5, serve as a source for 
alternative approaches both from within the South African legal system, and from 
outside.  
 
1.5  ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The theoretical framework for this thesis is premised on certain assumptions which 
are not examined further in the chapters which follow although they may be 
elaborated upon in some respects in Chapter 2. The assumptions are: 
 
1  That the inventions in dispute are patentable  
This thesis is concerned with patentable inventions, in other words, inventions which 
attract patent law ownership rules. It is assumed that the inventions under discussion 





2  That employers are juristic persons  
Although a natural person may be an employer, in the context of this thesis, 
references to an employer are to a juristic person. Therefore, as regards 
inventorship, for example, a distinction is drawn between the natural persons who 
make the actual intellectual contribution, and the employers whose contribution can 
only be indirect, for example through resource contributions. 
 
3 That inventive activity in a corporate context where inventors are also 
employees, exhibits the particular characteristic as discussed in 
Chapter 2  
  
It is acknowledged that modes of inventorship differ and that the nature of 
employment is not static. However, for the purposes of this thesis Chapter 2 posits a 
corporate inventorship landscape which exhibits characteristics peculiar to both 
these aspects. These include, for example, that there are substantially more 
employed inventors now than in previous years, and that much corporate inventive 
activity exhibits characteristics of disaggregation and multiple contributions. As 
regards the employment context, it is assumed that employers and employees have 
unequal bargaining power and that this is a real consideration even though it is 
acknowledged that the nature of the power differential may be influenced by the type 
of work and the particular skills of the employee.   
 
4  That innovation drives economic development  
There are two elements to this assumption both of which are explained in greater 
detail in Chapter 2. The first is that this thesis does not engage with theories of 
innovation, but rather adopts a narrow view of technological innovation. Secondly, it 
is assumed that an increase in technological innovation has a positive effect on 
countries’ economic development in general.  
 
5  That the patent system is a positive driver of technological innovation 
Although the patent system is commonly associated with its role as a driver of 
technological innovation, there is also opinion to the contrary.  This thesis does not 
engage with those arguments, but assumes that the grant of a patent can and does 
play a positive role in influencing the individual decision to engage in inventive 
activity. Therefore, the focus is on the positive impact of the patent system even 
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though there may be drawbacks. Chapter 2 provides further explanation of this 
assumption. 
 
6  That the patent system can be justified on utilitarian grounds 
The exclusionary nature of intellectual property rights has resulted in the search for 
justifications forming an almost inevitable starting point for debate on intellectual 
property matters. There is no single theory or philosophy which unequivocally 
underlies all types of intellectual property rights. Specifically in respect of patents, 
justification theories abound; these may overlap in some respects and be completely 
at odds in others. Even if core theories can be identified, these are usually further 
qualified, for example, by the perspective that is adopted (such as economics or 
property-based perspectives);  whether they are  deontological or consequentialist in 
nature;30 or by distinguishing between natural rights and contract-based 
approaches.31 
 
Commonly acknowledged theories – in other words theories which would not be 
considered controversial in light of the overwhelming body of scholarly work devoted 
to theorising about patents – are the utilitarian theory, the Lockean (labour) theory, 
the personality theory, and the social planning theory.32 Each of these is open to 
criticism and their validity depends on the particular purpose to which they are put – 
for example, labour theory may be more easily justified in copyright than in patents. I 
do not engage with the merits of each of these theories which receive sufficient 
attention in a growing body of more specialised literature. 33 
                                                          
30 See, for example, Spinello R & Bottis M A Defense of Intellectual Property Rights (2009) 167; 
Dutfield & Suthersanen (n5) 48-52. 
31 See also Grandstrand (n9) 318 for a comparison of the traditional and newer economic rationales 
for the patent system. 
32 See Fisher W ‘Theories of Intellectual Property’ in Munzer S (ed) New Essays in Legal and Political 
Theory of Property (2001). 
33 It is a futile exercise to attempt to list the body of writing in this area. Examples include Spinello & 
Bottis (n30) Ch 5; May C &  Sell S Intellectual Property Rights A Critical History (2006) 17; Merges R 
Justifying Intellectual Property  (2011); Hughes J ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988) 77 
Georgetown Law Journal 297; Hettinger E ‘Justifying intellectual property’ (1989)  Philosophy and 
Public Affairs  31; Drahos P A Philosophy of Intellectual Property Rights (1996); Lemley M ‘The myth 
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In the absence of a single, uncontested rationale for patents, this thesis aligns itself 
most closely with a utilitarian approach which aims at public welfare as its underlying 
justification. This utilitarian formulation manifests in economics-based arguments that 
companies will not invest in the development of innovative products if they cannot 
recoup their investment and also profit.  In this thesis, the formulation adopted is that 
the social goals of public wealth through innovation can be achieved by using 
patents as incentives. This appeal to the incentive function is arguably the most 
common justification for patents – even in the absence of incontrovertible evidence 
of its success.34 However,  the success of the system from this conventional 
utilitarian approach is, as Merges notes, dependent on ‘striking the right balance’ so 
that the policy ‘equilibrates the scale at just the right point – the point that maximizes 
the number and quality of new creative works without costing society and arm and a 
leg’. 35 This he notes is a ‘simple but, practically speaking, not at all easy’ task so that 
‘[t]he sheer practical difficulty of measuring or approximating all the variables 
involved means that the utilitarian program will always be at best inspirational’.36That 
inspirational formulation is summed up by Suthersanen who advises that  
 ‘t]he revised current theory is that patents are tools for economic 
 advancement that should contribute to the enrichment of society through (i) 
 the widest possibility availability of new and useful goods, services and 
 technical information that derive from inventive activity, and (ii) the highest 
 possible level of economic activity based on the production, circulation and 
 further development of such goods, services and information’. 37  
 
The benefit to society is that ultimately new products and processes are made 
available to the public.  In this way, patents enhance social welfare by incentivising 
innovation which may not have otherwise have occurred.   Social welfare is also 
enhanced when the patent system is correctly calibrated so that when the patent is 
awarded to the correct person, the rights granted are proportionate to the benefit the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the sole inventor’ (2012) 110 Michigan Law Review 709. See Andersen (n9) on the various 
justifications and the challenges them, in particular 117-127 on the economics-based rationales. 
34 See, for example, Hettinger (n33) 47. 
35 Merges (n33) 2-3. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Suthersanen U & Dutfield G  ‘Innovation and the law of intellectual property’ in  Suthersanen U, 
Dutfield G & Boey Chow K  Innovation Without Patents (2007) at 14. 
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public receives in exchange.  In other words, the public interest is fully served by the 
disclosure of the invention in the patent specifications and by the fact that ‘after a 
certain period of time, these legal rights are extinguished and the now unprotected 
inventions are freely available for others to use and improve upon’.38 
 
In this thesis, I formulate the incentive theory in a way that assumes that the purpose 
of the patent system is to fuel innovation by incentivising the generation of new ideas 
in the form of inventions. The exclusionary nature of the patent system is justified by 
the increase in social welfare that comes with the dissemination of the new 
knowledge through the patent disclosure. Whether or not the incentive offered is 
proportionate to the social welfare that results from the dissemination of information, 
either in the patent specification or through the availability of the new technology 
through commercialisation, is not in issue here.   
 
7  That the patent system encourages inventive activity by incentivising 
such behaviour by individual contributors 
 
I assume that if the patent system is constructed as an individual incentive 
mechanism as advocated in Chapter 2, it will have a positive impact on inventive 
activity.It is not possible to prove that the existence of the patent system is what 
moves people to invent. Indeed, this is a common criticism of the ex ante incentive 
theory. Although I accept the conventional approach that the patent system acts as 
an incentive, this is based on a very specific and narrow conceptualisation of the 
incentive function.  
 
1.6  SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH  
 
The title of this research is ‘The Development of a South African Legal Framework 
relating to Patentable Inventions made by Employees’. This has the potential to raise 
myriad issues related to, amongst other things, intellectual property rights generally 
and patents specifically, economics, employment law, labour regulation, innovation 
theory, and contract. However, this thesis is narrowly directed towards finding a legal 
                                                          
38 Suthersanen & Dutfield (n37) 14. For discussion on whether the disclosure element is in fact useful, 
see Lemley M ‘Ignoring  Patents’ in Shimanami R The Future of the Patent System (2012) 79. 
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regulatory response, and is delineated by the underlying assumptions set out in 1.5 
above as well as the considerations set out below.  
 
Firstly, inventive activity which leads to patentable inventions occurs across 
industries and at all levels within enterprises. The thesis is concerned with 
establishing a regulatory legal solution that is adaptable to employee-inventions 
generally in South Africa. Consequently, it is not concerned with companies’ internal 
patenting strategies or with industry and sector-specific patenting phenomena.  The 
reasons underlying the choice of a particular patenting strategy are internal 
corporate decisions which may relate to any of a number of issues, including the 
nature of the industry, the size of the company, the ethos of the company, and the 
possibility of more appropriate ways to commercialise intellectual products. Similarly, 
the patent system is not equally, or even necessarily, advantageous for all industries, 
and technological innovation may be more readily associated with industries such as 
biotechnology, electronics, software, and pharmaceuticals.  
 
Secondly, as explained above, the construction of how patents act as individual 
incentives for employers and employees is premised on a number of assumptions 
about the effect of patents at that individual level, and more generally at an 
innovation level. This thesis is not directed towards conducting empirical research 
into these matters; such an exercise is far beyond the scope and goals of this 
contribution.   
 
Thirdly, inventions are only one type of intellectual property generated by employees.  
My focus is on how the allocation of first ownership in the patent for an invention 
made by an employee aligns with the purpose of patents.  It is not within the scope 
of this work to consider other bases which may give rise to remedies relating to 
employee-made inventive activity (which may or may not be patentable) such as 
restraint of trade agreements in terms of which employees may be obliged to refrain 
from interfering with or using an invention, non-disclosure agreements, unlawful 
competition, or unjustified enrichment.  Consequently, for example, the effect of 
common-law confidentiality obligations on employee-ownership of patentable 
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inventions which may arise in the context of unlawful competition, are not 
considered.39 
 
Fourthly, my concern is with patentable inventions which do not attract the provisions 
of the IPPFRD Act, or any other industry or enterprise-specific legislation,40 although 
Chapter 4 does include a necessary discussion of the regulation of publicly-financed 
inventions in South Africa. I carry this focus on the private sector through to the 
analyses of other South African intellectual property rights in Chapter 4, and of 
foreign jurisdictions in Chapter 5.  
 
Fifthly, the discussion is limited to employment relationships characterised by an 
ongoing work relationship between the parties and may be distinguished from the 
self-employed or independent contractor or worker who may also be ‘employed’, in 
the broad sense, to invent. 
 
Finally, modern inventorship is characterised by teamwork and collaboration. In the 
employment context, it is likely that more than one person – including employees 
and third parties – will meet the legal requirements for inventorship in respect of a 
single invention. In such a case, the issue of co-ownership arises. The discussion is, 
however, limited to the single inventor and employer as representative of the 
principles and would apply to multiple parties with the necessary changes. 
 
 
1.7  THE RELEVANCE AND ORIGINALITY OF THIS THESIS 
 
South Africa has embraced the patent system as a tool for economic growth through 
its role in government’s innovation strategy. A substantial portion of investment in 
research which may lead to patentable inventions, is derived from the private sector 
and carried out by employees of private corporations. Yet, as this thesis will show, 
                                                          
39 It is accepted though that while such a disaggregated approach is common, the issues inevitably 
intertwine around the concern with restricting employee mobility. See for example, Hyde A ‘Intellectual 
property justifications for restricting employee mobility: A critical Appraisal in light of the economic 
evidence’ (2010) Rutgers Research Paper Series Paper No 070 1 
40 Such as the Geoscience Act 100 of 1993 (s24). 
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there is no clear regulatory approach to ownership in employee-inventions. The 
question:  ‘Who owns a patentable invention made by an employed inventor in South 
Africa?’ cannot be answered definitively and without considerable qualification. 
 
The reality of the challenges posed by the employee-invention paradigm is evident 
from the number of countries which have introduced deviations from the standard 
paradigm.  South Africa is not immune to the potential shortcomings of relying on a 
regulatory framework which does not take the contributions of both corporate 
investors and employee-inventors into account.  Although there has not been 
significant litigation in this area, the issue of employees and intellectual property 
ownership has not gone unnoticed.41This is most notably evidenced by the interest 
generated in the media by the Makate v Vodacom matter in 2014, and again in 
2015.42 
 
The relevance of this thesis lies in the contribution it makes to the limited South 
African jurisprudence on how ownership in patentable inventions made by 
employees ought to be allocated. It presents an exposition of the patent and labour 
considerations that must play a role in the allocation of first ownership in patentable 
inventions generated in the employment context in South Africa; a detailed analysis 
of the South African position; and recommendations for future legislative 
amendment.  Of particular note is the consideration of labour law as a policy 
consideration to be taken into account when determining whether ownership of 
employee-inventions aligns with the purpose of patents. To date, there is no current 
academic contribution which addresses the issue of ownership in patentable 
employee-inventions in South Africa in a similar way. 
 
As explained, this thesis approaches the research question from the assumption that 
the role of patents is to incentivise inventive activity.  To this end the construction of 
a theoretical framework in Chapter 2, with its specific conceptualisation of the 
                                                          
41 An example is a seminar, ‘Labour Law and Intellectual Property – Should the fruits be shared 
differently?’  hosted by the University of Johannesburg’s Faculty of Law and Centre for International 
and Comparative Labour and Social Security Law (‘CICLASS’) 3 March 2014.  
42 Makate v Vodacom case no 08/20980 1 July 2014; Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 191 
(GSJ). The matter has since gone  to the Constitutional Court. 
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incentive function of the rights to the patent and to attribution, offers an original 
vehicle through which to engage with employee-inventions in the South African 
context.  In addition to the overall contribution, individual chapters – notably 
Chapters 3 and 4 engage with – employee-intellectual property claims in the South 
African system to a degree not previously undertaken in scholarly journals. 
 
 
1.8  METHODOLOGY 
  
The research objectives are met through a desktop, literature-based study. No 
empirical research has been undertaken. There are five aspects to the approach 
adopted to meet the research aims and objectives.  
 
Firstly, a theoretical framework for the analysis was developed.  There is no single 
way in which to approach the issue of ownership in employee-inventions. There is 
also no international guidance and consequently, the framework is developed in light 
of a number of assumptions as to the purpose of the patent system and how to 
construe it as an incentive mechanism. This formed the basis for constructing an 
employee-invention paradigm through which to consider the suitability  of the South 
African approach to regulate patentable employee-inventions. In the absence of an 
international approach and specific and dedicated scholarly writing, it must be borne 
in mind that the literature which informs this section usually reflects a national 
perspective.  
  
Secondly, the South African approach to entitlement to patentable employee.-
inventions is analysed  against the backdrop of the general employee-invention 
paradigm. This entailed an explanation of the national patent and labour contexts, 
followed by an analysis, primarily of reported decisions dealing specifically with 
ownership in employee-made, patentable inventions,  academic opinion, and  patent 
legislation, to understand how first ownership in patentable employee-inventions is 
determined. This analysis provided a basis on which to draw conclusions about its 




Thirdly, in order further to understand the South African regulatory context, an  
analysis of other South African statutory intellectual property rights was undertaken 
along with an examination of the approach to patents adopted in the context of 
publicly-funded research.  
 
Fourthly, a comparative analysis of two foreign jurisdictions – the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the United States of America (USA) was undertaken.  The inevitable 
differences in economic status, historical development of both labour and patent 
laws, and national priorities between these countries and South Africa, require that 
the comparison be circumscribed if it is to be relevant. The examination of these 
jurisdictions is not intended to transplant either of them in toto into South Africa as 
alternatives to the current South African approach.    
 
These countries, like other systems, are examples of the diverse national responses 
to the possible disjuncture in the employee-invention context between the grant of a 
patent to the inventor, and its role as an incentive to encourage further inventive 
activity. The UK introduced specific statutory provisions into its patent law, whereas 
the USA, at federal level, has not.  The purpose here is to examine each system to 
ascertain whether they offer viable models for South Africa. However, the analysis is 
limited to reviewing their regulatory approaches to ownership in patentable 
inventions made in the employment context, and does not purport to be a 
comprehensive review of either system as a whole.  The reason for selecting the UK 
and the USA draws on past relationships and current influence.   
 
The British system was selected because of the historical and continuing influence of 
the system on the development of South African law.  Even though South Africa 
does not follow British law, our patent and employment laws have their roots in 
Britain.  The link between the British and South African patent laws is particularly 
strong because of the way in which early South African patent laws virtually mirrored 
early British legislation.43 The current South African patents legislation, the PA 1978, 
drafted with the PCT in mind, is formulated in much the same terms as the British 
Patents Act (‘BPA 1977’) which, in turn, was drafted in light of the European Patent 
                                                          
43 See further Chapter 3. 
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Convention (‘EPC’).44 As a result of this at times parallel, statutory development, 
there is a long history of South African courts referring to English case law. However, 
close as the historical development has been, the South African system is in no way 
bound by British developments and this has indeed been the view of the courts from 
the earliest South African patent cases.45 Interestingly, in relation to employee-
inventions, the British approach has been to introduce detailed statutory provisions 
to regulate ownership and to make provision for statutory compensation for 
employee-inventors. South Africa has not followed suit. The examination of the 
British system will provide a basis for determining whether a similar statutory system 
would meet our needs, as well as identify shortcomings associated with such a 
statutory model. 
 
The USA was, like South Africa, influenced by British rule and generally follows a 
common-law tradition. The system has, however, developed quite independently of 
the British system. Although the USA has had less direct influence on the 
development of South African patent laws than the British approach, its influence is 
present in both legislative developments and judicial decision-making. An early 
example of the former is the adoption in the South African Patents, Designs, 
Trademarks, and Copyright Act of 1916 (‘PDTCA 1916’) of the meaning of ‘inventor’ 
derived from USA law.46 In addition, it has been noted that the definition of ‘invention’ 
under the SA Patents Act of 1952 was ‘much more akin to that of the United States 
of America and Canada than to that of England’.47More recently, the USA legislation 
on federally-funded intellectual property – specifically the Bayh-Dole Act48 – has 
played an influential role in the development of the South African IPPFRD Act.   
Although there is significant litigation in relation to employee-inventions in the USA, 
the government has refrained from introducing statutory ownership rules at federal 
level. Ownership of employee-inventions is generally left to be resolved by state 
                                                          
44 Van der Merwe A ‘The Law of Patents’ in van der Merwe A (ed) Law of Intellectual Property in 
South Africa (2011) 269. 
45 See further Steyn J ‘Proprietary rights in inventive ideas’ (1953) 70 SALJ 269; Gerntholtz R 
Principles of South African Patent Law (1971) 11. 
46 Act 9 of 1916. 
47 Steyn (n45) 269. 
48 Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, 1980. 
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common law. The approach at federal level is much like the South African approach, 
although, as discussed later, the common-law rules that have developed are very 
different.49  Consequently, the types of common-law developments expose gaps in 
the non-statutory system which have required intervention, and as such, point to the 
possibility of similar gaps in the South African system.   
 
The fifth aspect of the methodological approach is a synthesis of the preceding 
research.  A number of conclusions are drawn from each chapter. From these 
conclusions, recommendations for an amendment to the PA 1978 which will 
introduce a statutory framework for the allocation of ownership of employee-
inventions, are made.  
 
1.9  RESEARCH IN ITS REGULATORY CONTEXT 
 
South Africa’s membership of international intellectual property law and labour 
organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’), World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (‘WIPO’), and the International Labour Organisation (‘ILO’), 
imposes obligations which it is bound to respect in its development of laws in these 
areas. However, there are no specific imperatives relating to ownership of employee-
inventions at international level which need to be considered.  
 
At national level, the South African enabling patent legislation, the PA 1978, does not 
distinguish employee-inventions in its entitlement provisions.  Its only reference to 
employee-inventions relates to limitations on contracts in that context. In contrast, 
the IPPFRD Act, which deals with intellectual property derived from public finance, is 
specifically concerned with the allocation of ownership. However, it does not deal 
separately with the employment context.50  In relation to other intellectual property 
rights – specifically copyright, registered designs, and plant breeders’ rights – the 
respective enabling statutes make provision, in varying degrees, for the 
determination of ownership in the intellectual property between employers and 
employees. While each of these refers to ‘employment’, none of them provides 
                                                          
49 See Chapter 5. 
50 See Chapter 3. 
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guidance as to what it meant by employment and related concepts in the context of 
the specific provision. 
 
None of the statutes regulating general aspects of collective and individual labour 
laws deals with entitlement to intellectual property made by employees in the private 
sector.51 The effect of the common law on the allocation will depend on the terms of 
any contract between the parties, and on whether a rule relating to employee-
inventions can be implied.52 
 
Finally, although there is no specific constitutional imperative relating to employee-
inventions, the development of a regulatory framework must take the constitutional 
context into account.53 The rights relating to labour relations in section 23 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’), and in 
particular section 23(2) which provides for the right to fair labour practices;54 the 
rights to freedom of trade, occupation and profession;55and the right to property,56 
underlie the development of labour and intellectual property laws. Furthermore, in so 
far as it may be necessary to resort to the common law, section 8 of the Constitution 
which provides that when a court applies the Bill of Rights, ‘it must apply, or if 
necessary, develop the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect 
to that right’.57 
 
1.10  LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The research objectives are met through a desktop, literature-based study that relies 
on an array of sources of law, including: South African primary legal sources; 
legislation and case law from the USA and UK; international instruments; secondary 
                                                          
51 See Chapter 3. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Constitution s2, Chapter 2. 
54  Constitution s23(1). 
55 Constitution s22. 
56 Constitution s25.  
57 Constitution s8(3). 
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sources such as journal articles, books, and published theses; and official 
documents and reports. 
 
As regards South African law, there is a dearth of case law on the ownership of 
employee-made intellectual property in general, and very few reported cases dealing 
specifically with ownership of patentable employee-inventions, none of which, it 
appears, provide a clear elucidation of the issue.58 While employees, and more 
specifically ex-employees, do feature in many unlawful competition matters, these 
are predominantly in the area of the validity of restraint of trade agreements and the 
misappropriation of confidential information, neither of which falls within the scope of 
this research.59 
 
There are also few secondary-source contributions on the South African position.  
Those that are available include textbook entries, academic articles, short 
commentaries, and published student theses at LLM level.60 None offers a complete 
treatment of the subject.  The most comprehensive  contribution appears in Timothy 
Burrell’s Burrell’s South African Patent and Design Law which was last updated in 
1999.61  
 
Outside of South Africa, there is a wealth of jurisdiction-specific literature on the 
issue of employee-inventions.  In relation to the UK and the USA – the two foreign 
jurisdictions considered in this thesis – there is substantially more scholarly work on 
the subject than in South Africa.  Among the authors who have directed their 
attention to this topic are Jeremy Phillips, Ann Monotti, Robert Merges, Justine Pila, 
Susanna Wolk, Catherine Fisk, and Mark Lemley.  Recent works such Business 
Innovation and the Law - Perspectives from Intellectual Property, Labour, 
Competition and Corporate Law edited by Pittard, Monotti and Duns;62 and 
Managing the Legal Nexus Between Intellectual Property and Employees edited by 
                                                          
58 See further Chapter 3. 
59 See 1.6 Scope of the Research. 
60 See Chapter 3 for details of the sources specific to South Africa. 
61 Burrell T South African Patent and Design Law (1999) 293-5. 
62 Pittard M, Monotti A & Duns J Business Innovation and the Law - Perspectives from Intellectual 
Property, Labour, Competition and Corporate Law (2013). 
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Oswald and Pagnatarro,63 are testament to the current relevance of the issues raised 
by the intersection of employment and intellectual property. 
 
The international instruments are silent on the issue of employee-inventions, 
although the issue has in the past been raised in fora like the WIPO and the ILO.64 
 
1.11  A NOTE ON DATES 
The research for this thesis ends at 31 December 2015.  
                                                          
63 Oswald J & Pagnatarro L (eds) Managing the Legal Nexus Between Intellectual Property and 
Employee Domestic and Global Contexts (2015). 









2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The question underlying this research is: How ought South Africa to regulate the 
allocation of first ownership in privately-funded patentable inventions between 
employers and employee-inventors so that it aligns with purpose of the patent 
system?1     
 
As explained in Chapter 1, there are myriad ways to engage with the issues raised 
by the ownership of employee-inventions.  This chapter provides the framework for 
conceptualising the research question.  This framework is built on a series of 
assumptions about the purpose of patents, the circumstances surrounding 
inventorship by employees, and the conceptualisation of patents as individual 
incentives.  It is developed in four stages. It starts with the assumptions that this 
thesis makes as to the purpose of the patent system as a driver of innovation and 
the operation of patents as individual incentives to encourage inventive activity.  
 
Stage 2 is a snapshot of how the system is currently constructed. It captures the 
fundamental characteristics of the system as promoted by the Paris Convention and 
the TRIPS Agreement, and focuses on how rights are allocated when inventions are 
made during the subsistence of an employment relationship.    
 
The third stage is a response to the disjuncture between the default allocation in 
favour of the individual inventor, and the prevalence of patent ownership by firms.  
The response takes the form of an ‘employee-invention paradigm’; a reflection of the 
context in which the patent system commonly operates and which arises as a 
                                                          
1 See para 1.3. 
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consequence of the involvement of labour laws in the allocation of patentable 
inventions, the particular characteristics of firm-based inventive activity, and the 
suitability of the archetypal approach to allocation as an incentive mechanism in the 
employment context. 
 
The final stage considers the incentive effect of particular allocation rules in the 
employee-invention context. This is based on assumptions about the incentive effect 
that a particular allocation of rights will have on employers’ and employees’ 
willingness to engage in inventive activity. It is this conceptualisation of the patent 
system as an optimal individual incentive mechanism for employers and employees 
that must inform the conclusions about the fitness of the South African system 
eventually in Chapter 6. 
 
 
2.2  STAGE 1: THE PURPOSE OF PATENTS 
 
2.2.1  Introduction 
 
This thesis operates on the premise that the patent system contributes towards 
economic growth by acting as an incentive mechanism to encourage inventive 
activity which, in turn, is a driver for technological innovation.  While there is nothing 
novel or even incongruous about this interconnection of intellectual property rights, 
economic growth, and innovation, it manifests in complex relationships which form 
the bases for an increasingly labyrinthine body of scholarly research and comment. 
The engagement reveals scepticism as to the association of innovation with 
increased economic growth, and criticism of the assertion that patents stimulate 
innovation.   
 
The latter questions the lack of empirical evidence to support the assertion that 
patents encourage innovation,2 the costs of implementing and maintaining a patent 
                                                          
2 See discussions in Dutfield G & Suthersanen U ‘Innovation and development’ in  Suthersanen U, 
Dutfield G & Boey Chow K Innovation Without Patents (2007) 1; Suthersanen U & Dutfield G  
‘Innovation and the law of intellectual property’ in  Suthersanen, Dutfield & Boey Chow id 16; Boldrin 
M & Levine D ‘The case against patents’ (2013) 1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 3. 
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system, the wastage of simultaneous invention, the anti-commons effect of patents, 
and the creation of patent thickets which potential innovators must negotiate.3 There 
is also the uncertainty as to whether the scope and breadth of patents are correctly 
calibrated for a balanced system,4and whether patents incentivise the creation of 
inventions that would not otherwise have been made.5 This thesis does not attempt 
to resolve these issues, but proceeds on the basis that the system functions to 
encourage inventive activity provided that the allocation of ownership recognises the 
correct person.  
 
2.2.2 Assumptions as to the Relationship between Innovation and the 
Incentive function of Patents 
 
Dutfield and Suthersanem observe that ‘[t]he current conventional wisdom is that the 
world’s most successful nations are those best at producing, acquiring, deploying 
and controlling valuable knowledge’,6 and further that ‘[k]nowledge, especially new 
knowledge unavailable to one’s rivals is key to international competitiveness and 
therefore to national prosperity.  However, clichéd such a view may be, the fact is 
that many policymakers believe it to be true and are acting accordingly’. 7  Goods 
which are knowledge-intensive are generally able to command a higher price in 
international markets.8  As a result of globalisation, the capacity to produce such 
goods has become an international benchmark for economic advancement. This 
association of knowledge-goods with economic growth drives the global narrative 
                                                          
3 See for example Suthersanen (n2) 16; Straus J ‘Is there a global warming of patents?’ (2001) 11 
Journal of World Intellectual Property Law 58; Lerner J ‘The patent system in a time of turmoil’ (2010) 
2(1) WIPO Journal 33-5; Dutfield G & Suthernanen U ‘The innovation dilemma: Intellectual property 
and the historical legacy of cumulative creativity (2004) 4 IPQ 380. 
4 Landes W & Posner R The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (2003) 310-26. 
5 See  Andersen B ‘If “intellectual property rights” is the answer, what is the question? Revisiting the 
patent controversies’ in Andersen B (ed) Intellectual property rights: Innovation, governance and the 
institutional environment (2006) 117-127 for an overview of the literature on the conceptualisation of 
patents as incentives and the criticisms. 
6 Dutfield G & Suthersanen U Global Intellectual Property Law (2008) 7. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Dutfield G & Suthersanen U ‘Innovation and development’ (n2) 6; Andersen (n5) 110 that knowledge 
assets are define the modern economy.  
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that technological progress is necessary for nations’ development goals.9  The result 
is that countries have been drawn into an ecosystem which uses technological 
advancement as an indicator of competitiveness and economic success, with 
developing countries, in particular, under pressure to invest in a knowledge-based 
economy if they wish to advance economically.10 
 
Technological progress, in turn, is commonly associated with innovation. Although 
this association is familiar, the term ‘innovation’ may be used in a number of ways 
and takes its meaning from the purpose to which it is put.  A transposition of one 
definition to a different context without qualification would inevitably promote 
confusion.11 Although this thesis is not concerned with interrogating the expansive 
discourse on theories of innovation, it does demand that assumptions about the 
nature of innovation and its relationship to patents, be made.  
 
The term ‘innovation’ is used generally to refer to the introduction of different and 
new products and practices which advance technology.  More particularly, innovation 
must be understood as a process directed towards the conceptualisation, 
development, and application of the new technology.  As such, it resonates with the 
approaches in international fora and literature which view technological innovation as 
                                                          
9 See Czarnitzki D, Hall B & Oriani R ‘Market valuation of US and European intellectual property’ in 
Bosworth D & Webster E (eds) The Management of Intellectual Property (2006) 111. 
10 See further Ostergard R ‘Economic growth and intellectual property rights protection: A 
reassessment of the conventional wisdom’ in Gervais D Intellectual Property, Trade and Development  
(2007) 158; Gervais D ‘(Re)implementing the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights to foster innovation’ (2009) 12 Journal of World Intellectual Property 359-65; 
Mengistie G ‘The patent system in Africa: its contribution and potential in stimulating innovation, 
technology transfer and fostering science and technology: Part 2’ (2010) 16 International Trade Law & 
Regulation 175; also Grandstrand O ‘Intellectual property rights for governance in and of innovation 
systems’ in Andersen B (ed) Intellectual property rights: Innovation, governance and the institutional 
environment (2006) 325-6 for a brief overview of the ‘track record’ of the patent system in promoting 
national innovation. 
11  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), acknowledges the 
necessity for a definition of innovation precisely to overcome the ‘complexity of the innovation process 
and the variations in the way innovation occurs in firms’. See OECD OSLO Manual Guidelines for 
Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data 3ed (2005) (‘OSLO Manual’) 46; Jensen P & 
Palangkaraya A ‘Innovation scoreboards: An Australian perspective’ in Bosworth & Webster (n9) 159. 
29 
 
a process which can be traced from research and development (‘R&D’), to the 
production and implementation of new products or processes.12    
 
This approach aligns with the OECD’s broad definition adopted in its ‘OSLO Manual’ 
as ‘the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), 
or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business 
practices, workplace organisation or external relations’. 13 The OCED’s approach 
may be narrowed to distinguish between four types of innovation in which firms may 
engage: product, process, organisational, and marketing innovation. The first two 
resonate with this thesis which approaches innovation as technological innovation.14 
Product innovations are described as involving ‘significant changes in the capabilities 
of goods or services. Both entirely new goods and services and significant 
improvements to existing products are included’, while process innovations are those 
which ‘represent significant changes in production and delivery methods’.15  
 
The key element in each of these approaches is that of change brought about by 
newness or difference. The ‘OSLO Manual’ expressly states that the ‘minimum 
requirement for innovation is that the product, process … must be new (or 
significantly improved) to the firm’.16 Since innovation is characterised by change, 
new ideas for the development of novel and different products and methods are 
integral to the innovation process. These ideas may constitute the basis for 
protectable intellectual property, including patentable inventions. The decision to 
apply for patent protection depends on the patent’s usefulness to the particular firm’s 
innovation strategy – for example, providing protection from competitors during the 
commercialisation stage of the invention. The grant of a patent is not of itself 
indicative of a successful innovation, but may be one mechanism in the innovation 
process. 
 
                                                          
12 See, for example, Jensen & Palangkaraya (n11) 61. 
13 OECD (n11) 46. 
14 The second edition of the OSLO Manual (1999) only included product and process innovations and 
regarded them as technological innovations. 
15 OECD (n11) 16. 
16 Id 46. 
30 
 
Although patents do not feature in every innovative process, a consequence of their 
use to protect new ideas in these circumstances is that statistics on patenting are 
regarded as indicative of innovative activity generally.  The most simplistic 
association is that an increase in patenting indicates an increase in innovation.17 This 
use of patent statistics as a proxy for innovation at both national and firm level, has 
many shortcomings.18 For one, patents only capture activity of a particular kind: 
inventive activities which culminate in patentability criteria.19 Nations which are in fact 
innovative, but where patenting is low because of factors like the nature of their 
industries’ or firms’ reluctance to patent, will not fare well  on an innovation index 
linked to the number of patents granted.20Similarly, at firm level a decision not to 
patent may adversely affect a firm’s ranking. There are also deficiencies in the 
information that can be extracted – for example patents do not readily reflect the 
degree of innovative contribution of the invention.21  
 
Unlike other indicators, like R&D expenditure and human capital, patent statistics are 
an accessible source of data.22  Consequently, the use of patent data remains a 
popular tool for ex post facto analyses of firms’ innovative capacity.23 However, the 
                                                          
17 See Sanders A ‘Intellectual property treaties and development’ in Gervais (n10)166.  
18 See, for example, Sanders (n17) 167; Giuri P et al ‘Inventors and invention processes in Europe: 
Results from the Pat Val-EU survey’ (2007) 36 Research Policy 1108; Bernstein S ‘Does going public 
affect innovation?’  (2012) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061441 6. (viewed 30 November 2015). 
19 See Jensen & Palangkaraya  (n11) 159-60, 162. 
20 Id 162. 
21 Ostergard (n10) 147. 
22 Giuri (n18) 1108. 
23 The diversity in the use of patent citation data is reflected in the following examples: Harrison E 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Software Technologies (2008) 140  who uses patent 
records of software-related patents in the USA to ‘portray the structure of ownership of software’ 141; 
Bernstein (n18) who found that there was ‘a significant link between public ownership and innovation: 
going public causes a substantial decline of approximately 40% in innovation novelty as measured by 
patent citations’ but that there was at the same time ‘no change in the scale of innovation, as 
measured by the number of patents’. Miguelez E & Fink C ‘Measuring the international mobility of 
inventors: A new database’ WIPO Economics and Statistics Series 2013 Working Paper No.8, map 
migratory patterns of inventors from information on inventor nationality and residences in PCT 
applications; and Breschi S, Cassi L & Maerba F ‘The exploration of knowledge networks through 
patent citations’ in Andersen B (ed) Intellectual property rights: Innovation, governance and the 
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purpose of the patent system is not ex post facto benchmarking, but rather the ex 
ante role it plays in facilitating innovation. Aggregate measures of innovation are 
used to indicate countries’ positions in the innovation race.  According to Gervais, 
the development of innovative capacity at the country level follows a path where ‘first 
a country imitates foreign technology (the imitation phase, which itself requires some 
technical skills); then it modifies the foreign technology to suit domestic needs and 
markets (the local innovation phase); then it produces innovations (whether new 
products or processes or improvements of existing ones) which are globally 
competitive (the global innovation phase)’.24Various factors will affect a country’s 
progress along this innovation spectrum, one of which is investment in R&D.25 The 
actual R&D takes place at the firm level, the results of which are captured in national 
innovation rankings. 26  
 
Private firms will usually only invest in innovative activities as part of a strategy to 
out-perform market rivals. Where innovation is part of the business model of a 
particular corporation, the cost of directing resources to this end must be offset by 
the return on the investment.  If the risk is too high, firms will not direct resources to 
this end.27 Governments adopt a variety of strategies to encourage private-sector 
investment in innovation, for example tax incentives, prizes,28 and supportive 
regulatory and legal frameworks.29 These may form part of national systems of 
innovation designed to generate, disseminate, and exploit innovation to the benefit of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
institutional environment (2006)  278 explore their role as relational data in semiconductor and 
computer industries. 
24 Gervais D ‘TRIPS and development’ in Gervais (n10) 46. 
25 Id 45-6; 55-6.  
26 Jensen & Palangkaraya  (n11) 159. 
27 Lerner (n3) 29; Dratler J ‘Fixing our Broken Patent System’ (2010) 14 Marquette Intellectual 
Property Law Review 51 
28 See further Jaffe A & Lerner J Innovation and its Discontents (2004) 39. 
29 See further Lerner (n3) 29-31; Grandstrand (n10) 312. 
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the domestic economy.30  The patent system may be regarded as one such strategic 
device directed towards increasing innovation. 31  
 
Patent ownership offers patentees the opportunity to exclude others from exploiting 
the new technology and by so doing gain a competitive advantage over market 
rivals.32 In the absence of such exclusivity, the ease with which others could copy an 
invention negates any competitive benefit and discourages the effort and investment 
to invent anew. As such, the protective shield it offers serves as an incentive for the 
development of fresh inventive activity.33    
 
This thesis asks whether the rules which determine patent ownership support the 
functioning of patent ownership as an ‘incentivisation mechanism’ encouraging the 
generation of new ideas at firm level. My assumption is that if the grant of a patent is 
to serve as an incentive for the production of a patentable invention, the rights 
associated with the patent must be allocated in a way that will encourage more of the 
same type of inventive effort not only by the contributors to the particular invention, 
but also by observers. Therefore, I do not conceptualise the incentive function as the 
reason for patents, but hold rather that the incentive value of a patent lies in its role 
in reducing reluctance by contributors to expend the necessary effort to invent 
further.34 My assumption is that the optimal patent-allocation rule has the least 
discouraging effect on the probability of those whose input is a sine qua non for the 
                                                          
30 Dutfield & Suthersanen (n8) 9. 
31  See, for example, Gervais (n24) 4; Straus (n3) 58; Lerner (n3) 29 Grandstrand (n10) 325. The 
theoretical justifications which support a system of state-granted monopolies are explained in Chapter 
1. 
32 See Davis L ‘Why do small high-tech firms take out patents, and why not?’ in Andersen B (ed) 
Intellectual property rights: Innovation, governance and the institutional environment (2006) 151-154. 
33 Suthersanen (n2) 14.  
34 On the concerns of the inducement effect of patents and the view that incentives must function at 
the individual level as well as the firm level, see further Van Caenegem W ‘Pervasive incentives, 
disparate innovation and intellectual property law in in Arup C & Caenegem W Intellectual Property 
Policy Reform (2009) 250ff and esp 257-262; Dent C ‘An exploration of the principles, precepts and 




invention making a further contribution of the same type. This means that the 
incentive must reach the correct person. 
 
The next step in constructing the theoretical framework is to provide an exposition of 




2.3  STAGE 2: THE CURRENT PATENT PARADIGM  
 
2.3.1  General  
 
This stage provides a snapshot of the current and archetypical approaches to the 
allocation of patent rights. It will be recalled that the conceptualisation of the 
incentive function sees patent rights as incentives for contributors to make the 
necessary effort to develop a patentable invention. The benefits of the patent must 
be directed to the proper person if that person is not to be dissuaded from 
contributing to the process.  The focus now turns to understanding the nature of the 
current system and how benefits associated with the grant of a patent, namely the 
economic and attribution rights are allocated between employers and employees 
engaged in patentable inventive activity. This part of the chapter therefore provides a 
basis for reflection on how the current system aligns with the purpose set out above. 
 
2.3.2 The Nature of the ‘International’ Patent System 
Patents operate territorially. Although an increasingly globalised economy has seen 
multinational corporations emerge as the dominant users of patents,35 there is no 
global patent system which provides for the registration of a worldwide patent. 
Although patent laws vary from country to country, there are fundamental similarities 
across national patent systems which arise as a consequence of a common 
commitment to international regulatory instruments, particularly the Paris Convention 
and the TRIPS Agreement.  It is submitted that the substantive and procedural terms 
of these two instruments are the closest approximation to an ‘international’ patent 
                                                          
35 See further Spinello R & Bottis M A Defense of Intellectual Property Rights (2009) 51. 
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system.36 This international patent system constitutes the archetypal patent 
paradigm which informs the theoretical framework in this chapter. 
 
Although the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement underpin the imperative to 
implement patent protection for inventions, national interests determine patent 
practices at local level and are responsible for the past and continued development 
of these international instruments. 37 Both the Paris Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement arose out of national initiatives ultimately fuelled by corporate economic 
interest in accessing foreign markets. However, while the Paris Convention can 
claim title as the first international intellectual property instrument which dealt with 
patents, the system of patents generally cannot be ascribed to a single historical 
account. Historically, various forms of protection for inventive activity have featured 
in national legal systems,38 for example, the first letters patent can be traced to the 
city of Florence, and the first written patent law to the state of Venice in 1474.39 The 
early Venetian patents were limited monopolies awarded to individuals and were 
used to advance the importation of knowledge as a way of advancing the 
competitiveness of specific geographical entities in the international market. 40 
 
For countries with a common-law legal tradition, the development of patent laws is 
influenced by the British patent laws.41  It was the practice of the Crown in the Middle 
Ages to grant letters of protection to those who imported new industries into 
                                                          
36 There are other international instruments which serve to facilitate more efficient ways to apply for 
patents in  multiple jurisdictions – for example the PCT -  however these are arguably limited in 
informing the substantive content.  
37 See Yu P ‘Political privilege, legal right, or public policy tool? A history of the patent system’ (2009) 
ATRIP 38. 
38 Spinello & Bottis (n35) 15; Sherman B ‘Towards a history of patent law’ in Takenaka T (ed) 
Intellectual Property in Common Law and Civil Law  (2013) 14. 
39 See Dutfield & Suthersanen (n6)106. 
40 See further Neppel C et al ‘The future of IP in Europe’ in Shimanami R The Future of the Patent 
System (2012) 97; for more on the historical development of the patent system in Venice, see Yu 
(n37)  8-16; Grandstrand (n10) 313-4. 
41 For more on the historical development of the British patent system, and in particular how historical 
accounts have shaped the system, see Sherman (n38) 6-15. 
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England,42 who were in specific trades, and who had actually invented something.43 
The purpose, at least initially, was to enhance local technological capacity by 
attracting those who were able to introduce new technologies to England.44 These 
were acceptable monopolies because, as explained by Suthersanen,  
‘the prevailing mercantilist ethos of the time accepted the principle that a system of 
exclusive privileges would nurture innovative activity which would, in turn, promote 
the economic well-being of the country.  The mercantilist regarded the state as the 
appropriate instrument for promoting the well-being of his country; in his view the 
country was regarded as a unit of national interests, irrespective of the interests of 
individuals’. 45 
 
However, the tendency of granting these privileges to Crown favourites resulted in 
litigation over letters patent issued for playing-cards to a non-inventor. The result of 
Darcy v Allein46was the introduction of the Statute of Monopolies by the English 
parliament to prohibit Crown monopolies in commodities. 47  However, certain rights 
were reserved for inventors by allowing for letters patent for new inventions to be 
granted to the first-and-true inventor for a period of fourteen years. The justification 
for the retention of letters patent in these narrower circumstances came to be 
accepted on the basis that they were appropriate rewards.48 Interestingly, the 
                                                          
42 For example John Kempe of Flanders was granted letters of protection to introduce the techniques 
of cloth weaving in 1331. For more on the development at this stage see Pila (n47) 210. 
43 Examples include letters patent for methods of draining water (1562), methods of making ovens 
(1563), and glassmaking (1567). See further Spinello & Bottis (n35) 35. 
44 Spinello & Bottis (n35) 35. 
45 Suthersanen (n2) 13. 
46 Edward Darcy Esquire v Thomas Allin of London Haberdasher (1599) 74 ER 1131, (1602) 77 Eng 
Rep 1260 and (1599) Nov 173. 
47 Statute of Monopolies 1623, 1623 Ch 3 21 Ja 1. See further Pila J: ‘The common law invention in 
its original form’ (2001) 3 IPQ 209 219-22. According to Sherman, the attribution of the start of the 
patent system to the Statute of Monopolies is a consequence of ‘the official history being written for 
the first time’ when ‘for the most part the official history of intellectual property law that emerged in the 
second half of the nineteenth century was written evangelically; that is, it presumed that particular 
areas of law could be traced back to a single moment or event’ Sherman B & Bently L The Making of 
Modern Intellectual Property Law: The British Experience, 1860-1911 (1999) 206-7. See Gubby H 
Developing a Legal Paradigm for Patents (2012) 87-88. 
48 Suthersanen (n2) 13-14.  
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interpretation of the term ‘first and true inventor’ was not confined to the person who 
have exercised his or her inventive faculties but sustained an interpretation which 
included the importer of the technology.49 The British patent laws are thus commonly 
traced to the 1624 Statute of Monopolies although the statute is more appropriately 
an anti-monopoly intervention, not a system of invention protection.50 
 
Although many countries had adopted domestic forms of protection for inventions, 
there was little harmonisation of approach or underlying philosophy until the rise of 
the industrial revolution. Development of the system in civilian jurisdictions, for 
example, was more readily justified on the basis that entitlement to patents for 
inventions was the natural right of inventors, as opposed to the more industry-
centred British common-law approach. 51 
 
By the mid-nineteenth century a more consequentialist way of thinking about patents 
can be discerned,52with a shift from more metaphysical questions to those focussed 
on the role of the patent system in industrial development.  Van Caenegem’s 
description of this mood bears repetition in full. He writes that the  
industrial revolution progressively provided both the goods that the masses had 
come to aspire to acquire, the means (in income in salaries and wages) to acquire 
them, and the necessary institutions to organise their acquisitions, thus creating 
something of a self-perpetuating engine of growth … It is not surprising that 
alongside innovations in administration, a notion of intellectual property arose and 
gained credence at  such a time as an organisational instrument in a new market 
dependent on novelty, progress and constant change.  It reflected both the new 
attitude to property, the notion of a reward of property rights for those who achieved 
more with less (for that is what successful new technologies must do, increase the 
productivity of labour and real inputs), and also an increasing belief in the unique 
contribution of the individual.  It matched the crucial progressive notion that 
technological change or innovation would result in increased individual welfare.53 
 
                                                          
49 See Gubby Gubby (n47) 101-5. 
50 See further Dutield & Suthersanen (n6) 106; Gubby (n47) 2-3 
51 See further Spinello & Bottis (n35) 36; Bainbridge D Intellectual Property 9ed (2012) 18. 
52 Sherman (n38) 14. 
53 Van Caenegem W ‘Intellectual property and the idea of progress’ (2003) 3 IPQ 243. 
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Although the British the patent system had come under severe criticism for its 
inefficiency – even with a call for its abolition in mid-Victorian times – as Coulter  
explains, it was settled by this stage that ‘patent protection, although nominally still a 
privilege granted by royal grace and favor, was the right of every inventor who could 
afford to secure it’.54  
 
The rise in industrialisation resulted in an increase in cross-border exchanges of 
information and goods, with governments under pressure to find ways to secure 
protection for their nationals’ inventions in foreign countries.  This was one of the 
principal reasons for convening the Paris Convention. This Convention – currently 
administered by WIPO – was signed by eleven contracting states at a Diplomatic 
Conference in 1883, and was ratified in 1884.55  It has since been revised several 
times, with the most recent formulation being the Stockholm version of 1967 as 
amended in 1979.56 The number of parties has grown to 176. 
 
The Paris Convention recognises patents as one of a number of mechanisms to 
protect industrial property.57 The most far-reaching provisions are general provisions 
relating to the principle of national treatment58 and rights of priority,59with the more 
patent-specific ones relating to compulsory licensing,60 importation,61and the 
independence of patents.62 Because the Paris Convention is not prescriptive as to 
implementation of the patent system, and in so far as it does prescribe rules, 
                                                          
54 Coulter M Property in Ideas: the Patent Question in mid-Victorian Britain  (1991) 167. 
55 See further Bodenhausen G Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (1969) 9. See further Gubby (n47) 238-43. 
56 The Treaty was revised at Brussels, Belgium, on 14 December 1900, at Washington, United States, 
on 2 June 1911, at The Hague, Netherlands, on 6 November 1925, at London, United Kingdom, on 2 
June 1934, at Lisbon, Portugal, on 31 October 1958, and at Stockholm, Sweden, on 14 July 1967, 
and was amended on 28 September 1979. See further http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/ (Date 
of use 30 November 2015.) 
57 Paris art 1(2). 
58Id art 2. 
59 Id art 4. 
60 Id art 5A. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Id art 4bis. 
38 
 
Bodenhausen advises in the ‘Guide to the Convention’ published under the auspices 
of the WIPO, that ‘their scope is limited and they leave considerable freedom to the 
member States to legislate on questions of industrial property according to their 
interests and preferences’.63 Thus decisions as to patentability criteria, examination 
requirements, whether patents should be granted for both products and processes, 
and indeed who should be entitled to the patent, are left to states to decide.64 
Interestingly, while the economic aspects are devoid of detail, the right of the 
inventor to be named is unequivocal.  Article 4ter, introduced in 1934, provides that 
‘[t]he inventor shall have the right to be mentioned as such’.65 This is the sole 
reference to this entitlement.66  
 
After the Paris Convention various instruments were introduced primarily to facilitate 
multi-jurisdiction patent filing. These include the PCT,67 the Patent Law Treaty,68the 
Budapest Treaty,69 and the Strasbourg Treaty.70Just over one hundred years after 
                                                          
63 Bodenhausen (n55)15.  However, see Kingston W ‘Why patents need reform, and some 
suggestions for it’ in Arup C & Caenegem W Intellectual Property Policy Reform (2009) 14-5  for how 
the US patentability criteria developed into the general standard and ‘recruitment’ strategy of the 
Secretariat of the Paris Convention to bring developing countries into the fold. This included the 
development of model laws aims at developing countries.  
64 Id 5.  
65 Article 4ter. See Cornwell S ‘Employee rights in innovative works’ (1980) 119 International Labour 
Review 309; Dutfield G ‘Collective invention and patent law individualism, 1877-2012 – or, the curious 
persistence of the inventor’s moral right’ in Araposthathis S & Dutfield G Knowledge Management and 
Intellectual Property (2013) 115 for the history to this inclusion. 
66 It appears akin to the moral right of attribution which the Berne Convention (art 6bis) recognises in 
respect of authors of copyright works.  
67For details of the operation of the PCT, see www.wipo.int/pct/en/ (Date of use 30 November 2015.) 
68 Patent Law Treaty of 2000. See further www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/plt/ (Date of use 30 November 
2015.) 
69 Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the 
Purposes of Patent Procedure of 1977 and amended 1980. See further details at 
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/budapest/ (Date of use 30 November 2015.) 
70 Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification of 1971 and amended 




the ratification of the Paris Convention, intellectual property rights were indelibly 
linked to the global economic landscape by the TRIPS Agreement.   
 
The TRIPS Agreement emerged in the late 1980s in the context of the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, in part as a response to the perceived failure of the existing international 
instruments – specifically the Paris and Berne Conventions – to ensure enforceable 
intellectual property protection.71 The TRIPS Agreement does not offer a completely 
novel understanding of intellectual property rights, but incorporates and adds to the 
substantive provisions of the earlier instruments.72 Although member states have a 
measure of flexibility in how they implement the provisions, 73 the effect of the 
Agreement is to impose a minimum threshold on the levels of protection that WTO 
members are obliged to implement. This, combined with its enforcement through the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, contributes to its being the dominant driver of 
intellectual property policy currently. Even so, it has been and continues to be 
vociferously criticised for a range of perceived failings ranging from the fairness of its 
negotiating history74to its harsh effect on developing countries, 75and to its 
(un)suitability for new modes of innovation. 
 
In relation to patents, the TRIPS Agreement incorporates the substantive articles of 
the Paris Convention and provides additional directions to members, most of which 
expand on the nature and scope of protection for inventions.76 Unlike the Paris 
                                                          
71 On the historical development of TRIPS see UNCTAD-ICTSD Resource Book on TRIPS and 
Development (2005) 1-16. 
72 TRIPS arts 2(1), 9(1). 
73 Id art1. 
74 See, for example, Yu P ‘TRIPS and its discontents’ (2005) 10 Marquette Intellectual Property Law 
Review 369 who discusses four narratives: the bargain narrative, coercion narrative, ignorance 
narrative, and self-interest; Gervais 2007 (n24) 5-12; Drahos P & Braithwaite J Information Feudalism: 
Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (2002) 109-48. 
75 See Sanders (n17) 163; Chon M ‘Substantive equality in international intellectual property norm 
setting and interpretation’ in Gervais 2007 (n10) 476ff; Dutfield & Suthersanen (n6) 6-12; Gervais 
(n10) 348-350. 
76 TRIPS art2(1) provides that: ‘Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of 
the Paris Convention (1967)’. 
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Convention, the TRIPS Agreement specifically sets criteria for patentability. 
Inventions must be ‘new, involve an inventive step and [be]…capable of industrial 
application’.77 However, any narrowing of the pool of inventions which may result 
from the set criteria, must be considered against the widening of the pool by the 
prohibition on excluding broad types of subject matter.  The TRIPS Agreement 
demands that ‘patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology’,78 but does allow countries a measure of 
discretion to exclude certain subject matter from patentability.79   
 
The TRIPS Agreement delineates the scope of the exclusivity which a patent affords 
the patentee. 80A patented product may not be made, used, offered for sale, sold, or 
imported for such purposes without authorisation.81 The patentee of a patented 
process not only has the exclusive right to prevent unauthorised third-party use of 
the process, but may also prevent the acts of using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing for such purposes, products obtained directly from that patented process.82 
A patent may be assigned or licensed,83 and endures for a period of at least twenty 
years from the date of filing for the patent.84  
 
The quid pro quo for this monopoly is found in the disclosure requirements 
necessary for the grant of the patent.  The applicant for the patent must ‘disclose the 
invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried 
out by a person skilled in the art’.85 Article 29 provides further that it ‘may’ also be 
required that the applicant ‘indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention 
known to the inventor’ at the filing date or priority date of the application. 
 
                                                          
77 Article 27(1). See UNCTAD-ICTSD n(71) 351-3, 358-361 on these requirements. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Article 27(3)(a), (b); (2). 
80 The patent rights may be limited by the introduction of exceptions and limitations, see TRIPS art 30 
and Paris Convention art 5. 
81 TRIPS art 28(2)(a).  
82 Id art 28(1)(b). 
83 Id art 28(2). See also Bainbridge (n51) 363 on the scope of the patentee’s rights. 
84 TRIPS art 33. 
85 Id art 29(1).   
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The inventor’s right to be mentioned is one of the provisions of the Paris Convention 
which has been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. However, the Agreement 
does not elaborate any further on the nature and scope of this right.86   
 
2.3.3 Allocation of Patent Rights 
 
2.3.3.1 Ownership and attribution 
 
The benefits which arise as a consequence of a patent are twofold: economic and 
personal. Entitlement to these benefits depends on how ownership and attribution, 
respectively, are vested.87 
 
In so far as the patent or economic rights are concerned, neither the Paris 
Convention nor the TRIPS Agreement prescribes a first-ownership rule. 
Counterintuitive as it is, ownership is not expressly allocated to the inventor, even 
though inventorship has tended to be associated with ownership.88The Paris 
Convention’s only reference to a potential legal subject is to ‘[a]ny person who had 
duly filed an application for a patent’89 (italics added) in the context of the provisions 
relating to the  right of priority.90 According to Bodenhausen, ownership in patents is 
one of the issues to be decided at national level.91 The TRIPS Agreement simply 
                                                          
86 Interestingly, the TRIPS Agreement expressly excludes art 6bis of the Berne Convention which 
provides an attribution right for the author, from the provisions it incorporates from that Convention. 
87 See Fromer J ‘Expressive incentives in intellectual property’ (2012) 98 Virginia Law Review 1745 
for the argument that even in utilitarian-based theories, it is possible for personal rights like moral 
rights in copyright and attribution in patent law, to be conceptualised as incentives. 
88 See Takenaka T & Reboul Y ‘Employee invention system: Comparative law perspective’ in 
Takenaka (n38) 366. The WIPO Model Laws for Developing Countries on Inventions of 1965 and 
1979 both suggest that countries adopt a rule that vests default ownership in the inventor. See BIRPI 
(WIPO) Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions 1965 Geneva (‘WIPO Model Law 1965’) 
and; WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions 1979 Vol 1 ‘Patents’ Geneva (‘WIPO 
Model Law 1979’); also WIPO Draft Model Provisions on Patentability, the Right to the Patent, the 
Rights under the Patent, Duration, and Compulsory Licences 24 February 1975. 
89 Paris art 4. 
90 This is the only occasion on which reference is made to a particular person. 
91 Bodenhausen (n55).  
42 
 
states that ‘[a] patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights’ (italics 
added)92and provides further that ‘[p]atent owners shall also have the right to assign, 
or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts’ (italics 
added).93 Reference is also made to the ‘applicant for a patent (italics added)’ in 
article 29 which imposes disclosure requirements. The provision states that it is a 
requirement ‘that an applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled 
in the art and may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the 
invention known to the inventor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the 
priority date of the application (italics added)’.94 Article 4I refers to applicants for 
inventor’s certificates.  
 
Consequently, despite the references to possible legal subjects in the guise of 
‘applicant’, ‘owner’, and ‘inventor’, there is no explicit linking of any specific person to 
default ownership of the patent.  There are no definitions or criteria for status as an 
applicant, inventor or owner, nor are these categories expressly limited to juristic or 
natural persons. It is submitted that this failure to identify the first owner, indicates 
that the ownership is not linked to a particular person but rather to a desired 
outcome, namely the creation of an invention which meets patentability criteria. In 
other words, the fact that a particular contribution has been made does not of itself 
associate the contributor with ownership, rather it is the existence of the final product 
which is incentivised. As indicated above, this absence of guidance means that 
national laws determine first ownership. However, even in the absence of an express 
first-ownership allocation, the international instruments appear to endorse the 
inventor as the proper default first owner.95 
 
Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that in addition to the mandatory 
disclosure requirements by the ‘applicant’, member states may also ‘require the 
applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the 
                                                          
92 TRIPS art 28(1)(a). 
93 Id art 28(2). 
94 Id art 29(1). 
95 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n71) 353 for the view that a patent ‘confers an exclusive right granted by the 
state to an inventor’.  
43 
 
inventor’.96 Since the inventor is expressly recognised as the person with the 
knowledge of the best mode, it is implicit in article 29 that the applicant can only 
present an invention which was derived from the ‘inventor’. In the absence of the 
inventor disclosing the best mode to another person so allowing that person to apply, 
only the inventor would be able successfully to meet this requirement imposed on 
the applicant. Therefore, if the international system is interpreted on the basis of the 
incentive function, then in the absence of any other contributor it is the inventor’s 
contribution which the system acknowledges.97 
 
The second aspect of the incentive mechanism inherent in the grant of a patent is 
that of attribution or, more specifically, the right to be mentioned as the inventor.98 It 
is clear that this entitlement vests in the inventor with inventorship as the basis on 
which allocation takes place. The incentive effect differs from that of the patent as 
the right to be mentioned does not attract exclusive economic rights – its value lies in 
the association with the invention. However, as Fromer suggests although the value 
of attribution is most readily found in personhood theory, it is possible to 
conceptualise ‘expressive incentives’ within the utilitarian framework. 99  The value of 
attribution as an incentive for the inventor lies in the reward it offers; for example the 
enhanced reputation of the inventor, which in turn could translate into increased 
employee-mobility and financial benefits.100   
 
Given the pivotal role played by the inventor in the allocation of ownership and the 
attribution right, it is essential to the incentive objective that we establish the nature 
of inventorship.  
                                                          
96 Ibid. 
97 See (n88) above. 
98 See Fromer (n87) 1776 that ‘an optimized intellectual property system would likely contain some 
mix of pecuniary and expressive incentives’. See Dutfield (n65) questioning why this right ‘persists’.   
99 Fromer (n87) 1775-6. According to her, the personhood theory manifests in notions of self-
expression, the belief that inventors are ‘creative geniuses’ who are also guided by functional 
considerations, the prestigious reputation associated with the invention, and the labour which has 
done into the invention’. 
100 See further Fromer (n87) 1790. See also Fisk C ‘Credit where it’s due: The law and norms of 




2.3.3.2 The nature of inventorship  
 
Neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the Paris Convention defines ‘inventor’ or clearly 
explains what inventorship entails. Where only one person is associated with all 
aspects of the generation of the invention, the identification of the inventor for the 
purposes of patent ownership and attribution is unproblematic – that person would 
be the inventor. It would be difficult to argue for recognition without some contribution 
to the invention.  
 
However, where more than one person is involved, which is inevitably the case in the 
corporate innovation environment, each contributor is a potential contender for the 
title of ‘inventor’. In order to ensure that ownership and attribution reach the 
‘inventor’, it must be possible to distinguish between inventors and non-inventor 
contributors. Each person who claims inventorship (or co-inventorship), must have 
made the required input or contribution for him or her to derive the benefits reserved 
for inventors under patent law.  It is submitted that this entails two considerations: 
knowing what must have been made; and the nature of the contribution which must 
have been made. 
 
The first consideration can be rephrased as: ‘What is the invention?’. It is submitted 
that the subject matter for which the patent will be granted must be an expression of 
what the system expects in exchange for the patent. The patent system only 
recognises certain types of technological advancement – specifically contrivances 
which meet certain requirements, the most relevant of which are newness and 
inventiveness. Newness, or novelty, is determined with reference to the state of the 
art at the time when the inventor stakes his or her claim to the invention. It is an 
objective assessment measured against what existed before the invention was 
made.    Inventiveness is a less straightforward determination.101 It is generally 
established by reference to whether a person skilled in the art would find the idea 
obvious.  In this case it is tested against the notional person skilled in the art when 
the application is made and requires a value judgement. In both cases, it is the final 
                                                          




intellectual embodiment of the underlying mental ingenuity which is tested for 
newness and inventiveness.   
 
The approach to applying this test will determine the boundaries of the invention, and 
so also of the monopoly it grants.  The complexity this raises is clear when one 
considers the question in two contexts: entitlement; and infringement proceedings.  If 
the approach differs, that which constitutes the invention in an entitlement dispute 
will not necessarily coincide with the invention in an infringement matter, even 
though both enquiries involve a single contrivance.  
 
Therefore, while the claims of the patent may be used to show the subject matter of 
the invention for the purposes of entitlement, this is not necessarily the case for 
infringement.  In order to determine the scope of the patent monopoly in the latter 
context, the enquiry is not necessarily limited to the claims as they stand102 but may 
use various levels of abstraction to determine whether the alleged infringer’s actions 
fall within the scope of patent.103 This translates into a broader delineation of what 
constitutes the invention.  Even within the entitlement enquiry there are variations, 
for example, whether the specifications ought to be considered along with the claims. 
A pure claims approach will narrow the basis of inventorship.104 
  
The second aspect of the inventorship enquiry involves the nature of the contribution 
to the invention claimed. This requires knowing what sort of effort will culminate in 
the invention.  The actual process which leads to the invention depends on a host of 
context-specific factors, for example, the nature of the enterprise and the institutional 
environment. However, the process will inevitably require two types of input: 
                                                          
102 The doctrine of equivalents is one manifestation of this. See Fellmeth A ‘Conception and 
misconception in joint inventorship’ (2012) 2 NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment 
Law 126-8; Chiang T ‘The levels of abstraction problem in patent law’ (2011) 105 Northwestern 
University Law Review 1097  for an analysis of how not considering the levels of abstraction affect 
patent scope (and thus also the appropriateness of the  quid pro quo inherent in a patent award); also 
generally on inventorship disputes Abdussalam M ‘Identifying “the invention” in inventorship disputes’ 
(2014) 11 Scripted 43-4. 
103 Chiang (n102) 1097-98. 
104 See further Abdussalam (n102) 44-64. 
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resource and intellectual contribution.  The resource contribution manifests in human 
resources, materials, facilities, and equipment. There is a financial cost associated 
with securing each component and this contribution is only available through 
financial investment.  The intellectual contribution is not similarly quantifiable. It 
refers to the intangible mental effort required for the emergence of an idea and 
generally depends on individual human intellectual engagement. 
 
The resource and intellectual contributions may, but need not, be made by a single 
contributor. Where they are, inventorship resides in that single contributor simply 
because there is no-one else to vie for the title of inventor. However, where the 
components derive from multiple contributors and are of different types, every 
contributor may also be an inventor.  Whether or not the system recognises the 
contribution depends on the interpretation of ‘inventor’. 105 This, it is submitted, is 
limited to the intellectual contribution as captured in the inventiveness and novelty 
criteria that qualify the invention as patent-worthy.106 This is also implicit in the 
association of the inventor with the best-mode-of-delivery disclosure which demands 
an intimate knowledge of the working of the invention.107  Furthermore, the 
international instruments make no reference to resource components or investment, 
directly or indirectly.108  
 
On this basis, a failure to contribute to the intellectual ‘patent-worthy’ concept 
renders a contributor a non-inventor, regardless of the significance of his or her 
contribution. It also means that if more than one person contributes the intellectual 
input, each is an inventor and entitled to the concomitant rights.  This in turn raises 
further complexities, for example how to determine co-inventorship and its effect on 
co-ownership.109 As I do not explore co-inventorship in this thesis, it is assumed that 
any rights flowing from inventorship apply equally to multiple inventors.110 
                                                          
105 See Dratler (n27) 53. 
106 See Greive E ‘The doctrine of inventorship: Its ramifications in patent law’ (1965-66) 17 Western 
Reserve Law Review 1344. 
107 TRIPS art 29(1). 
108 See Dratler (n27) 51. 
109 See Monotti A & Ricketson S Universities and Intellectual Property Ownership and Exploitation 
(2003) 143; McManus J Intellectual Property: From creation to commercialisation. A practical guide 
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Where a corporate seeks title to the invention, the question arises as to whether 
inventorship can inhere in a juristic person. There is no indication that the 
international instruments exclude juristic persons from being inventors. However, the 
legislative history indicates that article 4ter of the Paris Convention was a response 
to the concern that individual inventors were being de-linked from their inventions in 
the patent process which was increasingly firm-centred,111in other words, the 
‘corporatisation’ of the system. Dutfield notes that its inclusion was the outcome of 
‘an extensive discussion held by a conference subcommittee not only on a proposed 
moral right equivalent to the right of attribution in copyright law, but also on employee 
inventions and a possible right of remuneration.  Indeed, the moral rights of inventors 
was hardly the most ambitious proposal’.112  
Therefore, historically at least, the individual making the invention was the central 
concern. 
 
While natural persons may undoubtedly qualify as inventors through the association 
of inventorship with intellectual contribution, it is not that clear that juristic persons 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
for innovators and researchers (2012) 124; University of Southampton Applications [2005] RPC 11 
par [220]. For more on the effects of co-ownership of patents arising out of joint inventorship, in 
particular the approach in the US, see Merges R & Locke ‘Co-ownership of patents: A comparative 
and economic view’  (1990) 72 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 586. The complexity 
is captured in the oft-quoted comment by Judge Newcomer in Mueller Brass Co v Reading Industries 
that co-inventorship ‘is one of the muddiest concepts in the muddy metaphysics of patent law.  One 
the one hand, it is reasonably clear that a person who has merely followed the instructions of another 
in performing experiments is not a co-inventor of the object to which those experiments are directed.  
To claim inventorship is to claim at least some role in the final conception of that which is sought to be 
patented.  Perhaps one need not be able to point to a specific component as one’s sole idea, but one 
must be able to say that without his contribution to the final conception, it would have been less – less 
efficient, less simple, less economical, less something of benefit’ (352 F Supp 1357, 1372 (ED Pa 
1972).  
110 See, for example, the differences in co-ownership in the British and US approaches. 
111 Heath states that ‘there is no doubt that the Paris Convention was meant to strengthen the rights of 
inventors, the text of Article 4 only mentions the inventor’s right to be named as such’, Heath C 
‘Harmonizing scope and allocation of patent rights in Europe – Towards as new European patent law’ 
(2002) Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 26. 
112 Dutfield G ‘Collective invention and patent law individualism: Origins and functions of the inventor’s 




could not also claim title, albeit through the ‘agency’ of individuals. However, it is 
submitted that the conventional approach favours the exclusion of juristic persons. 
 
2.3.3.3 The effect of employment on ownership, attribution and 
inventorship 
  
The ‘international’ patent system does not regard the context in which an invention is 
made as significant in the allocation of rights. Regardless of the circumstances under 
which the invention was made, the individual (natural person) inventor is the default 
owner. This approach also applies when inventions have been made by contributors 
who are in an employment relationship at the time. Consequently, entitlement to 
ownership and attribution between employers and employees depend on whether 
the claimants meet the definition of inventor under the patent regime.  
 
As between the employer and employee, the only contribution which the former, as a 
juristic person, can make is a resource contribution. The intellectual contribution 
which defines inventorship emanates from the individual employee. The obvious 
consequence is that under the archetypal approach, ‘inventor’ status, and as a result 
also default ownership, are ascribed only to the employee. The employee is 
therefore recognised as the person whose contribution must be incentivised through 
the grant of the patent. This places employees in the position of patent owner which 
enable them to commercialise the invention through licensing or assignment. Under 
patent law the employer can claim title only if the employee transfers his or her rights 
in the patent as permitted under the patent system.  
 
Nonetheless, there is no obligation on the employee-inventor to divest him- or herself 
of entitlement in favour of the employer simply on the basis of an employment 
relationship. The employee may, however, choose to transfer the invention in 
response to obligations arising outside of the patent domain. The legal 
consequences will here depend on the basis for the transfer, and in the employment 
context, will at least involve labour law considerations. Consequently, labour law 
policies, along with considerations from areas like contract, will come into play where 




The benefit of attribution or the right to be mentioned as the inventor, would likely 
even in the case of an assignment of the patents to the employer, remain with the 
employee. It inheres in the inventor and there is no provision for it to be transferred. 
 
The agreement to transfer the rights to the patent for the invention from the 
employee-inventor to the employer may occur under various circumstances, which in 
turn will determine the regulatory implications. One way of considering the range of 
circumstances is to divide such agreements to transfer rights to the patent into those 
arising before the invention was made, and those concluded after the creation of the 
invention. 
 
In the first situation, namely the transfer of future inventions, at least three scenarios 
arise. The first is where the parties have yet to establish an employment relationship 
but agree to the transfer of the invention when it arises. The second is where the 
parties include the obligation to transfer future inventions in the conditions of 
employment. The third situation is where the parties are in an employment 
relationship the terms and conditions of which have been agreed upon, and they 
subsequently enter into an agreement whereby the employee agrees to assign future 
inventions. These agreements may broadly be referred to as ‘preinvention’ 
agreements or assignments. 
 
In the second situation – agreement to transfer rights after the invention has been 
made – three analogous scenarios arise: the first pre-dates an employment 
relationship and the inventor assigns the invention to his or her future employer; in 
the second the invention exists prior to the employment relationship and the transfer 
of its ownership is included as a condition in the employment contract; and the third 
is where the employee makes an invention during the subsistence of the 
employment relationship and thereafter enters into an agreement to transfer 
ownership to the employer. 
 
While patent law does not distinguish assignment in the above situations from the 
ordinary course, the employment relationship attracts labour law considerations 
which may place limits on freedom of the parties to enter into such transactions. 
Such limitations arise as a consequence of the policy considerations underlying 
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labour law. Where such constraints are informed by policies which do not align with 
patent policy, there is the risk of an allocation model which does not further the  
purpose of the patent system. The issue then becomes one of trying to balance 
policies from different perspectives in a way that takes into account these realities. 
 
The next section explores the effect of employment on the inventorship context. 
 
 
2.4 STAGE 3: THE EMPLOYEE-INVENTION PARADIGM 
 
2.4.1  Introduction 
 
The patent system is geared towards directing both ownership and attribution to 
individual inventors.  This notwithstanding, patent ownership is dominated by firms 
who are not recognised by default.  This real disjuncture between inventorship and 
ownership, and to a lesser degree also attribution, is symptomatic of the failure of the 
current system to allocate rights in line with the contemporary context in which 
patentable inventions arise. It is therefore necessary to redefine the inventorship 
context in a way that reflects the dominant presence of corporate patentees and the 
labour law policy considerations which are implicated as a consequence of the 
employment relationship between the inventor and the firm. 
 
To this end, what follows is an exposition on how firms have become patent owners 
in a system built on individualism, and how labour law is pulled into the determination 
of patent ownership. An analysis of the extent to which the current patent system 
operates as an incentive mechanism in the context of corporate inventive activity is 
then undertaken.  In order to establish a theoretical context for this analysis, I make 
a number of assumptions regarding the characteristics of corporate inventive activity. 
These assumptions underlie my re-conceptualisation of the incentive function of 
patents which I present at the close of this chapter and which I later use as the basis 
for making conclusions and recommendations for an optimal allocation for South 




2.4.2  From Employee-inventors to Employer-owners: The Implication of 
Labour law 
As explained earlier, protection for inventions through patents or analogous systems 
was a feature of many national systems even before the emergence of international 
instruments promoting the use of patents. 113 Early technological development 
allowed the association of particular individuals with both the intellectual contribution 
behind the invention, and its development into a useful product or process. Gubby 
for example, talks of the ‘businessmen inventors’ as opposed to the amateur and 
professional inventors as ‘artisans, manufacturers, millwrights or machine-makers 
interested mainly in patents which related to their own branch of business’ and who 
‘might devise an invention themselves or purchase an invention relevant to their 
business’ as dominating the patent landscape from the mid-1700s.114   
 
By the time the Paris Convention came into effect in the mid-1880s, the process of 
industrialisation had been underway in Britain for at least 100 years and had spread 
abroad.  Industrialisation introduced changes into the way in which inventions were 
developed.  Advances in technology and the rise of companies around technological 
developments meant that inventive activity became increasingly complex and 
expensive, and consequently more corporate.115 To be competitive, firms had to 
improve productivity by operating more innovatively. Some companies devoted 
substantial resources to industrial research,116 thereby transforming into ‘knowledge-
creating’ companies.117 The model for these innovative corporations is commonly 
ascribed to Thomas Edison’s Menlo Park laboratory built in 1876. It was ‘staffed by 
scientists and tradesmen to work on a multitude of projects’ so that ‘[f]ar from being 
                                                          
113 For example, the first US Patent Act 1790; the British Statute of Monopolies; and subsequent 
British legislation such as the Patent Acts of 1835 and 1952. 
114 Gubby (n47) 246. 
115 Fisk C Working Knowledge Employee Innovation and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property 
1800-1930 (2009) 240. Also, Gubby (n47) 246; Simmons J ‘Inventions made for hire’ (2012) 2 NYU 
Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment law 34. See also Lamoreaux N & Sokoloff K ‘The 
decline of the independent inventor’ in Scott K & Troy P Perspectives on Commercializing Innovation 
(2012) on this trend in the US. 




the lone inventor, Edison in fact managed an invention factory’.118 Edison was a key 
proponent of mass invention and held over 1 000 patents in the US, and at least as 
many across other jurisdictions, including Britain.  Drahos notes that between 1921 
and 1941 ‘the number of industrial research laboratories went from 300 to 2200, and 
that these laboratories employed more than 700 000 research staff’.119 Companies 
like Du Pont, General Electric, AT&T, Westinghouse, and Parke Davis are examples 
of early ‘knowledge-creating’ companies.120 
 
The push for technological advancement meant that innovation-driven companies 
engaged the services of individuals with the intellectual skill to develop new products 
and processes. This created the opportunity for individuals to be involved in research 
activities which would otherwise have been too costly or risky to undertake on their 
own. Under the archetypal patent ownership paradigm which informed the early 
patent laws, these individual inventors were the first owners of the patents and were 
in  a position to negotiate adequate compensation for what was in effect, the sale of 
their inventions to the company. 
 
With industrialisation came changes in the regulation of the world of work. One such 
change was a shift from an agricultural economy and individual artisans plying their 
trade, to an economy in which increasing numbers of people were dependent on 
firms for work.121 Firms, in turn, needed systems to control the growing workforce. 
Work relationships became conceptualised as contracts in terms of which the worker 
‘sold’ his or her labour to the firm in exchange for wages. However, the blueprint for 
the relationship was heavily influenced by the master-and-servant laws which meant 
that the work contract incorporated the concepts ‘power’ and ‘dependency’.  
 
These creative workers became part of the complement of ‘non-manual’ or 
‘professional’ labour needed by growing corporations. The move to conceptualise 
work relationships as contractual had no effect on the patent laws which remained 
                                                          
118 Id 40. 
119 Id 40-1. 
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rooted in the notion of the individual inventor as the cornerstone of the patent 
system. This did not change with the adoption of the Paris Convention, even though 
the flow of creative activity was predominantly firm-directed. For inventors, this was a 
potential source of bargaining power in their dealings with firms,122 although, it is 
submitted, the Paris Convention subtly facilitated corporate ownership by leaving 
ownership to national discretion.123 
 
However, for the inventors who were increasingly party to ‘sale of labour’ 
agreements which made them economically dependent on employers, the autonomy 
to deal with patentable inventions was eroded by the firm claiming not only the 
inventor’s labour, but also any invention as a term in the work contract.  Although the 
patent system appeared to favour the employee with a bargaining chip in the form of 
default ownership based on inventorship, the employment contract remained 
unequal and even in the case of skilled workers, such as scientific staff, it reflected 
the dependency of the worker on the firm. In this way, the common-law contract of 
employment became a vehicle for employers to claim title to patentable inventions 
made by employees.124 
 
Fisk effectively captures the impetus for this shift when she writes that 
‘The old legal conception of individual invention (and therefore, individual ownership) 
seemed anachronistic.  The acceptance of corporations as legal ‘persons’ with all the 
rights and privileges of personhood provided a new legal framework to reconcile the 
traditionally individualistic presuppositions of patent and copyright law, which focus 
on the author or the inventor, with the new social reality of collective innovation.  The 
cultural change and the legal change coincided and reinforced one another in ways 
                                                          
122 Id 43. Also Simmons (n115) 42. 
123 Bodenhausen (n55) 15. 
124 See discussion on the developments in America in Simmons (n115) 37-42; also Fisk (n115) 240: 
‘[a]s is always the case with law, the changing applications ultimately changed the rules themselves.  
As the settings in which ideas were manufactured became more ‘corporate’ – more bureaucratic, 
more collective, and quite literally, under the aegis of corporations – and as the claimants to idea 
ownership increasingly were corporations, what judges thought of idea ownership and how firms 
managed creative employees changed too...judges developed a view of contract law generally, and 
the employment contract specifically, that operated both as a conceptual technology and as a 
mechanism of social control to enable a shift in idea ownership’. 
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that naturalized the radical developments and made a revolution seem normal, 
inevitable, and uncontroversial.125 
 
In effect however, although the archetypal patent model did not align with the way in 
which the practice resulted in employer control over the invention, it remained the 
default position.   
 
This assimilation of inventors into the general workforce means that inventors are 
trapped in a world of work characterised by inequality and vulnerability 
accompanying the ordering of labour by contract between economically unequal 
parties.  The employment contract, while being a voluntary bilateral agreement 
between the employer and the employee in terms of which the employee undertakes 
to provide labour in exchange for remuneration, exhibits additional traits which 
manifest across jurisdictions.126  Its key characteristic is that the employer is in a 
superior hierarchical position to the employee. This position of power generally 
arises from the employer’s influence over the employee’s execution of his or her 
contractual obligations. This includes: ‘(1) the power to assign tasks and to give 
orders and directives to employees (directional power); (ii) the power to monitor both 
the performance of such tasks and the compliance with same orders and directives 
(control power); [and] (iii) the power to sanction both the improper or negligent 
performance of the assigned tasks and disobedience to given orders and directives 
(disciplinary power)’.127 
 
A response to this worker vulnerability has been to develop labour laws as a 
‘countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is 
inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship’.128 One line of 
development is support for the contractual notion by providing workers with a tool by 
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which to gain greater bargaining power.129 This is seen in the rise and recognition of 
collective bargaining and representative structures.130 A second line of development 
is more substantive and attempts to secure justice for workers by bargaining on their 
behalf. Therefore, interventions for minimum conditions of service to be implied into 
work contracts, aim to ensure for the most economically vulnerable a fair bargain. 
Although the concerns of workers vary across countries, the general themes emerge 
from the attention of international organisations – in particular the ILO – to the issue 
of the employment contract as a means of achieving social justice.131  The ILO,  
founded in 1919, provides a forum for workers, employers, and governments to 
contribute jointly to the development of labour standards.132 This tripartite structure is 
a defining feature of the Organisation and ensures that workers are equally 
represented at the international policy level.  
 
It should be clear that it is not possible to allocate rights in inventions between 
employers and their employees without taking into account the effect that 
employment has on the bargaining power of the inventor. Similarly, the role of firms 
in furthering the goals of innovation cannot be ignored. Consequently, both labour 
and patent policies will drive an optimal allocation. 
 
2.4.3 Responses at International Level 
 
It would seem that for both employers and employees, this development would 
precipitate a shift to an alternative approach.  From the employer side, a default rule 
favouring employer ownership would eliminate the transaction costs and uncertainty 
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of relying on contract to acquire rights from the employee. For the employee, the 
employment relationship places him or her at a disadvantage in the negotiation of 
adequate reward for the invention, or indeed the assignment of the invention. 
However, the engagement with the issue in the international fora, while illustrative of 
some of the concerns, has made very little difference.   
 
The effect of employment on the position of employee-inventors had already been 
formally identified as a concern by employees in the 1930s. The first meeting of the 
Advisory Committee of Salaried Employees under the League of Nations in 1931, 
put forward a ‘Resolution concerning the Protection of Salaried Employees’ 
Inventions’ which called on the ILO to ‘take all measures which seem calculated to 
hasten on the adoption of international regulations on inventors’ rights for salaried 
employees, which should take account of authors’ rights for inventors’.133 As to the 
nature of the regulations, the committee’s primary points of importance included that 
the inventor as the person who contributed the intellectual work be entitled to 
protection for the invention, including a patent; or if this could not at the time be 
guaranteed by national laws, at least attribution in  the patent documentation. It also 
called for a restriction on ‘the individual freedom of contract … as is already done in 
certain cases for labour legislation’, and that pre-invention contracts be ‘permitted 
only when the salaried employee has been engaged specially for research work with 
a view to making inventions’.134 In addition, employees wanted ‘special 
compensation’ where inventions had been transferred to the employer.135 There was 
little further development and it was only after the Second World War that the issue 
resurfaced in the ILO. 
 
What is noteworthy is that the concerns found their way into a different forum – there 
was a proposal for the inclusion of such remuneration in the Paris Convention. This 
                                                          
133 ILO Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees’ Resolution concerning the Protection of Salaried 
Employees’ Inventions International Labour Office (League of Nations) Industrial and Labour 
Information vol XXXVIII (April-June 1931) (‘Resolution’) 99-100. The reference to authors’ rights no 
doubt refers to a moral right of attribution for inventors. See Cornwell (n65) 301-2; Dutfield (n65) 115-
117. 
134 Id 100. 
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was rejected and the only change was the introduction of article 4ter in 1934 which 
secured for individual inventors generally the right to be named as the inventor.  
Although a response to the agitation by mainly employee-inventors, the provision 
steered clear of any direct reference to the employment context. 136 
 
When the ILO was again apprised of the matter after the war, the concerns of 
inventors found a home in a new Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and 
Professional Workers set up in 1947. Unlike the previous committee, this one had 
increased status and was constituted on a tripartite basis to include employers. 
Nationally, many countries had introduced measures to deal with the apparent 
disjuncture between patents law and labour law.  These measures, as noted by the 
Advisory Committee in its 1952 report, entailed three broad aspects: ‘the drafting or 
revision of patent laws; the inclusion in legislation on the contract of employment of 
clauses covering the rights of salaried inventors; the inclusion of similar clauses in 
collective bargaining agreements’. 137 According to the Committee, this was a 
response to the economic and industrial developments which had ‘seen an 
increasing number of persons lose their previously independent status and be 
absorbed in the economy as employed persons’. 138 The inventor, while independent  
under patent philosophy, had become one of a range of inputs in the industrial 
process.  
 
The Advisory Committee continued to engage with the concerns of salaried inventors 
at various meetings and maintained the idea that an international standard be set in 
this regard. 139 It was only in 1984, however, that the Governing Body of the ILO 
resolved to convene a Tripartite Meeting on Salaried Authors and Inventors. The 
                                                          
136 See Wolk S ‘Remuneration for employee inventors– is there a common European ground? A 
comparison of national laws on compensation of inventors in Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom’ (2011) 42 IIC 274; Dutfield (n65) 117. 
137 ILO Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Workers Report 1 Second 
Session, Geneva 1952 General Report International Labour Office, 1951 (‘Report 1952’) 44. 
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terms of reference of the meeting were: ‘(a) to adopt conclusions on the principles 
that should be applied in order to protect the rights of salaried authors and inventors, 
having due regard to the interests of employers; (b) to make recommendations for 
future ILO actions’.140 It was stated in the introduction to the meeting that while the 
protection of works by patents was not within the ILO’s competence, ‘from the 
standpoint of labour law and social justice, which clearly fall within the ILO’s 
competence, both salaried authors and inventors are faced with common 
problems’.141The report of the meeting which happened in 1987 acknowledged that 
the complexity and controversy associated which ‘the conflict between the principles 
of labor law and those of intellectual property’ and the need to ‘reconcile these 
principles and protect the differing interests of both employer and worker’.142 
 
Employees argued that the act of inventing warranted that the employee-inventor 
have rights in the invention and share in the resulting benefits. Their view was that  
while employees may be ‘recruited to carry out research, make discoveries, analyse 
and solve specific problems’, it was not a condition of employment that they actually 
invent ‘as evidenced by the fact that failure to invent in no way implies that their 
contractual obligations are not being respected’. 143 Because ‘not everyone has what 
it takes to be an inventor or creator’ and it is the ‘inventive or creative mind’ which is 
required to ‘actually bring an idea or project to fruition’, the act of inventing ought to 
attract additional remuneration. 144 Therefore, the resource contribution of the 
employer is subsidiary in the inventive process and is in any event recouped through 
the benefits which accrue as result of the invention.145 
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Although the meeting dealt with a range of issues, including the economic rights, 
moral rights, effect of termination on employment, and dispute settlement,146 there 
was no unanimous adoption of any of the proposed conclusions on any of the 
issues. The only agreement between the three branches was that the ILO undertake 
further research, compile and disseminate information, and study the law to allow its 
governing body to examine the possibility of placing the issue of salaried inventors 
on agendas of future sessions of the International Labour Conference.147Since that 
1987 meeting the issue has attracted no further attention in the ILO. 
 
It is worthwhile to note that even though employees’ claimed title and additional 
remuneration, there was no dispute that ultimately it was intended that the employer 
would be in the position to exploit the invention. The concern was to ensure that the 
employees’ contributions were properly recognised mainly in monetary terms. The 
issue had been formulated as one of balancing interests of the employer and 
employee, and not of furthering innovation policy directly. 
 
In the international intellectual property fora, there have been no developments since 
the 1934 revision of the Paris Convention.  There is no directive or model generally 
applicable to all members of WIPO, for example. The WIPO’s engagement with the 
issue is limited to references in two non-binding Model Laws for developing countries 
implementing the patent system.  The Model Laws have no binding effect and serve 
merely as examples of possible formulations of patent law. However, they 
acknowledge the possibility of countries implementing default first-ownership rules 
involving a deviation from the standard first-ownership approach.148 As such, they 
are also indicative of an acknowledgement that the original formulation of the system 
does not respond to realities of corporate inventorship. 
 
Consequently, in 1965 when the United International Bureaux for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (‘BIRPI’), now the WIPO, introduced its Model Law 1965,149 it 
did so on the basis that it was at best a model and not a uniform law,  especially as  
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it is not possible to generalise given the differences in countries’ social, economic, 
technical and cultural structures.150  The guiding principles state that patents are ‘the 
traditional means of encouraging inventive activity and the necessary investments for 
research and for industrial exploitation of inventions’151 – a clear recognition of the 
different contributions which the patent system needs to recognise. 
 
The Model Law 1965 provided specifically for employment situations by presenting 
an alternative default ownership position. It linked ownership to the terms of the 
employment contract and to the provision of resources; and recognised an 
employee’s right to remuneration for the inventive activity. 
   
Section 10(1) provides as default, that ‘an invention made in the execution of the 
contract shall belong to the person having commissioned the work or to the 
employer’.152 Where the work was made by the employee, the employer similarly 
owned the invention even though ‘the employment contract does not require the 
employee to exercise any inventive activity’, provided that ‘the employee has made 
the invention using data or means that his employment has put at his disposal’.153 
Thus, it based a shift in default ownership either on the obligations in the contract or 
on the use of the employer’s resources.  
 
The Model Law 1965 also anticipated an employee’s right to remuneration for the 
invention. Where the invention was made in the execution of the employment 
contract, remuneration for the invention arose for inventions of ‘very exceptional 
importance’.154 In this case, employer ownership was based on ‘the employee 
[being] under a contractual obligation to carry out an inventive activity’.155The basis 
for additional remuneration would likely be that exceptional importance was not 
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anticipated when the contract was concluded and so was factored into the 
employee’s salary.  
 
Where the invention was made using data or means supplied by the employer, the 
employer’s right arose, according to the commentary, because ‘it would be 
inequitable to expose the employer to competition with his employees because of the 
fact he has put at their disposal data and means enabling them to  make an 
invention’.156 Any inequity towards the employee appeared to be mitigated by his or 
her right to ‘additional remuneration’157 – although the commentary states that ‘the 
supplementary remuneration for his fruitful efforts must be determined taking into 
considerations his salary and the importance of the invention patented by the 
employer’.158 
 
The right of the ‘true inventor’ to be named also featured with the condition that it 
‘shall not be modified by contract’.159However, the inventor had formally to request 
such attribution as opposed to its being automatically implemented. 
  
The 1965 Model Law was subject to revision.160 In a draft revision the provisions 
acquired a somewhat more complicated gloss which eventually found its way into the 
WIPO Model Law 1979.161 Like the 1965 version, it is premised on the view that the 
patent system plays a role in promoting investment in innovation.162 In so far as 
employee-inventions are concerned, the Model Law 1979 echoes the 1965 
formulation that ‘when an invention is made in execution of a commission or 
employment contract, the right to the patent for that invention shall belong, in the 
absence of contractual provisions to the contrary, to the person having 
commissioned the work or to the employer.’163 Similarly, an employee who has ‘lost’ 
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ownership on this basis is only entitled to additional remuneration for the invention if 
‘the invention has an economic value much greater than the parties could have 
reasonably foreseen at the time of concluding the contract’.164 This amount is to be 
determined by agreement or by a court. The reference to ‘economic value’ as a basis 
for determining a claim is a new addition and the provision as whole is more explicit 
in the basis for the remuneration.165  The remuneration is because parties could not 
have contracted in full knowledge of the value of the invention at the time of the 
contract. 
 
To the extent that the inventive activity falls outside the requirements of the 
employment contract but within the field of activities of the employer, and is made 
using the data or other means provided by the employer, the Model Law provides 
two options. First, that the invention belongs to the employer subject to the employee 
having ‘a right to equitable remuneration taking into account his salary, the economic 
value of the invention and any benefit derived from the invention by the employer’166  
– again an echo of earlier model laws but with the reference to the economic aspect.  
 
The alternative rule is that the employee owns the invention save if the employer 
notifies the employee by a written declaration of interest within four months. Once 
again the employee is entitled to equitable remuneration as above. The commentary 
suggests that the choice between the two will depend on country needs. It posits that 
the choice of approach could serve to ensure that the patent rights remain with 
national industries or individuals, depending on where ownership of the firm lies.167  
It is submitted that the more relevant enquiry would be into which one would act as 
the greater incentive for further investment in innovation in the country, as opposed 
simply to vesting ownership in a national. The fact of ownership must lead to the 
growth even in the absence of a contractual deviation. Thus, if ownership is vested in 
employee-inventors, then this must result in the positive growth even in the absence 
of the employee thereafter acquiring rights through contract. 
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In so far as determining what would constitute equitable remuneration, the 
commentary provides that in principle this is fixed by contract but that the employee’s 
salary, the economic value of the patent, and the employer’s benefit derived from the 
invention through, for example, a reduction in manufacturing costs and gains in 
efficiency and quality, are factors to be taken into account.168 Like the 1965 one, the 
1979 Model Law retained the provision nullifying contractual provisions less 
favourable to the employee. 
 
It also placed greater emphasis on the inventor’s right to be named.  The right can 
only be avoided if the inventor makes a written declaration to the Patent Office 
advising that he or she does not wish to be named. However, to counter potential 
abuses, the rejection of the right may not be a consequence of ‘any promise or 
undertaking by the inventor’ to make such a declaration to any person. 169It is hard to 
see under what other circumstances the inventor would wish not to be named. 
Indeed, an inventor who wishes to transfer the patent may find that such a 
declaration would be more attractive to potential purchasers and add a premium to 
the price. 
 
This brief overview of the international responses serves to foreground the main 
sites of contestation. A distinction is clearly made between whether the invention is 
the response to a contractual obligation to do so and which is remunerated by a 
salary based on effort; and where the reason for the ownership rule is compensatory 
for the use of resources and equitable in so far as the invention could be used in 
competition with the employer. In the latter case, the salary is not commensurate 
with the production of an invention.  It seems that in both the ILO and WIPO, 
employer-ownership is not anathema to the modern inventorship situation. The 
responses are to labour concerns of employees as opposed to a defence of a patent 
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2.4.4 The Characteristics of Employee-Inventorship  
 
This thesis is based on the assumption that the development of patentable 
inventions by employee-inventors takes place under conditions which require a 
deviation from the archetypal allocation of patent rights if the incentive function is to 
be realised. In this section, I explain the assumptions I make about the 
characteristics of modern inventorship and how it differs from the model to which the 
traditional system is built upon. It is this understanding of inventorship which is being 
referred to in the analysis of the current international approach and the 
reconceptualising of the inventive function which follow in this Chapter. 
 
Firstly, technological development is driven by increasingly complex innovations.170 
This has a number of implications.  For a start, the development of an invention is 
not possible without resources. This resource component may be broadly 
understood to include all inputs which are made, such as human capital, facilities, 
and equipment.171 With the provision of resources is an associated cost which may 
be reduced to monetary terms.  A consequence of this is that a financial investment 
is a sine qua non for the development process.  Even the intellectual effort which the 
patent system recognises in its criteria for patentability, is a resource to which a cost 
is associated.  
 
Another consequence of the complexity in the process is that inventions are likely 
the result of collective endeavour.172Although it may be possible technically to 
ascribe inventorship to particular persons, non-inventors would inevitably also have 
been involved. Furthermore, the nature of the inventions which are regarded as 
patentable may be components of larger projects. In other words, inventorship is 
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disaggregated so that the inventive contributions of individuals only really gain value 
when they are considered as part of a bigger project.  
 
Secondly, the motivation for engaging in activities which lead to patentable 
inventions is driven by the corporate context in which individuals work. Where the 
inventor is party to a work agreement which anticipates an inventive output, the 
scope and nature of the inventive activity would have been informed by the terms of 
the agreement. Thus, where the services of an inventor had been engaged to deliver 
a particular result, the impetus of the inventor’s behaviour is his or her obligation to 
meet the terms of the contract.  Similarly, where the inventor is employed under a 
contract of ongoing service, the motivation for engaging in the activity which gives 
rise to the invention may arise from obligations in the employment contract.  
 
In the employment situation, the employee’s duties and associated activities may 
culminate in an anticipated patentable invention. In other cases, an unexpected 
invention may arise out of the general research efforts of the employee.   A 
characteristic of the employment relationship is that the employee is paid a salary for 
making his or her services available to the employer. Given that it is not possible to 
predict whether a patentable invention will result from an employee’s efforts even if 
they are directed to finding a particular technical solution, it can hardly be said that 
an employee who does not produce a patentable invention as a solution would not 
be entitled to a salary. 
 
A further point of note is that not all inventive activity by employed inventors arises 
during conventional work hours while the employee is on the employer’s premises.  
The nature of the industry and the individual firm strategy will affect the way in which 
employees execute their tasks. This may include virtual or remote offices and 
employee discretion in determining when and how to work. 
 
It is these underlying characteristics of employee-inventorship that determine 






2.4.5 Analysis of the Incentive Effect of the Archetypal Allocation on 
Employee-inventions 
 
I turn now to an examination of how the current patent system regulates ownership 
and attribution against the international labour law background and my assumptions 
as to the nature of employee-inventorship.  The concern is with whether the way in 
which benefits associated with the patent are allocated in this context, recognises 
the contributions of both employers and employees. In principle, this translates into a 
question of  whether and how the international system recognises the intellectual 
contribution and the resource component where the former is made by the employee 
and the latter by the employer. 
 
The international instruments do not distinguish inventorship in the employment 
context. Therefore, regardless of the employer’s investment the system will only 
recognise the intellectual contribution of the employee-inventor.  This eliminates any 
possibility of the corporate employer claiming title through inventorship if the latter is 
strictly construed as referring only to natural persons.173Furthermore, the attribution 
right is limited to the inventor, who in the employment context is the employee. On 
this basis, the patent system appears to fail in its role as an incentive mechanism to 
encourage both employee and employer. 
 
However, one should not discount the possibility that the system may nonetheless 
incentivise the contributors even in its current form. Two such possibilities are 
considered here. 
 
The first is to argue for an interpretation of ‘inventor’ which includes an employer.  If 
the employer is an inventor, it would, like any other inventor, have the rights of 
attribution and ownership.  This outcome necessitates that the system embrace 
juristic persons as inventors which can be achieved by deeming the employer an 
inventor based on the employee’s intellectual contribution. Therefore, the employee 
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must be assumed to be the amanuensis of the employer as, in practical terms, a 
juristic person is not able to formulate the intellectual contribution required for 
inventorship.174 This approach works within the restricted view of inventorship that 
the system appears to support because it maintains the association of inventorship 
with patentability criteria.175  A more direct approach is to construe inventorship more 
broadly to include the employer’s investment contribution. However, this would 
severely strain the current formulation and, it is submitted, cannot realistically be 
supported if the link between inventorship and patentability criteria is maintained. 
 
A second route is to step outside of the patent system to find an alternative way to 
recognise the employer’s contribution.  This would entail that the default allocation in 
favour of the employee-inventor remain, but that the system operate in a way that 
vests rights in the employer.  The ownership in a patent and the right to apply for a 
patent are expressly transferrable and the system clearly anticipates that someone 
other than the inventor may be the patentee.  This implies that the inventor is in a 
position to assign the patent rights to a non-inventor and to bargain over a suitable 
return for the loss of the patent. This would apply equally to the employment context 
and an assignment of rights could move title from the employee-inventor to the 
employer. This approach is clearly only relevant in respect of ownership as an 
incentive as it appears that the right to claim the title of ‘inventor’ is not similarly 
transferred. 
 
The basis for such transfer would be an agreement between the parties under which 
the employee-inventor assigns rights to the employer in a way which results in the 
ideal balance of rights to further the incentive function of ownership. However, 
various factors mitigate against relying on contract. 
 
The first is conceptual. The assignment of rights from the employee-inventor to the 
employer must ensure that both parties are in a legal position which encourages 
further invention. It is not simply an exercise of the employee-inventor’s monopoly, 
but rather a means to recalibrate the system to take account of the employee-
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invention paradigm and the incentive function. A contract offers the parties the 
opportunity to negotiate the outcome, and in this case, whether and how the rights 
will be transferred to the employer. This creates an opportunity for individual sets of 
parties (an employer and its employee) to negotiate in order to secure an 
advantageous personal outcome, as opposed to an outcome aimed at furthering the 
incentive purpose of the patent system.  Where the incentivisation goals of the 
patent system are not a priority for the parties, any alignment will likely be a result of 
coincidence rather than of the will of the parties. Even if it is accepted that contract 
could form the basis for allocating rights in a way that sustains the incentive function, 
there are many qualifications. 
 
One concern with relying on an assignment of rights from a default in favour of the 
employee-inventor is that any transfer of rights to the employer would have to be the 
result of an agreement with the employee and relate to each invention the employer 
seeks to own. There is no certainty that the employee will agree to transfer rights in 
the invention. Therefore from the employer’s perspective, the costs associated with 
possible hold-ups resulting from the need to negotiate with employees could reduce 
the incentive to be gained by ownership.176 
 
A solution is for the parties to conclude pre-invention assignments in which the 
employee-inventor assigns future inventions. However, this brings its own problems, 
one of which is that such assignments are likely to form part of the terms of the 
employment contract between the parties. In this way, pre-invention assignments 
and other invention-related issues form part of the general negotiation of the 
employment contract, along with rights and obligations relating to work duties, 
company benefits, work policies, and remuneration.  The benefits the employee 
derives from the employer may be directed at the employee’s services in general 
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and not specifically at calibrating the incentive function.  Therefore the divestment of 
ownership under these conditions may be a disincentive for the employee to invent 
unless he or she can negotiate remuneration that realigns the loss with the incentive 
function. Such hesitation is compounded by the employee not knowing what might 
be invented in future or its value.177 
 
As explained earlier, a characteristic feature of employment contracts is the parties’ 
inequality in bargaining power which stems from employee’s economic dependence 
on the employer.178 This is captured in Otto Kahn-Freund’s oft-quoted observation 
that  
 ‘the relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a 
 relation between the bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power.  In its 
 inception it is an act of submission, in its operation it is  condition of subordination, 
 however much the submission and subordination may be concealed by that 
 indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the “contract of employment”’.179  
 
Where such an imbalance exists, the employer – as a profit-seeking entity – will use 
its advantage to acquire more rights from the employee-inventor than the calibration 
of the patent system requires. Further, where the employee has been divested of 
rights to the invention in these circumstances, he or she will not necessarily be left 
with adequate compensation to serve as an incentive for further inventive 
contributions. Consequently, it must be admitted that reliance on the contract 
between the parties to trigger an outcome which advances the incentive function of 
the grant of the patent, is unlikely to yield any success.  
 
The conclusion is that the existing system is not responsive to the employee-
invention paradigm even at the most basic level of simply acknowledging the 
resource contribution of the employer. 
 
 
                                                          
177 See Dreyfuss R ‘Collaborative research: Conflicts on authorship, ownership, and accountability’ 
(2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1212. 
178 See 2.4.2 above. 
179 Davies & Freedland (n128) 18.  
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2.5 THE INCENTIVE FUNCTION OF PATENT RIGHTS IN THE EMPLOYEE-




I proceed from the assumption that the employee-invention paradigm which has 
been put forward in this Chapter180reflects the context in which most innovation takes 
place. Consequently, the effect of a particular ownership rule must be to encourage 
the development of inventions in that context. The employee-invention paradigm 
presupposes that an invention requires both the intellectual input of the individual 
employee and the financial investment of the employer. Without either, the invention 
would not be possible. How, then, should the system allocate rights to encourage 
both contributions?  In the section, I extrapolate the fundamental principles which 
must inform the development of an optimal allocation. The more closely a system is 
aligned to these principles, the greater the probability will be that it will incentivise 
similar contributions by the employer and employee to another invention.  It is to this 
model framework that the final conclusions in Chapter 6 about the South African 
system must respond. 
 
It is assumed that an optimal allocation at the individual level ultimately supports the 
innovation purpose through the general availability of new ideas.181 The concern is 
simply what needs to be considered if the allocation is to encourage the individual 
contributors (employer and employee) to make their necessary contribution, either 
for the first time or to repeat it under the same circumstances. Negatively framed, will 
a particular allocation discourage the employer or the employee from making his, her 
or its contribution? The more likely either party is to be discouraged or will hesitate, 
the less effective the allocation serves as an incentive for further inventive activity. 
Consequently, it must be borne in mind that issues such as the effect of the 
allocation on post-grant commercialisation of the technology, or on employees’ 
mobility and innovation outside the firm, are not part of this enquiry, although they 
are all part of the broader innovation landscape.  
 
                                                          
180 See2.4 above. 
181 See 2.2 above. 
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It is submitted that an optimal default allocation is one which encourages both 
contributions.   Although the aim is to determine the individual incentive effect, the 
ownership rule has to be driven by the policy considerations underlying both patent 
and labour law. It is submitted that it is not possible to ignore the latter, particularly in 
light of its automatic involvement when inventors are in economically-dependent 
work relationships with the employer-investor.   
 
2.5.2 Assumptions on the Incentive Effect of Ownership 
 
In this section I analyse the extent to which it can be said that ownership of the 
patent will be an incentive for either the employer or employee to repeat the 
contribution to make a further invention. 
 
For the employer, it is assumed that the employer’s investment in the development 
of the invention is an expense in pursuit of profit.  Ultimately, it is a profit-motive that 
underlies the corporate’s interest in the patent. However, the value of ownership to 
the employer, and thereby the efficacy of employer-ownership as an incentive, are 
influenced by other factors in the employee-invention context. 
 
At one end of the spectrum, the employer may have specifically directed resources 
towards inventive activities related to its core business, and it may have engaged the 
services of employees to this end, through conditions of employment.  The firm’s 
goals are directed towards finding the solution which is has been provided by the 
invention.  In this case, patent ownership to the exclusion of the employer, is a 
disincentive for the employer to investing under the same conditions. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, where the invention is entirely unrelated to the 
employer’s business, it is assumed that patent ownership by someone else will not 
necessarily discourage a repeat investment – provided that there is an alternative 
way for the firm to counter the loss.  This does not mean that ownership itself would 
not be of value to the employer, but in order for the employer to recoup its expenses 
as owner, it would have to redirect resources away from its core business, either to 
the task of trying to sell the patent, or to embark on a new line of business to 
commercialise the invention itself.  Thus, even though the use of the employer’s 
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resources is not to a profit-making end, it is not necessarily the case that the firm will 
avoid a similar experience. 
 
Between these extremes, inventions may arise which relate to the employer’s 
business but fall outside of its planned investment strategy. Here, once again, 
ownership in the patent by someone else will only be a disincentive to repeat 
investment if the employer is not recompensed through some other channel, or if 
non-ownership results in a rival gaining a market share at the employer’s expense. 
It is submitted that, in general, the further removed the invention is from the 
employer’s field of business, the greater the need for the employer to direct 
resources to non-core activities associated with the invention so as realise a profit 
from it if it were vested with ownership.  This reduces the incentive effect of 
ownership, unless that the employer can recoup its costs elsewhere if it so wishes. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the employer would not actively exclude its 
contribution under similar circumstances, although it would also not specifically 
allocate resources to the cause. It is, in effect, neutral.  
 
From the employee’s perspective, the application of his or her intellectual faculties to 
the inventive activity which led to the patentable invention may have been self-
directed, or may have been the result of his or her obligation to find a solution to 
specific problems, or a consequence of a more general imperative to engage in 
research efforts given the nature of the employer’s business.  The impetus for the 
actual inventive behaviour will determine the incentive value of ownership of the 
patent.  
 
Where the invention is a response to a specific obligation, for example, a condition of 
the employment relationship, the ownership in the patent on the invention is likely to 
have little incentive effect. In other words, given the same situation, the employee 
would again engage in the necessary activity – his or her contribution is made in 
fulfilment of his or her contractual obligations. The ‘incentive’ or push to invent is 
therefore a consequence of the employment relationship and lies in the remuneration 
he or she receives for the labour provided.  This assumes though that the reward 
which the employee receives for the effort is sufficient. However, given the inability to 
predict the actual effect of the invention before entering into salary negotiations, this 
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may prove inadequate in certain situations, most notably where the invention turns 
out to be more valuable than what was contemplated at the time that the reward or 
salary was negotiated. 
 
However, if the terms of the contract are such that the employee is not adequately 
remunerated for the service, including the inventive activity which led to the patent, 
patent ownership may increase in incentive value to the extent that it enables the 
employee to be adequately rewarded. It is submitted, however, that it would only be 
an incentive to the extent that it is able to correct any imbalance in the benefits the 
inventor received as a consequence of the employment relationship. This in turn 
depends on the employee’s ability to convert the patent into adequate remuneration. 
Generally though, a failure to be granted patent ownership will not be a disincentive 
to a repeat performance by the employee under circumstances where the motivation 
for the effort is to further the employer’s business. 
 
However, the likelihood of an inventor being discouraged from inventing should he or 
she not own the invention increases where the invention has been driven by his or 
her own needs. If the employee created the invention to develop and commercialise 
it him-or herself, the absence of ownership will be a disincentive to repeat the 
performance. 
 
2.5.3 Assumptions on the Incentive Effect of Attribution 
 
It is suggested that as a corporate’s purpose in contributing to the inventive activity is 
the commercial advancement of the enterprise, the failure to be recognised for its 
contribution would not deter further contributions – provided that the omission does 
not influence the objective. The association of a firm with the invention may enhance 
its reputation which may, in turn, have spinoff economic benefits – for example, it 
may attract clients or investors. However, whether the failure to be attributed will be 
a disincentive will depend on whether the attribution of inventorship to someone else, 
such as the employee-inventor, will impact negatively on the return on investment. 
 While there is therefore some argument for extending the right to be mentioned to 
an acknowledgement of the role played by employers, particularly where the subject 
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matter of the invention was initiated by the employer, that in itself is likely insufficient 
to encourage a repeat investment. 
 
For the employee, the right to be named as the inventor may be attractive for the 
prestige of being associated with the specific invention, or because it serves as an 
indicator of prolific inventive behaviour.  Both aspects are likely to be important to 
inventors whose career-mobility is affected by their inventive activity. In such a case, 
a failure to be associated with the invention may be a disincentive to engage in 
inventive activity under the same circumstances.  However, where the nature of the 
inventive activity is routine and part of a disaggregated process of invention, it is 
more likely that the lack of attribution would not necessarily be a disincentive to 
future similar behaviour, provided that it does not affect the employee’s other 
rewards, namely a salary or future prospects. 
 
 
2.6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This chapter has provided a backdrop against which to analyse and assess 
ownership in patents to employee-inventions. In this thesis, it is accepted that the 
patent system is a tool for the generation of new ideas necessary for a successful 
system which promotes innovation.  It does this by encouraging the development of 
inventions through the grant of a patent. Where only one person is involved in the 
inventive process, that person will generally be recognised by the patent system as 
both inventor and first owner. However, where the invention is made in the 
employment context, the allocation of rights must balance the interests of both the 
employee and the employer in a way that gives effect to the incentive purpose of 
patents and is sensitive to labour law policies which are implicated as a 
consequence of the employment relationship between the contributors.   
 
Under the international patent system, the current approach to the ownership of 
patents appears to be at odds with the assumptions about the incentive value of the 
patent ownership and attribution for employers and employees.  The key concern is 
the seeming failure of the system to recognise the contribution of employers in a way 
that would directly incentivise repeated investment.  It has been shown that efforts to 
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recognise employer contributions by relying on these instruments are limited to a 
strained interpretation of inventorship and the vagaries of contract law, particularly 
the employment contract. 
 
In the absence of specific provisions in the international instruments, it is within the 
discretion of national systems to regulate ownership to give effect to the patent 
purpose in the employee-invention paradigm as they please. Whether or not the 
approach is one which furthers the incentive function of the patent system, depends 







THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS TO EMPLOYEE-INVENTIONS 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 3 is the core of this thesis. In it I present the South African legal framework 
for the allocation of ownership in patentable inventions between employers and 
employee-inventors against the model framework in Chapter 2.  I start by 
establishing that the purpose of patents in South Africa is in harmony with the 
assumptions as to the purpose of patents set out in Chapter 2. This is followed by a 
detailed examination of the current patent system to establish the nature and scope 
of the rules which allocate patent rights generally and, more specifically, in relation to 
inventions made in the employment context. Thereafter, the policy considerations 
associated with South African labour regulation, are expounded.  I conclude with a 
commentary on the alignment of the South African approach with the Chapter 2 
model framework for patents as individual incentive mechanisms in the employment 
context.  
 
3.2  THE PURPOSE OF PATENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This thesis assumes that patents aim to encourage investment in innovation and it is 
submitted that in the South African context, this view can be sustained at least in so 
far as innovation appears to be a deliberate goal of government. The shift to a 
knowledge economy has been recognised by the South African government as 
fundamental to the country’s development and economic growth strategy.1 Increased 
technological innovation capacity features in policies like the New Growth Path2 and 
                                                          
1 See also Kraemer-Mbula E & Muchie M ‘Neighbourhood system of innovation: South Africa as a 
regional pole for economic development in Africa’ (2010) Institute for Economic Research on 
Innovation, Working Paper 3ff on South Africa’s innovation role in Africa.  
2 Economic Development Department ‘The New Growth Path: Framework 2011’ 31. 
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the National Development Plan 2030.3 The need to increase innovation, and 
economic growth through improved science and technology (‘S&T’) strategies has 
been a refrain of various government departments over the last twenty years. This is 
evidenced by what was then the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and 
Technology’s (‘DACST’) ‘National Research and Development Strategy 2002’ 
(‘NDRS’),4 the Department of Trade and Industry’s (‘Dti’) ‘National Industrial Policy 
Framework’,5 and the Department of Science and Technology’s (‘DST’) ‘Innovation 
towards a knowledge‐based economy: Ten‐year plan for South Africa (2008‐2018)’ 
2007 (‘Ten-Year Plan’).6 
 
Developments to date can be traced to the ‘White Paper on Science and 
Technology: Preparing for the 21st Century’ published by the DACST in 1996 (‘White 
Paper’).7  The purpose of the paper was to establish a framework for the 
development of S&T.  It is premised on the assumption that  if ‘technological change 
is the primary source of economic growth … economic and S&T policies have to 
recognise as central concerns the two processes – innovation and technology 
diffusion – which are the agents driving that technological change’. 8  Technological 
change was to be achieved through a ‘National System of Innovation’ (‘NSI’) ‘to try to 
                                                          
3 National Planning Commission ‘National Development Plan Our Future: Make it Work’ Executive 
Summary 15 August 2012, 23.  
4 Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology  ‘National Research and Development 
Strategy’ August 2002, 23. The DACST was split into the Department of Arts and Culture and the 
Department of Science and Technology at the same time that the NDRS was published. The 
Department of  Science and Technology was tasked with giving effect to the NDRS (see 5 of NDRS). 
5 Department of Trade and Industry ‘National Industrial Policy Framework’ 2007. See further 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/industrial_development/industrial_development.jsp. (Date of use 30 
November 2015.) 
6 DST ‘Innovation towards a knowledge‐based economy: Ten‐year plan for South Africa (2008‐2018)’ 
2007 2. 
7 Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology  ‘White Paper on Science and Technology 
Preparing for the 21st Century’  GN 1687 of 1996, GG 17675 20 December 1996 24. See also DST 
‘Final Report of the Ministerial Review Committee on the Science, Technology and Innovation 
Landscape in South Africa’ GN 425 of 2012 GG 35392 30 May 2012 (‘Report 2012’). 
8 DACST White Paper (n7) 23. 
78 
 
create the conditions that will support both creativity and innovativeness throughout 
our society’.9   
 
Innovation was here described as ‘the application in practice of creative new ideas, 
which in many cases involves the introduction of inventions into the marketplace’. 10  
The functions of the NSI included regulatory policy,11with  intellectual property rights 
identified as one of the government’s regulatory policy concerns.12 It was anticipated 
that the DACST and the Dti would collaborate on revising patent laws to ‘best 
promote innovation’13 with the ‘value to the inventor of the patenting system’ as one 
of two considerations in this revision. 14 The view was that ‘[a]dequate protection 
fosters investment and stimulates innovation’, and that the 'rights of South African 
inventors need to be rigorously protected’.15   
 
Initiatives which followed the White Paper included the establishment of the 
‘Technology Innovation Agency’,16the ‘National Research Foundation’17 and the 
‘Innovation Fund’. However, by the DACST’s own admission some six years later, 
the NSI failed to deliver and had little, if any, broader effect.18 This was attributed 
various weaknesses including lack of funding; a decline in research and 
development expenditure by South African companies; deficiencies in the intellectual 






14 Ibid. The second issue was a concern about South Africa’s depository patent system and the need 
to move to a substantive examination system. 
15 DACST White Paper (n7) 43. 
16  See DST Ten-Year Plan (n6) 22-3. For more on the Technology Innovation Agency, see Naidoo D 
‘The Technology Innovation Agency (TIA): A public support mechanism for technological innovation in 
a developing country’ (2009) 1 African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 
(‘AJSTID’) 235, 235-42. See further www.tia.org.za (date of use 30 November 2015) for more on the 
Technology Innovation Agency. 
17 For more on the National Research Foundation see www.nrf.ac.za. (Date of use 30 November 
2015.)  
18 DACST NRDS (n4) 20. 
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property (particularly in respect of publicly-financed intellectual property), and 
fragmentation of government science and technology management. 19  
 
The DACST’s NRDS aimed to resuscitate the NSI. Among the strategic objectives 
were: innovation; science, engineering and technology; human resources and 
transformation; and an effective government S&T system.20 Within the context of the 
latter, the low patenting rate by South Africans was perceived as ‘evidence of a 
major weakness in South Africa’s ability to become a knowledge economy’21 and 
indicative of the lack of ‘appreciation for the value of intellectual property as an 
instrument of wealth creation in South Africa’.22 At the time South African inventors 
secured in the region of 100 USA patents annually, based on a priority registration in 
the South African Patent Office. This equated to 2,5 patents per million of the 
population in contrast to a developed country like Japan which had 776 patents per 
million annually.23 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, the value of patents statistics is at best dependent on the 
nature of the enquiry to which the data is applied.  In South Africa this is particularly 
true given the limited nature of the information in local patent data resulting from the 
non-examining registration system. Although inventiveness, novelty, and industrial 
applicability are requirements for patentability, the absence of any of them will not 
prevent a patent being granted.24  However, within the framework of government’s 
                                                          
19 Id 21-2. 
20 Id 16. 
21 Id 67. 
22 Id 68. 
23 Id 67. 
24 See further Sibanda M in DST Innovation Fund ‘The State of Patenting in South Africa Special 
Report 2007’ (2007) 27. Although see the use of the data by Sibanda M ‘Intellectual Property, 
Commercialization and Institutional Arrangements at South African Publicly Financed Research 
Institutions’ in WIPO The Economics of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2009) 18. On the effects 
of a non-examining system see Gregory S ‘Intellectual Property Rights and South Africa’s Innovation 
Future’ Trade Policy Report (2008) 12-14; Teljeur E Intellectual Property Rights in South Africa: An 
economic review of policy and impact’ (2002/3) 54, 57; Kaplan D ‘Intellectual property rights and 
innovation in South Africa: A framework’ in WIPO The Economic of Intellectual Property in South 
Africa (2009) 3; Pouris A ‘Quantitative assessment of South Africa’s inventive outputs: International 
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strategy to drive innovation, available statistics were considered indicative of a 
suboptimal level of innovative activity and a failure fully to harness the economic 
benefits that patents attract.  However, the NRDS  recognised  increasing patent 
filings was not a guarantee of quality and economic value of the inventions.25  
 
Most of the criticisms in the NRDS was directed at publicly-funded institutions and so 
the focus was on a framework to manage this aspect. 26  Four years later, within the 
context of the NSI, the DST published its ‘Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) from 
Publicly Financed Research Framework’ (‘IPR Framework’)27 to serve as a policy 
framework for the management of intellectual property financed by public funds. The 
IPR Framework identified inconsistent approaches to intellectual property 
management at public institutions and a failure to secure IPRs as two of its 
concerns.28 The proposed solution of introducing legislation to address these 
concerns was supported by the argument that many other countries had introduced 
regulatory frameworks to increase patenting and commercialisation of inventions in 
this context.29 Inventors, particularly academic inventors, were recognised as 
stakeholders who in the absence of benefit-sharing, saw little reason to patent their 
inventions.30 
 
At about the same time, the Innovation Fund published ‘The State of Patenting in 
South Africa Special Report 2007’ which reported on South African patenting 
activities between 1991 and 2005.31 It was based on the premise that it is ‘generally 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
patent analysis’ (2009) 20 South African Journal of Industrial Engineering 13, 15; Pouris A & Pouris A 
‘Patent and economic development in South Africa: Managing intellectual property rights’ (2011) 107 
(11/12) S Afr J Sci. 5-6. 
25 DACST NRDS (n4) 69. 
26 Id 68-70. 
27 DST ‘IPR and Public Funded Research’ Policy Document ‘Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) from 
Publicly Financed Research Framework’ July 2006. 
28 Id 29, 33. 
29 Id 8.   
30 Id 10. For an interesting analysis of inventorship in academia, specifically the effect of patents on 
inventiveness, see Lubango S & Pouris A ‘Is patenting activity impeding the academic performance of 
South African university researchers?’ 2009 Technology in Society 1. 
31 Sibanda 2007 (n24).  
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accepted that a country’s intellectual property in the form of the number of patents 
granted to its nationals, can be used as a proxy for both the extent of innovation and 
current and future economic growth potential’.32 The report underscored the 
commercial value that could be derived through patenting, and indicated that for the 
period under review patents were relatively stagnant in contrast to a general 
increase in filings at the WIPO and USPTO offices.  The report attributed this in part 
to stagnation in the innovation system and a reduction in S&T output along with the 
impression that a non-examining patent system an ineffective protection 
mechanism.33 At the time, according to the NRDS, South Africa was spending 0,7 
per cent of GDP of R&D of which 0,29 per cent constituted government funds. The 
average OECD country expenditure at the time was 2,15 per cent of GDP.34 
Interestingly, the OECD’s review of South Africa’s innovation policy, published in 
200735 did not identify the intellectual property system as a weakness. 
 
Against this backdrop of government activity the Intellectual Property Rights from 
Publicly Financed Research and Development Act was promulgated in 200836and, 
along with its regulations, was implemented in August 2010.  There is, as yet, no 
clear indication of its effects on innovation.37 The stated object of the IPPFRD Act is 
                                                          
32 Id 1.  
33 Id 27. 
34 DACST NRDS (n4) 21. 
35 OECD ‘Reviews of Innovation Policy: South Africa’ (2007). 
36 The IPPFRD Act 51 of 2008 (GG 31745 of 22 December 2008).  Regulations made in terms of s17 
of the Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act 51 of 2008 
GN R675 GG 33433 of 2 August 2010 (‘IPPFRD Reg’). For more on the  legislative background see 
DST IPR Framework (n27); Visser C ‘Intellectual property rights from publicly financed research: The 
way to research hell is paved with good intentions’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 363; Tong L ‘Ownership of 
IP derived from publicly funded research: The state steps in’ (2010) 5(6) JIPLP  409; Gregory (n23) 
16-19; Sibanda 2009 (n24) 138; Chetty P ‘Review of IPR Act and Regulations’ (2009/2010) 10 African 
Journal of Information and Communication 78. At about the same time, the Technology Innovation 
Agency Act 26 of 2008 was passed its object being ‘to support the State in stimulating and 
intensifying innovation in order to improve economic growth…’ (s3).  
37 The available research tends to be institution-specific and as yet the overall impact, if any, on 
innovation in South Africa is not known. See, for example, Bansi R & Reddy K ‘Intellectual property: 
From publicly financed research and  intellectual property registration by universities: A case study of 
a university in South Africa’ (2015) 181  Procedia – Social and Behavioural Studies 185. 
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‘to make provision that intellectual property emanating from publicly financed 
research and development is identified, protected, utilized and commercialised for 
the benefit  of the people of the Republic, whether it be for a social, economic, 
military or any other benefit’. 38  It provides for ownership in and commercialisation of 
IP and for benefit-sharing arrangements to reward intellectual property creators.  Its 
operation is limited to intellectual property made with public finance and only apples 
to private enterprises if they create intellectual property using public funds – for 
example, as part of a collaboration with a public research institution. The legislation 
is discussed Chapter 4 as one of the complementary bases for the protection of 
inventions. 
 
At about the same time, the DST published its Ten-Year Plan to ‘help drive South 
Africa’s transformation towards a knowledge-based economy, in which economic 
growth is lead [sic] by the production and dissemination of knowledge for the 
enrichment of all fields of human endeavour’.39 Two years later, in 2010, a review of 
the science, technology and innovation landscape was commissioned by the Minister 
of Science and Technology with the report of the Ministerial Committee released for 
public comment in 2012.40  The first phase of the review was a survey of the 
innovation landscape with particular reference to the OECD’s 2007 review of South 
Africa’s state of innovation, the activities of the DST during the 2006-2009 period, 
and the role of the private sector in S&T. One of the Ministerial Review Committee’s 
conclusions on the OECD study was that ‘business enterprise should be placed at 
the head of an innovation system’.41 The second phase of the review addressed 
recommendations for the future of the NSI.42 The report noted with regard to creating 
an enabling environment for innovation in the private and social sectors, that 
intellectual property rights were regarded as important by businesses in the 
innovation sector.43  
 
                                                          
38 IPPFRD Act s2(1). 
39 DST Ten-Year Plan (n6) 1. 
40 DST Report 2012 (n7) 2 for the remit of the Committee. 
41 Id 78. 
42 Id 2-3. 
43 Id 145. 
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It is clear from this brief overview that the South African government’s 
conceptualisation of the patent system is that patents serve as tools for advancing 
innovation capability.44 To this end, patenting is encouraged even though the 2002 
observation  by Teljeur that ‘there is no South Africa specific research available that 
assesses the impact on (sic) the IPRs regime on domestic innovation, technology 
dissemination, imports and licensing payments’ still rings true.45 In 2009, Kaplan also  
identified a lack of research in key areas such as ‘the impact of the current IPR 
system on FDI inflows or on technology transfer to South Africa’.46 Although Pouris 
and Pouris set out ‘to assess the extent to which patent protection rights, as they are 
implemented in South Africa, promote or hinder economic development’,47 in effect 
they provide an overview of the regulatory environment without empirical evidence of 
the extent to which the rights actually do so.  
 
While government initiatives in aligning patent regulation with innovation goals have 
been most visible in relation to publicly-financed research and development, it has 
not gone completely unnoticed that most expenditure on research and development, 
is made by the private sector.48 The DST’s 2012 ministerial report acknowledges that 
the ‘private sector is the most important source of finance for, and performer of, 
                                                          
44 See DTI ‘Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property 2013 GN 918 of 2013 GG 36816 of 4 
September 2013, 9. 
45 Teljeur (n23) 64, 50. There has, however, been some scholarly engagement on the effect in 
specific contexts. Lubango, for example, looks at the effect of strengthening the patent regime. 
Lubango L ‘When can strong patent regimes boost countries stocks of inventions and related trade? 
An analytical model’ (2015) 42 Technology in Society  150; Wynberg R, Silveston J & Lombard C 
‘Value adding in the Southern African natural products sector: How much do patents matter?’ in WIPO 
(n23) 18 who conclude that in respect of natural products development: ‘IPRs seldom restrict value 
adding, but may instead stimulate trade and may provide further commercial opportunities’. On how 
intellectual property strategy affects foreign partnerships, see Barnard H & Bromfield T ‘The 
development and management of an intellectual property strategy in a developing country context: 
The case of Sasol’ in WIPO (n23) 84. 
46 Kaplan (n24) 1, 4.  See generally on the impact of intellectual property in South Africa,  Ncube C 
‘Harnessing intellectual property for development: Some thoughts on an appropriate theoretical 
framework’ (2013) 16 PER 370; Van der Walt L & Visagie P ‘Moribund patenting industry now a 
national emergency’ 2014 Without Prejudice 23. 
47 Pouris & Pouris (n24) 1. 
48 DST Ten-Year Plan (n6) 22. 
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R&D; it is a key strategic partner for government to engage in promoting R&D 
investment in the country’.49 However, it added that ‘[g]overnment has little direct 
control over the private sector in respect of self-driven R&D, but plays a critical role 
in creating favourable framework conditions for product and process innovations, as 
well as steering to support mainstream policies and attain national objectives’.50  
Ultimately the question is whether patents can play a role in encouraging investment 
in innovation. Where private corporates do anticipate investment in the development 
of technology in South Africa, the nature of the investment will depend on the 
associated risk.  In this context, the decision to use patents does not work to the 
public benefit through the diffusion of information and the availability of better 
products or processes, but through a reduction in the risk associated with investment 
in developing new technology. Patents are one strategy by which the results of costly 
inventive activity can be exploited without the risk of being copied by competitors.51 
The value of the patent system for firms is therefore not as a driver of aggregate 
(national) innovation, but rather as a means of gaining a competitive advantage. This 
aligns with the conceptualisation of patents as individual incentives within the 
national quest to increase aggregate innovation. 
 
In short, there is little to contest that the assumptions relating to the individual 
incentive function of patents can be a basis for examining the South African system. 
 
 
3.3 THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN PATENT SYSTEM 
  
3.3.1  The Regulatory Context 
 
The PA 1978 and its regulations are the only route by which a patent can be 
granted.52  It applies to all patents granted before or after its commencement, subject 
                                                          
49 DST Report 2012 (n7) 140. 
50 Id  203. 
51 See Visagie  P ‘Salmon fishing in the Kalahari’ (2014) 14 Without Prejudice 22. 
52 Assented to 26 April 1978 and commenced 1 January 1979, save for ss21 and 32(5) – see s95 PA 
1978. Patent Regulations 1978 GN R2470 GG 6247 of 15 December 1978 (with effect from 1 January 
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to transition arrangements.53 South Africa has a hybrid legal system, a legacy of past 
colonial relationships with the Dutch and the British, the latter being the dominant 
influence in respect of intellectual property law generally. 54 The first patent law after 
the Union of South Africa Act 1909 was the Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and 
Copyright Act (‘PDTCA 1916’). 55 The Patents Act of 1952 (‘PA 1952’) followed.56 
Both Acts were in effect incorporations of the British Patents and Designs Act of 
1907, and the British Patents Act of 1949 respectively.57  The PA 1978 was drafted 
in light of the EPC and follows the approach of the British Patents Act of 1977.58   
 
South Africa is a member both of the WIPO and the WTO, and an observer to the 
African Regional Industrial Property Organisation. Developments in these fora have 
a direct bearing on national developments.59 South Africa acceded to the Paris 
Convention in 1947, and has adopted the Lisbon and Stockholm revisions.60  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1979). Last amendment GN R1226 GG 30593 of 14 December 2007 (‘PA Reg’); Patents Examination 
Regulations 2003 GN 25 GG 24290 of 17 January 2003. 
53 PA 1978 s3; s39. 
54 See Steyn JR (updated by Tanziani) ‘Patents’ in LAWSA vol 20 (1) 2ed  [148]. For more on the 
historical development of the South African patent laws, see van der Merwe A ‘The Law of Patents’ 
van der Merwe A (ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2011). On the Roman-Dutch period 
see  Burrell T South African Patent and Design Law (1999) 5;  Steyn J ‘The significance in South 
African patent law of the claims in a patent specification’ published LLD Thesis (1974) Ch 2; 48-57,  
56, 66; Gerntholtz R Principles of South African Patent Law (1971)  8-9. 
55  Act 9 of 1916. 
56 Act 37 of 1952. 
57 See van der Merwe A ‘Introduction’ in van der Merwe A (n54) . See also Burrell (n54) 5; Coulter  M 
Property in Ideas: the Patent Question in mid-Victorian Britain  (1991) 167 on the policy of the 
exclusion of the British patent statutes into the colonies which resulted in the colonies retaining their 
own patent laws. 
58 See Adams & Adams Practitioner’s Guide to Intellectual Property Law (2011) 63; van der Merwe 
(n54) 268.  
59 See further Adams & Adams (n58) 28-29 for a discussion on government policy on accession to 
intellectual property treaties.    
60 South Africa acceded to the Paris Convention on 1 December 1947 and has since adopted the 
Lisbon (31 October 1958) revisions and the Stockholm (14 July 1967) revisions which entered into 
force for South Africa on 25 March 1975. 
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country has been a contracting state to the PCT since 16 March 1999,61 has 
acceded to the Budapest Treaty in 1997, and is a signatory to the IPIC Agreement.62 
The patent system is considered substantially TRIPS-compliant through the PA 
1978. 63 
Domestically, the development of patent laws must conform to the principles of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (‘the Constitution’).64  The 
Constitution does not refer to intellectual property rights specifically, and there is no 
express right to intellectual property in the Bill of Rights.  This has inevitably focused 
attention on whether section 25 of the Constitution recognises intellectual property 
rights as protected property.65 It appears to be accepted that intellectual property 
rights qualify as constitutional property.  In so far as employees may be affected, 
section 23 of the Constitution – the right to fair labour practices66 and collective 
action67 – and section 24 – freedom of trade, occupation and profession – form part 
of the context. In this thesis, I do not examine these Constitutional provisions 
further.68 
  
3.3.2  The Nature of the Patent Monopoly 
 
The PA 1978 defines a patent as ‘a certificate in the prescribed form to the effect that 
a patent for an invention has been granted in the Republic’.69 The patent grants the 
                                                          
61 South Africa acceded to the PCT on 16 December 1998 and it entered into force on 16 March 
1999.  
62 South Africa ratified the IPIC Agreement on 21 September 1956 and it entered into force on 2 
October 2005. 
63See Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997; Gregory (n23) 19. 
64 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
65 See, for example, Ncube (n46) 378; Tong L ‘The interface between intellectual property rights and 
human rights’ in van der Merwe  (n54) 433; Van der Walt AJ & Shay R ‘Constitutional analysis of 
intellectual property’ (2014) 17 PER 52;  du Bois M ‘Intellectual property as a constitutional property 
rights: The South African approach’ (2012) 24  SA Merc LJ 177; Dean O ‘The case for the recognition 
of intellectual property in the Bill of Rights’ 1997 (60) THRHR 105; Burrell (n54) 12-14.  
66 Constitution s23(1). 
67 Constitution s23(2) to (6). 
68 There has not been any legal attack on the constitutional validity of any of the intellectual property 
statutes. 
69 Section 2. 
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proprietor the right to exclude other persons from ‘making, using, exercising, 
disposing or offering to dispose of, or importing the invention, so that he or she shall 
have and enjoy the whole profit and advantage accruing by reason of the invention’70 
for a non-renewable period of twenty years from the date of application.71 The patent 
and the rights in the pending application are assets in the estate of the patentee or 
applicant and may be assigned, licensed, or used as security. 72  Section 59(1) of the 
PA 1978 provides that ‘the rights vested in a patentee or an applicant for a patent 
shall be capable of assignment and of devolution by operation of law’ (emphasis 
added).73  
 
An ‘invention’ is defined as ‘an invention for which a patent may be granted under 
section 25’.74  In the absence of a more useful explanation of the quid pro quo for the 
section 45 set of rights, regard must be had to the patentability criteria.75 As under 
the TRIPS Agreement, these require an invention to be new,76 to involve an inventive 
step,77 and to be capable of use or application in trade, industry or agriculture.78  The 
criteria point to the contribution recognised by the grant of first ownership in the 
patent. Applicants are required to disclose the invention sufficiently to enable a 
person skilled in the art to replicate it.79 The TRIPS Agreement option requiring that 
the inventor disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention was removed from 
                                                          
70 At s45. 
71 PA 1978 s46(1).  
72 See Burrell (n54) 109 for a discussion of the nature of the rights in an application for a patent as a 
ius in personam ad rem acquirendam. 
73 Section 59(1). 
74  PA 1978 s2. For a detailed understanding of how the definition of ‘invention’ developed historically, 
see Gerntholtz (n54) 24-39; Naidoo T ‘Globalization and South African patent law’ (2010) 2 Point 12-
15. 
75 Certain contrivances are excluded from protection in line with the discretion provided for in the 
TRIPS Agreement. See PA 1978 s25(2)-(4).  See further Burrell (n54) 45-53; Adams & Adams (n58) 
66-70. 
76 PA 1978 s25(5); Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 589 (A) 
77 See Ensign-Brickford (South Africa) Ltd v AECI Explosives & Chemicals Ltd 1998 BIP 271 (SCA); 
Roman Roller CC v Speedmark Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1996 (1) SA 405 (SCA). 
78 Patents Act s25(1).  
79 PA 1978 s32(3)(b).  
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the PA 1978 by the Patents Amendment Act of 2002.80 However, because the 
Registrar does not examine the application substantively and there is no pre-grant 
opposition, compliance with the formal requirements suffices.81 The only way to 
remove a patent from the register is to have it declared invalid via revocation 
proceedings.82 
 
The system allocates first ownership on a first-to-file basis. The first applicant to file 
for the patent will have priority over subsequent filers,83 and if the application is 
successful, that person will be recognised as the first ‘owner’ or proprietor of the 
patent.84 However, the system only recognises two categories of applicant for the 
purpose of first ownership: ‘the inventor or … any other person acquiring from him 
the right to apply or by both such inventor and such other person’;85 and ‘in the 
absence to an agreement to the contrary, joint inventors … in equal undivided 
shares’.86 There can be multiple, non-competing applicants for a single patent, in 
                                                          
80 Patents Amendment Act, 2002, s32(2). 
81 See PA 1978 s34 read with reg 40; Adams & Adams (n58) 66; Sibanda 2007 (n24) 27. 
82 PA 1978 s61(1). The PDTCA 1916 (s27) and the PA 1952 (ss19 & 23) both allowed for interested 
parties to oppose the granting of the patent. 
83 PA 1978 s44(1) provides that a patent will be granted to the applicant. PA 1978 s2. The definition of 
‘applicant’ includes ‘the legal representative of a deceased applicant or of an applicant who is a 
person under legal disability’. See further Gerntholtz (n54) 42. 
84 See PA 1978 s2 definition of ‘patentee’ as ‘the person whose name is for the time being entered in 
the register as the name of the grantee or proprietor of a patent’.  
85 PA 1978 s27(1). The previous Patents Acts provided for substantively similar provisions, although 
they were more specific about the possible permutations of applicants. The PDTCA 1916  provided 
that ‘(1) The following persons, whether British subjects or not, may make application for a patent:- 
 (a) The inventor either alone or jointly with one or more other persons; or 
 (b) the inventor jointly with the assignee of a part interest in the invention; or 
 (c) the assignee of the inventor either alone or jointly with one or more other persons’ (s 14).   
The 1952 legislation was not much different. Section 8 provided that an application for a patent in 
respect of an invention could be made   
 ‘(a) by the inventor either alone or jointly with one or more other persons; or 
 (b) by the assignee of the inventor to whom all the rights in the invention have been assigned, 
 either alone or jointly with one or more other persons’. 
86 PA 1978 s27(2).  
89 
 
which case the applicants will each hold an undivided share in the application, the 
size of which would depend on the basis for their claim.  
 
For both categories, inventorship forms the basis for recognition of first ownership. 
Non-inventors will be recognised only where they have acquired the right to apply 
from the inventor.  This acquisition arises from an assignment of the right to apply by 
the inventor to any other person, including a juristic person;87 or where the non-
inventor has acquired the right by operation of law.88 Regardless of how the rights 
are acquired, a non-inventor applicant must submit proof of title to apply; in effect, 
evidence of the legal chain linking the applicant to the inventor must be shown. 89 It is 
clear that the system operates on the basis that the inventor’s contribution of a 
contrivance which meets the patentability criteria is the quid pro quo for registration 
and the control that comes with it.  
 
A patent which is granted to a person not entitled to apply under section 27 can be 
revoked.90 The grounds for revocation include that ‘the patentee is not a person 
entitled to apply under s27’,91 ‘that the grant of the patent is in fraud of the rights of 
the applicant or any person under or through whom he claims’,92and ‘that the 
prescribed declaration lodged in respect of the application for the patent...contains a 
false statement or representation which is material and which the patentee knew or 
ought reasonably to have known to be false at the time when the statement or 
representation was made’.93 
 
                                                          
87 PA 1978 s59(1). See van der Merwe (n54) 294. 
88 Section 59(2) 
89 PA 1978 s30(4), Patent Reg reg22(1). 
90 PA 1978 s61(1)(a). See du Plessis E ‘Protecting your intellectual property at the research stage’ 
(1993) 1 Juta’s Business Law 152-3; Burrell (n54) 209. 
91 PA 1978 s61(1)(a). However, these are substantive grounds and a ‘false’ statement which is more 
correctly a clerical error, would not be ground for revocation.  
92 PA 1978 s61(1)(b). 
93 PA 1978 s61(1)(g). See I O Tech Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Gallagher Group Ltd (872/12) [2013] 
ZASCA 180 (29 November 2013). See also van der Merwe (n54) 323; Moerdyk C ‘Fatal 
consequences’ (2014) March  Without Prejudice 44. 
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The Commissioner of Patents may resolve disputes as to parties’ ‘rights to obtain a 
patent for or to make, use, exercise or dispose of an invention, or as to the right to or 
title in a patent’.94 Although the powers of the Commissioner are wide, there is no 
discretion for an order of entitlement other than on the basis of section 27.95 In 
entitlement disputes over first ownership the party claims either on the basis of sole 
or joint inventorship, or as a non-inventor who has acquired title from the inventor. 
Under the PA 1952, specific provision was made for the resolution of disputes 
between employers and employees.96 Section 63(2) provided that if  
 ‘either of the parties claims to be entitled, to the exclusion of the other, to the benefit 
 of an invention made by the employee, the court or the commissioner may, unless 
 satisfied that one or other of the parties is so entitled, by order provide for the 
 apportionment between them of the benefit of the invention and of any patent granted 
 or to be granted in respect thereof, in such manner as the court or the commissioner 
 considers just’.97  
This provision was essentially a copy of section 56(2) of the British Patents Act 1949 
which was interpreted very restrictively by the House of Lords in Sterling Engineering 
Co Ltd v Patchett 98 as not allowing the Comptroller to provide an equitable 
distribution.  Weber noted while the provision was in force, that if this interpretation 
were followed in South Africa (at the time there were no cases in South Africa on the 
provision), the scope of the Commissioner’s discretion to apportion the benefit would 
be limited to situations where the employer and employee had entered into an 
agreement to share the benefit but were at odds as to its interpretation.99 In other 
words, it was not an apportionment to divide ownership rights. 
 
In so far as the South African system implements article 4ter of the Paris 
Convention, inventors are not expressly vested with a right to be mentioned as 
inventors in relation to the patented invention. At best, attribution is made indirectly 
through the formal requirements in the patent documentation filed at the Patent 
                                                          
94 PA 1978 s28(1)-(2). 
95 Id s28. 
96 PA 1952 s63(1). See Van Meeredevoort v Scaw Metal Products 1955 BP 186 (CP). 
97 PA 1952 s63(2). 
98 [1955] 1 All ER 369. See further Chapter 5 on the British system. 
99 See Weber E ‘Employees and patents’ (1955) 72 SALJ 415-417. 
91 
 
Office which require that the inventor be identified. The registration process requires 
that the applicant complete the relevant forms, a number of which include his or her 
identity.100 Where the Registrar finds that the application does not meet the formal 
requirements, he ‘may refuse to accept the application or require the application or 
the specification which accompanied it to be amended in such a manner as may be 
necessary’.101 Presumably, the indication of the name of the inventor would be a 
critical requirement meaning that a patent cannot be issued unless the forms have 
been fully completed – although the regulations do allow a three-month period to 
remedy the fault.102 This means that regardless of the assignment of the patent, the 
identity of the inventor must be provided. It is clear that the PA 1978 focuses only on 
the economic rights of the patentee. Attribution is indirect, and it is unclear whether it 
is an inventor’s right per se. 
 
Further, the PA 1978 requires that a register be kept at the Patent Office reflecting 
the personal details of applicants, grantees, and inventors associated with the 
invention.103  Whether or not this provision is sufficient to meet the obligations under 
article 4ter of the Paris Convention and its incorporation into the TRIPS Agreement is 
uncertain, although the answer to likely to be positive – albeit barely. 
 
3.3.3  The Role of Inventorship in Allocating Ownership 
 
The inventor is the touchstone for first ownership in the patent. The international 
paradigm in Chapter 2 posited that only the intellectual contribution of a natural 
person could be associated with inventorship, and does not recognise resource 
contributions by employers. This, in turn, has an effect on how the current system 
operates as an incentive mechanism. Although the PA 1978 does not limit first 
ownership to inventors, it does require the cooperation of the inventor in the sense 
that the application must be linked to the inventor’s claim to the invention. The 
inventor also enjoys an ongoing association with the invention by being identified as 
                                                          
100 See Form P2 (Register of Patents), Form P3 (Declaration and Power of Attorney), Form P6 
(Provisional Specification), Form P7 (Complete Specification), Form P8 (Publication Particulars). 
101 PA 1978 s35(1), Patent Regs 42, 43. 
102 Patent Reg 43. 
103 PA 1978 s10(1)(a); See Pat Regs 4 and 5. 
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such in the patent. In order to understand the incentive effect of granting a patent, it 
is necessary to understand what inventorship entails in South Africa.  
 
The PA 1978 does not define ‘inventor’ providing little more than that the ‘inventor’ is 
the person who invented the invention; and that an ‘invention’ is ‘an invention for 
which a patent may be granted under section 25’.104 For du Plessis, the 
determination of the identity of the inventor is, therefore, a question of fact to be 
determined objectively.105 Earlier patent statutes provided various definitions of 
‘inventor’ the substance of which, however, was no clearer than under the current 
position.106  Under the Cape Patents Act 17 of 1860, an importer qualified as an 
inventor – a reflection of the British influence from which the Act derived.107  This 
changed when the first Union statute, the PDTCA 1916, provided that ‘inventor’  
‘shall not include a person importing an invention from outside the Union’.108 This 
formulation was the result of the adoption of the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek’s 
(ZAR) approach which was based on the US approach which emphasised the first 
and true inventor.109 The definition of ‘inventor’ under the Patents Act 1952 ‘includes 
the legal representative of a deceased inventor or of an inventor who is a person 
under disability, but does not include a communicatee’,110 echoing the exclusion of 
an importer as an inventor.  What is distinctive about this is that inventorship was 
deemed in the sense that not only the actual inventor fell under the definition, but 
also his or her legal representative in certain cases. 
 
The only reported decision which specifically considered the substance of what it 
means to be an ‘inventor’ in the context of the PA 1978, is Galison Manufacturing 
                                                          
104 Section 2 definition of ‘invention’. 
105 Du Plessis (n90) 154. 
106 For an account of how the definitions of ‘inventor’ and ‘invention’ have changed see Naidoo (n74) 
12-15. See also on the historical development of the meaning of ‘invention’ in the South African 
statutes, Gerntholtz (n54) 28-30. Steyn (n54) 3-6 claim is the operative part of the patent to determine 
what the invention is. 
107 See Kemp v Appleby and Co (1865) 5 S 86. See also Burrell (n54) 55; see Steyn/Tanziani (n54) 
[159]; Gerntholtz (n54) 226-7. 
108 At s6. 
109 See Burrell (n54) 55-6; Steyn/Tanziani (n54) [159]. 
110 Act 37 of 1952 s1[vii]. 
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(Pty) Ltd v Set Point Industrial Technology (Pty) Ltd and another111before the 
Commissioner of Patents.112 The dispute involved entitlement to a patent for an 
invention for a mining hopper.113 The patent had been granted to Crause who had 
applied for it as sole inventor.  A series of assignments resulted in the second 
defendant, Shock Proof Investments 82 (Pty) Ltd, becoming the patentee. The 
plaintiff, Galison, claimed proprietorship or co-proprietorship on the basis that its 
employees had acted in the ‘course and scope of their employment’, and that it had 
thereby acquired the right to apply for the patent.114  
 
Set Point did not contest the claim that Galison would be entitled to apply for the 
patent if its employees were inventors, so limiting the issue for the court to whether 
Galison’s employees were inventors for the purposes of section 27.  The court, 
noting that ‘[t]he parties agree that there is no South African precedent dealing with 
this issue’, and faced with an absence of judicial precedent on the determination of 
inventorship under the legislation,115 followed the British case of Stanelco Fibre 
Optics Ltd’s Applications116 on the basis that ‘[t]he defendant’s counsel does not 
contend that this statement is not appropriate on the facts of the present case and it 
will be accepted as the proper approach to be adopted to the dispute’.117 According 
to Stanelco, as quoted in Galison v Set Point, ‘[t]he task of the court is to identify the 
inventive concept of the patent or application and identify who devised it … The court 
is not concerned with issues of validity or inventiveness: merely with the concept as 
described’.118 
 
As to the first task, the court looked to the specification to determine the inventive 
concept and linked it to specific claims. It considered the differences introduced by 
                                                          
111 98/4753 [ZACCP] 1 (30 January 2009). 
112 See further Tanziani D & Dohmen D ‘Galison Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Set Point Industrial 
Technology Pty Ltd: South Africa-patents-ownership’ (2009) 31 EIPR 75-77; Dohmen D ‘Staking the 
correct ownership claim early’ (2009) July Without Prejudice 24.  
113 Galison  (n110) para [10]. 
114 Id para [5]. This aspect is discussed below. 
115 Id para [14].  
116 [2005] RPC 15 (Ch D). 




the new hopper, which it referred to as ‘the inventive concept’.119 It is submitted that, 
on this approach, the ‘inventive concept’ may be regarded as the contribution that 
would entitle the inventor to a patent. Since the patentee’s monopoly is defined by 
the claims, this approach eliminates persons who did not contribute to the invention. 
A logical extension is that the person must have contributed an essential integer, 
although no mention of integers was made in the case.  
 
Next, the court identified the persons who had ‘devised’ the inventive concept.  While 
the court references the English case as the basis for the use of ‘devisor’, it is not 
clear that it appreciated that the paragraph quoted was in the context of the statutory 
definition of ‘inventor’ under the British Patents Act 1977.  In the British Act the 
inventor is defined as the ‘actual devisor’.120 The reliance on this interpretation of 
‘inventor’ as ‘devisor’ is not explained. Given the lack of precedent on the matter, the 
court’s comment that ‘[t]e defendant’s counsel does not contend that this statement 
is not appropriate on the facts of the present case’, could be construed as a 
significant, if not key, reason for the approach – as opposed to any other approach –  
being ‘accepted as the proper approach to be adopted to the dispute’.121  In Galison 
this entailed a factual enquiry into which parties were actually involved in causing the 
inclusion of the inventive concept in the patent.  
 
However, the use of ‘devisor’ as a synonym for ‘inventor’ in South African secondary 
sources actually predates Galison.  Tanziani notes, without providing any precedent, 
that ‘[t]he word “inventor” in relation to an inventor means the actual devisor of the 
invention’.122 While it is probably not problematic to identify the ‘devisor’, or even 
‘actual devisor’ as the person entitled to the patent, without qualification the term is 
open to a broad interpretation which would widen the pool of persons recognised for 
patent purposes.  This has implications not only for the potential increase in the 
number of persons able to assume the status of inventor, but also for whether or not 
inventorship will be limited to individuals directly involved in the intellectual process.  
                                                          
119 Id para [12]. 
120 British Patents Act 1977 s7(3). 
121 Galison  (n110) para [12]. 
122 Tanziani D ‘Intellectual Property II’ LexisNexis Online Forms and Precedents (2009) [6]; See du 
Plessis (n90) 153. 
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What is clear is that to be an inventor or devisor, a form of engagement in relation to 
the inventive concept is required.  However, what that engagement entails is unclear. 
According to du Plessis (prior to the decision) someone who merely offers ideas for 
an invention or assists by, for example, verifying information or carrying out 
specifically assigned tasks, 123 cannot be said to have devised the invention.   
 
While this conceptualisation favours natural persons, it is not clear that a juristic 
person would inevitably be excluded as a devisor and hence inventor. The only 
bases for this would be if the Act sustained an approach which accepted title on the 
basis of an agency relationship with a natural person, or through a deeming 
provision much like that used in the definition of ‘author’ in the Copyright Act.124 The 
issue has not been before the courts and the cases dealing with employee-
inventions accept that it is the employee who is the inventor for purposes of the 
legislation. In Galison, for example, there was no allegation that the employer-firm 
was the inventor of the creation made by its employees.  Academic sentiment also 
appears to favour the conceptualisation of inventorship being ascribed only to natural 
persons who make an intellectual contribution.125 
 
Steyn, writing before the PA 1978, stated that ‘[w]hen considering the full meaning of 
the phrase “true and first inventor” it should be borne in mind that only a natural 
person can be an “inventor”.  The necessary creative mental activity can only 
originate with a natural person.  This has been internationally recognised’.126 
Similarly Rattray, prior to the current Act, stated that 
 ‘[i]t is accepted throughout South Africa that only a natural person can qualify as an 
 inventor of an invention.  An invention can only be conceived in the mind of a 
 natural person who is  hence the inventor thereof.  It is through assignment of 
 proprietary rights from the employee-inventor that the latter acquires ownership of the 
                                                          
123 See du Plessis (n90) 153. 
124 Act 98 of 1978 discussed in Chapter 4. 
125 See, for example, Gerntholtz (n83) 42. 
126 Steyn (n54) 14. 
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 invention in question but the employee remains entitled to be cited as the 
 inventor’.127.  
 
His authority for this is limited to a single English case.128Van der Merwe clearly 
sums up the general approach that ‘[a]lthough inventors are natural persons, 
applicants can be either natural persons or juristic persons such as a company’.129  
 
Interestingly, one of Steyn’s conclusions on the juridical nature of patents is that a 
natural inventor is unnecessary. He postulates that  
‘[a]s it is now clear that a patent right does not derive from some basic right of 
property of an inventor in his invention, it is quite permissible, if the well-being of a 
society demands this, to reform patent law so as to abolish the necessity of providing 
an assignment of invention from an individual natural person or persons to a 
company where a company is the applicant for a patent.  In the large and 
increasingly more complicated manufacturing industry of the modern world with 
research departments involving numerous scientists persuing [sic] research projects 
in closely co-ordinated groups, the identifying of some person or persons as being 
the “inventor” of the invention ultimately produced by such a co-operative research 
programme, is often nothing more that [sic] a mere fiction. Bearing in mind the basic 
nature of a patent right in law there is no reason why the prerogative power of the 
sovereign should not be exercised in granting patents to companies for corporate 
inventions without the need, in appropriate cases, of identifying individuals persons 
as inventors’.130 
 
Burrell, too, does not dismiss the notion out of hand but stops short of endorsing 
juristic inventorship. He notes that it 
‘often happens in large corporations today that teams work on a project in a field of 
sophisticated technology, with their work resulting in an invention.  In such 
circumstances, and particularly where the project is completed only after a 
considerable period of time has elapsed, it can be difficult to determine  precisely 
who the inventors are.  Practically, the corporation may be regarded as the inventor 
                                                          
127 Rattray C ‘Rights of Employers in the Inventions of their employees’ published LLM Thesis UNISA 
(1978) 3. 
128 Rattray (n127) 3. For the same position in England see In the Matter of an Application for a Patent 
by SA du Generateur du Temple 13 RPC 54. 
129 Van der Merwe (n54) 294.  
130 Steyn (n54) 103-104. 
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but, logically, it seems correct to say that a corporation cannot be said to invent in the 
ordinary sense of the word’.131 He makes the point, however, that certain statutes 
overcame the problem by deeming inventorship’.132 
 
Ultimately, conventional wisdom dictates that inventorship is limited to a natural 
person who has made the intellectual contribution constituting the inventive concept. 
There is no mention of the contribution of material resources or intellectual input less 
than that reflected in the inventive concept in the claims. This formulation would not 
recognise a corporation for its contribution of resources, nor has it been suggested in 
the primary sources that a corporation could claim to be an inventor indirectly 
through the intellectual contribution of a natural person (for example as agent).  In 
this respect, the South African system reflects the international approach to 
inventorship. 
 
3.4 INVENTORSHIP AND OWNERSHIP OF EMPLOYEE-INVENTIONS 
 
3.4.1  General 
 
This section continues the exposition of the current patent system but analyses how 
inventorship and ownership are determined between the employer and employee-
inventor. As discussed, the PA 1978 limits applications to inventors or persons  
‘acquiring from “the inventor” the right to apply’.133 These two bases for the 
recognition of contributions from the employee and the employer are analysed and 
inform the conclusions about the alignment of the system to its purpose which close 
this chapter. The absence of explicit first-ownership rules in this situation,134 and the 
ambivalence in the few reported cases, result in an analysis which relies heavily in 
                                                          
131 Burrell (n54) 56. 
132 Ibid, ‘[t]he legislature however, appears to take a different view if its definition in the Standards Act 
29 of 1993, of the South African Bureau of Standards being deemed to be an inventor is to be any 
guide’. 
133 PA 1978 s27(1). 
134 Du Plessis (n90) 152: ‘If an employee did [invent], the question is whether ownership of the 
information vests in the employee of in the employer.  The Patents Act offers no help in this situation’; 
also Visser (n36) 363. 
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places on lengthy extracts, simply to avoid conjecture in the absence of definitive 
rules.   
 
3.4.2  Entitlement by virtue of Inventorship 
  
Section 27(1) provides that the inventor is entitled to apply for the patent.  In the PA 
1978 inventorship follows the conventional route which limits it to natural persons 
who have made the required intellectual contributions. Consequently, the employee 
who has made the requisite intellectual contribution will be recognised on this basis. 
However, the employer’s claim to applicant status on the basis of inventorship, 
requires an expansion of inventorship to include investment and to accommodate 
juristic inventorship.  It is submitted that although there is little by way of case law to 
completely scupper attempts at such expansion, such an interpretation would be 
unlikely and instead, the employer would have to acquire the right to apply from the 
employee. This is discussed next. 
 
3.4.3  Entitlement through Acquisition from the Inventor  
 
3.4.3.1  General 
 
Section 27 (1) provides that a non-inventors may apply for a patent provided that 
they have acquired the right to do so from the inventor.   Therefore, although the Act 
acknowledges inventorship as the basis for the grant of the patent, it anticipates 
circumstances where persons other than the inventor ought to be vested with first 
ownership in the patent. The bases which may give rise to such a transfer of first 
applicant status reflect contributions supplementary to actual inventorship which the 
system is also willing to recognise. 
 
Where the employee is the inventor, the employer’s title to apply for the patent 
depends on its having acquired the right from the employee-inventor.  As indicated 
previously, the patent and the rights in the application are assets which may be 
assigned, licensed, or used as security.  Under section 59(1) of the PA 1978 these 
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rights are ‘capable of assignment and of devolution by operation of law’.135 
Therefore, the only way for an employer to acquire the rights from an employee-
inventor are through assignment by the employee or by devolution of rights through 
operation of the law.  
 
3.4.3.2  Employers’ acquisition by assignment 
  
Although an assignment in the context of patent law is more correctly a cession, this 
use of the term is standard in the field.136 Section 60(1) provides that the ‘applicant 
for a patent or a patentee may in writing assign his rights in an application or patent 
to any other person’137 and that ‘[u]nless such assignment is so recorded it shall not 
be valid, except as between the parties thereto’.138 Consequently, an oral 
assignment does not transfer rights even though at common law an oral assignment 
is generally valid .139 Even the reduction of the agreement to writing would transfer 
rights only between the parties. It is only when the Registrar has recorded the written 
assignment that it will have any effect on third parties. Such assignments need not 
comply with any specific form in order to be registered, nor, according to Van der 
Merwe, do they need to be signed.140 The regulations to the Act simply require 
‘assignment or other proof, to the satisfaction of the registrar, of the right of the 
applicant to apply’.141  
 
In the employment situation, the underlying basis for the assignment is contractual 
and can relate to a specific invention or to employee-made inventions generally. The 
validity of the assignment ‘requires only a reasonable cause and need not be 
                                                          
135 Section 59(1). 
136 See further van der Merwe (n54) 313; Insolvent Estate Dapino v The Automatic Pit Company Ltd 
(1907) 24 SC 480. 
137 PA 1978 s60(1)(a).  See in respect of the Cape Patents Act 1860 that an unconditional assignment 
‘transfers ownership at once’ Insolvent Estate Dapino (n136) 485-7. See Souter v Norris 1933 AD 41 
on the position under the 1916 Act. 
138 Section 60(1)(b)-(c). 
139 See MDB Animal Health (Pty) Ltd v Monsanto Company 2003 BIP 47 (SCA) 49G–50B. See Steyn/ 
Tanziani (n54) [177]. 
140 Van der Merwe (n54) 313. 
141 Patent Regulations 1978 reg 22(1)(d). 
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accompanied by a quid pro quo’.142 As there is no set form both a specific or a more 
general written agreement would meet the formal requirement. In these written 
instruments, the assignment can be express or, as Van der Merwe indicates, 
tacit.143In the latter instance, the common-law rules relating to tacit terms determine 
the existence of an assignment in the contract.144 
 
There appear to be only two reported cases in which the written assignment of 
employee-inventions to employers has attracted attention. Neither is particularly 
illuminating but both serve as examples of what could constitute a written 
assignment. Plessey South Africa (Ltd) v Colin Victor Fellowes,145 an application 
under section 63 of the PA 1952, turned on the validity of a provision in the 
employment contract governing ownership in intellectual property made by the 
employee. Here Fellowes had made integrated circuits while employed as a sales 
engineer by Plessey. It was standard for Plessey’s employees who held positions of 
trust, such as that of sales engineer, to agree to the terms of its ‘Secrecy-Patents’ 
document when taking up employment.  Fellowes had signed the document but now 
contested that it in fact constituted an assignment. The document stated that 
‘[e]very such improvement, invention and discovery shall become the sole and 
absolute property of Plessey. The employee at any time, whether during his 
period of employment hereunder or thereafter, when required by Plessey and at 
Plessey’s expense, shall do and execute all acts, deed and things which may be 
required to enable Plessey to obtain the fullest benefit and advantage from each 
such improvement, invention...’.146 
 
Although the term ‘assignment’ is not used, it is not difficult to find that the 
assignment was included tacitly.  In this case, however, Fellowes claimed that he 
                                                          
142 Van der Merwe (n54) 313. 
143 Id 31; Hutchison D & du Bois F ‘Contracts in general’ in du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 9ed (2010) 800: ‘One general question concerns the effect of a contract being reduced to 
writing. An “entire agreement” or “integration” clause in a contract has been said not to preclude the 
existence of a tacit term, and it seems this also holds good when a statute requires the terms of a 
contract to be in writing’; Wilkins v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A). 
144 Tacit terms are discussed below in relation to devolution by operation of law. 
145 1976 BP 566. 
146 Id 571. 
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had signed the agreement under duress and that as such it was invalid. His alternate 
claim was that Plessey had waived its rights to the patent by not assisting him to 
make the patent application. Both defences were dismissed.  
 
In EI Du Pont De Nemours and Company v SA Nylon Spinners (Pty) Ltd147 the main 
prayer was for an extension of the term of the patent on the basis that the patentee 
had not derived adequate remuneration from it. A side issue related to whether the 
patentee’s acquisition of the rights to the invention had been through a proper 
assignment from its employee. The clause in question read: 
 ‘Any and all improvements and inventions conceived or made by the Employer [sic] 
 during the period of his said employment, relating in any way to the activities or 
 business of the Employer, shall be disclosed promptly to the Employer and shall be 
 the sole and exclusive property of the Employer or its nominee’.148  
It was conceded that the specific provisions in the contract of employment 
constituted a proper assignment so it was unnecessary for a further assignment to 
have been filed.  
 
The use of an assignment to transfer the right to apply for the patent in this way is, 
however, limited by section 59(2) of the PA 1978 which explicitly restricts the 
assignment of employee-inventions.149 Although not a first-ownership allocation as 
such, it is important for the effect it has on the possibility of the employer claiming 
first ownership. It must be noted that this is the only reference to the employment 
context in the Act. 
 
Section 59(2) provides as follows: 
 ‘[a]ny condition in a contract of employment which 
 (a) requires an employee to assign to his employer an invention made by him 
 otherwise than within the course and scope of his employment; or 
                                                          
147 1987 BP 282 (CP). 
148 Id 288. 
149 See Truluck C ‘IP developed by employees – who owns what?’ (2015) (November) Without 




 (b) restricts the right of an employee in an invention made by him more than one 
 year after the termination of the contract of employment, shall be null and  void’.150 
 
For purposes of this thesis, only section 59(2)(a) will be examined for its effect on 
assignment.   
 
Contracts of employment are entered into at the start of the employment relationship. 
Practically, the provision will apply predominantly to so-called pre-invention 
assignments, namely those which relate to inventions which have yet to be made, 
although it is broad enough to apply to inventions already existing at the inception of 
the contract.  Since such a term in the contract between the employer and employee 
is invalid, it is submitted that any subsequent assignment based on the contract of 
employment as the reasonable cause, would be void. In the absence of reported 
case law on the operation of section 59(2)(a), that effect will depend on the 
interpretation of a number of key elements in the provision.   
 
Section 59(2)(a) relates to conditions which are part of a ‘contract of employment’ 
between the parties. It ought, therefore, to be possible to avoid the application of the 
provision if the legal cause is not a condition in the employment contract.151 This 
approach turns on the interpretation of the provision, and in particular the  
 ‘contract of employment’ - which is not explained.  In the patent context at hand, a 
very inclusive approach to ‘contract of employment’, and so also to ‘employee’, will 
increase the likelihood of an invention being excluded from the employer’s reach. A 
narrow construction means more inventions will fall outside the ‘contract of 
employment’ and thus be unprotected. In the absence of explanatory guidelines in 
the Act and no judicial consideration of these terms in this specific context, it is not 
possible to offer a definitive interpretation. 
 
However, if the matter comes before the courts, they will most likely canvas statute 
and case law where the terms have been used. The difficulty with this approach lies 
                                                          
150 See Moubray H ‘Contracts of employment – the effect of section 59(2) of the Patents Act, No. 57 of 
1978 on ownership of inventions made by employees’ (1990 ) December SAIPL Newsletter 3.  
151 See further Tong L ‘Employee-made intellectual property: Statutory considerations for the 
contractual regulation of ownership’ (2015) 36 Industrial Law Journal 870. 
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in identifying appropriate sources outside of the PA 1978. So, for example, the 
statutory definitions of ‘employee’ in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(‘BCEA’)152 and the Labour Relations Act (‘LRA’)153 are wider than under common 
law, primarily as a result of the policy considerations underlying the legislation. 
Consequently, the basis on which to classify an inventor as an employee for the 
purposes of the labour legislation will not necessarily coincide with that of section 
59(2) of the PA 1978. The role of labour policy is explored in 3.5. 
 
The term ‘contract of service’ arises in section 21 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
which deals with first ownership in copyright and it is  tempting to rely on the 
copyright approach. In that context, the term is interpreted as an ongoing 
employment relationship in the nature of the locatio conductio operarum as 
distinguished from a locatio conductio operis.154 However, section 21 serves to 
deviate from the standard rule to take the role of the employer into account, whereas 
its use in section 59(2) is to restrict the employer’s reach. The appropriateness must 
therefore be questioned in light of the differing policy considerations. 
 
Assuming that the basis for the assignment is a condition in the employment 
contract, the limitation only applies to those inventions which do not fall within the 
‘course and scope’ of the inventor’s employment. Therefore, a condition in a contract 
of employment that the employer will own an invention made by the employee within 
the course and scope of his or her employment, is acceptable and constitutes a 
legitimate basis for the acquisition of the right to apply.155  Once again, a narrow or 
broad construction will affect the ambit of the application. Consequently, even though 
a broad construction of ‘contract of employment’ brings more inventions within the 
possible exclusionary effect of section 59(2)(a), a broad interpretation of ‘course and 
scope’ increases the range of inventions which the employer can require the 
employee-inventor to assign.  
 
                                                          
152 Act 75 of 1997. 
153 Act 66 of 1995. 
154 Du Plessis (n90) 153. See 4.3. below. 
155 For a discussion of the practical implementation of this specific aspect, see du Plessis (n90) 152. 
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This phrase, and various incarnations of it, such as ‘course of employment’ and 
‘scope of employment’ have arisen in other contexts, most notably delict and 
copyright. Consequently, commentary on how to interpret the provision, in the 
absence of decisions on point, tends to resort to areas of law other than patent.156  
 
Burrell argues that the phrase can be equated with ‘sphere of employment’ or simply 
‘related to his work’, and that a distinction should not be made between ‘course’ and 
‘scope’.157 He bases this argument on the approach of vicarious liability, and then 
suggests the following as a practical approach to the issue:  
‘Suppose the employee had been directed by his employer to apply his  energies to 
the inventive concept in issue and had refused to do so, would the employee, in that 
event, be in breach of his contract of employment or in breach of a duty towards his 
employer? If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, the invention would in 
most cases have been made in the course and scope of the employer’s 
employment’.158 
The inherent difficulty in trying to draw the boundaries is evident from his concession 
that this approach would ‘in most cases’ lead to the outcome, thereby begging the 
question: When would it not lead to the outcome?  
 
Du Plessis adopts a more literal (and consequently narrower) approach. She 
considers ‘course’ and ‘scope’ to be separate components of the requirement in 
section 59(2)(a) and does not resort to vicarious liability. The enquiry is simply a 
‘matter of fact’.159 Factors which may be taken into account to determine whether an 
activity falls within the course of employment include ‘whether the work was made 
during working hours’, ‘whether it was made in the employer’s premises’, and 
‘whether it was made with the employer’s equipment’.160  She distinguishes this from 
the scope of employment which requires that one ‘refer to the duties for which the 
employee was appointed’ which are gleaned from the job description. 161 On this 
                                                          
156 For commentary on this provision see Bramson L &Hooper T ‘Who owns what’ (2007) Without 
Prejudice 25-6; Moubray (n150) 3-4. 
157 Burrell 1999 (n54) 291. 
158 Id 292. 





basis, the absence of either the course or the scope would render a condition to 
assign the invention to the employer, null and void.  Merry and Vally also appear to 
regard the terminology as intentional.162 
 
Van der Merwe appears to agree with Burrell that the correct approach is to equate 
the phrase ‘course and scope of employment’ with ‘sphere of employment’, although 
he, like du Plessis, avoids delict as the basis.163  However, he seems to contemplate 
‘sphere’ to mean something narrower than a mere relation to the work of the 
employee in that it requires the inventiveness to be part of the employee’s duties. His 
approach, worth repeating in full, is that 
‘related to the work, seems realistic. A distinction can perhaps  be drawn between the 
situation in which an employee makes an invention in his sphere of employment by 
way of a more or less run-of-the-mill occurrence and that in which the 
application of an inventive faculty forms at least by implication part of the sphere of 
employment as is the case with, say, employed researchers.  It seems clear that, in 
the latter situation at least, the employer is entitled to the rights to an invention made 
by the employee. As regards inventions made by way of a run-of-the-mill occurrence 
– such as a miner’s making an invention that can be used in underground mining 
operations - the rights may more readily accrue to the employee as the invention was 
not made within the ‘sphere’ of employment, which in the case of the miner 
requires the miner to do mining work (footnotes omitted)’.164  
 
It is evident that in the absence of judicial scrutiny, the true effect of section 59(2)(a) 
remains uncertain. However, what is clear is the necessity to determine the scope of 
the provision in light of its link to the employment relationship. How one determines 
whether the assignment is as a consequence of a condition in the contract of 
employment, will depend on the approach to interpretation, which in turn ought to be 
one which arises as a consequence of the policy underlying the provision. 
 
The best approach is to start from policy considerations. Although these are not 
expressly stated in the provisions, the effect of the restriction is to temper the use of 
                                                          
162 Merry R & Vally M ‘Employing intellectual property wisely’ (2013) December De Rebus 29. 
163 Van der Merwe (n54) 316. 
164 Id 316-7. 
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contract by the employer to divest the employee of ownership where the invention 
bears no relation to the employment relationship. It is assumed that the contract of 
employment refers to a work relationship which creates the danger of the employee 
losing ownership when he or she ought not to assign it. It would make no sense 
otherwise to restrict the employee’s ability to decide whether or not to agree to an 
assignment. This resonates with the general objectives of labour law policy to protect 
employees from contracting on unfavourable terms with employers. 
 
The provision does not prohibit an agreement to assign an invention made outside 
the course of employment after the invention has been made – in other words, not as 
a condition in the employment contract. 
 
3.4.3.3  Acquisition of rights by operation of law  
 
3.4.3.3.1  Introduction 
 
There is no elaboration of the meaning of ‘operation of law’ and it is submitted that in 
this context it refers to little more than that the rights may be vested in a person as a 
consequence of a statutory enactment or common-law rule to that effect.165 The 
distinction is between the written assignment which arises as a consequence of an 
underlying agreement between the employer and employee, and the vesting of the 
right to apply in the employer by law in the absence such an assignment. 
 
In terms of the regulations to the Act, proof of the acquisition must be submitted to 
the satisfaction of the Registrar, although its form is not prescribed. It is submitted 
that the devolution would either be implied by statute or by the common law, or may 
arise as a tacit term in the contract. While the term ‘operation of law’ is more 
commonly associated with the former basis,166 this discussion adopts a broader 
approach to include the tacit terms on the basis that at common law they are a 
                                                          
165 The law of succession is one example. See also Chauvier NO v Universal Pool Products 1991 BP 
70 (CP). 




legally recognised way of creating obligations between parties.167  The following 
principles underlie the ensuing discussion. 
 
An implied term is described in South African Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 
as ‘a term that is introduced into the contract as a matter of course by operation of 
law, either the common law, trade usage or custom, or statute, as an invariable 
feature of such a contract, subject only to the parties’ entitlement in certain, but not 
all, instances to vary it by agreement’.168 In this case, ‘the intention of the parties will 
not come into the picture and the issue is purely a legal one, of whether in those 
circumstances in relation to a contract of that particular type the law imposes such a 
term on the parties as part of their contract’.169 Reliance on an implied term means 
that it is a legal question whether or not there has been a transfer of the right to 
apply from the employer to the employee. 
 
Whereas the intention of the parties to include implied terms in their relationship is 
irrelevant to that imposition, it does arise in the context of tacit terms. Here the 
consideration is ‘the presumed intention of the parties to a particular contract’.170 The 
recognised test is that of the ‘bystander’ or ‘officious bystander’,171 and refers to 
those terms in the contract to which the parties agreed but which, for whatever 
reason, were not expressed.  As stated in McKenzie it  
                                                          
167 In the case that a tacit term has been found to exist, it will be to the effect that the parties had 
intended that there would be a transfer of the rights; in which case a written assignment would be 
needed to complete the transaction for the purposes of the PA 1978. As indicated previously, the 
assignment could be express or tacit in the written instrument.  Where the party refuses to assign, this 
would likely be treated as a breach of the contract. 
168 Id para [11]. See also City of Cape Town (CMC Administration) v Bourbon-Leftley & another NNO 
2006 (3) SA 488 (SCA). On the distinction between trade usage as custom versus a tacit term, see 
Totalgaz Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Solgas (Pty) Ltd & another; Easigas (Pty) Ltd v Solgas (Pty) Ltd 
& another (No 2) 2009 BIP 347 (W) paras [29]-[34]. See also Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v 
Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) 531. 
169 Mckenzie (n166) para [11]. See also Bredenkamp v Standard Bank (599/09) [2010] ZASCA 75 (27 
May 2010) para [6]. 
170 Bredenkamp (n164) para [6]. 
171 De Lange v ABSA Makelaars (262/09) [2010] ZASCA 21 (23 March 2010) para [21]. See further du 
Bois (n143) 799. 
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 ‘arises from the actual or imputed intention of the parties as representing what they 
 intended should be the contractual position in a particular situation, or where they did 
 not address their minds to that situation, what it is inferred they would have intended 
 had they applied their minds to the question’.172 
The term is implied on the facts. Therefore, the employer must show that on the facts 
of the matter, the presumed intention of the parties was that the employer owns the 
invention. According to du Plessis, [c]ircumstances which would point to a tacit term 
that the intellectual property produced by an employee should belong to his 
employer include provisions that the employee was employed to do research, 
develop new techniques and design new products’.173  
 
The following analysis of the application of this provision as a basis for the allocation 
of ownership in employee-inventions, starts with a consideration of whether the 
employer can rely on an implied term derived from statute.  The obvious situations 
are where ownership devolves in terms of the relevant statutes as a consequence of 
the patentee’s death or insolvency.174 In this case, I analyse the PA 1978 to 
determine whether it is the source of an implied term.175  
 
This is followed by a discussion of the common law as authority for an implied term 
transferring the right to apply to the employer, and as the vehicle for the recognition 
of tacit terms which regulate ownership in inventions. The reason for combining the 
common-law discussion is that the very few reported cases which deal with 
patentable employee-inventions do not expressly indicate the basis on which title is 
being claimed by the employer and, in order to avoid conjecture as to whether they 
are evidence of an implied or tacit term, they are each considered as fully as is 
possible given the available details.   
                                                          
172 Mckenzie (n166) paras [11]-[12]. 
173 See also du Plessis (n 90) 153. See, for example, Brown NO v Simmons 1947 (4) SA 108 (SR) 
115. 
174  For example, the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 provides in s22(1) that copyright can be transferred by 
assignment, testamentary disposition and operation of law. It is submitted that the term ‘operation of 
law’ would include testamentary disposition.  
175 The IPPFRD Act, which is more obviously an example of devolution by operation of statutory law, 
will be discussed in the next chapter as it does not apply to the private sector inventions here 
addressed. See Chapter 4. 
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3.4.3.3.2  Implied by statute: PA 1978    
 
There is no explicit statutory enactment in the PA 1978 giving employers the right to 
apply for patents for their employees’ inventions.  The only reference to the 
employment context is section 59(2) and there is conflicting opinion as to its effect as 
a statutory devolution.   
 
According to Burrell, the legislature’s approach to entitlement to employee-inventions 
is evident from section 59(2)(a).  In Burrell’s 1985 edition of South African Patent 
Law and Practice, the author was of the view that the  
 ‘approach of the legislature which appears to emerge from s59(2)(a)…is that an 
 invention made by an employee within the course and scope of his employment 
 would rightfully be the property of the employer provided that a contract to that effect 
 is in existence. This indeed would appear to be the correct approach in South African 
 patent law’. 176   
 
According to him, this implies a two-pronged enquiry: ‘whether the invention was 
made by the employee within the course and scope of his employment’, and 
‘whether there was a contractual relationship between the employee and the 
employer entitling the employer to rights in respect of the invention’.177 He cites 
Morewear Industries (Rhodesia) (Private) Limited v William Michie Irvine178 as 
authority. It is not entirely clear that he is indeed advocating that the effect of s59(2) 
is that the rights devolve on the employer in terms of the PA 1978.  His contention 
can also be read simply as a repetition of section 59(2)(a) – that it is possible for the 
employer to acquire employee-inventions through assignment provided that 
assignments of the type referred to in s59(2)(a) are prohibited. In other words, there 
still has to be an assignment from the employee to the employer of inventions made 
in the course of employment. 
 
However, in the 1999 edition of his work, the entry has changed to read that the 
 
                                                          
176 Burrell T South African Patent Law and Practice 2ed (1985) 320. 
177 Id 320. 
178 1960 BP 202 (RPT). 
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‘approach of the legislature which emerges from section 59(2)(a)…is that an 
invention made by an employee within the course and scope of his employment 
would rightfully be the property of the employer.  This is but a reflection of the 
position on common-law principles.  The enquiry is two-fold: first, whether the 
invention was made by the employee within the course and scope of his employment 
and, second, whether there was a contractual relationship between the employee 
and the employer entitling the employee  to rights in respect of the invention, 
notwithstanding that the invention was made in the course of his duty as an 
employee’.179  
 
The reference to ‘provided a contract to that effect exists’ has been removed. He 
seems to be saying the position implied by the legislature is the same as that at 
common law.  It is submitted that it requires a very strained reading of section 
59(2)(a) to regard it, in its current form, as a legislative provision to that effect, and 
furthermore, there is in fact no clear authority as to the common-law position in 
South Africa.  
 
In 1993, du Plessis did not see section 59(2) as an implied rule for devolution in 
favour of the employer.  She noted with regard to ownership of employee-inventions, 
that  
 ‘[t]he Patents Act offers no help in this situation.  Generally, it seems that two 
 requirements must be satisfied if an invention made by an employee is to belong to 
 his employer: there must be a contract between employer and employee providing 
 for ownership in inventions made by the employee to pass to the employer; and the 
 invention must have been made within the course and scope of the employee’s 
 employment’.180 
  
However, in a 2004 report on ownership of employee-inventions in South Africa, du 
Plessis put forward the view that ‘[f]rom this provision [s 59(2)(a)] it seems that the 
approach of the legislature is that an invention made by an employee within the 
                                                          
179 Burrell (n54) 290.  
180 Du Plessis (n90) 152.  
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course and scope of his/her employment would rightfully be the property of the 
employer’.181 The report continues that  
 ‘[h]owever, the Patents Act does not contain a provision which expressly ex lege 
 attributes the invention made by an employee within the course and scope of his/her 
 employment to the employer. In practice employers in South Africa are advised to 
 include appropriate clauses in employment contracts or regulations or institutional 
 rules of statutes’.182 
It would seem that if the legislation is indeed to be interpreted to mean that the 
invention belongs to the employer, there ought to be no need for employers also to 
rely on contract. 
 
Van der Merwe is less ambiguous and ambivalent.  His view - section 59(2)(a) plays 
no role where the contract of employment  does not deal with ownership of 
inventions - is to be preferred.183 His approach to section 59(2)(a) is that 
 ‘[w]hen an invention is not made during the course and scope of 
 employment, a condition in a contract of employment that grants the 
 employer rights in that invention is invalid (null and void). The converse is 
 that a condition in a contract that gives the employer the right to inventions 
 made or realized in the course and scope of an employee’s employment is 
 valid.  As employment is contractually regulated, a logical deduction is that, 
 when a contract of employment does not deal with rights to inventions, the 
 employer cannot claim any right to inventions made during the course and 
 scope of the inventor’s employment’.184 
 
Furthermore, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeal in King that ‘[p]resumably 
the common-law approach still applies to South African patents since the current 
Patents Act 57 of 1978 does not deal with patents by employees’,185seems to prefer 
                                                          
181 Du Plessis E ‘Employers’ rights to intellectual property’ Report Q183 South Africa Group AIPPI 
2004 3. 
182 Ibid. 
183 In other words, where it has not been dealt with whether by express or tacit terms of the 
employment contract. Van der Merwe (n54) 317. 
184 Van der Merwe (n54) 317. 
185 Para [14] n7. 
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view that a rule relating to the ownership of employee-inventions (patentable or not) 
must be sought in the common law, not the PA 1978.  
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the PA 1978 does not imply a statutory rule which 
devolves the right to apply for a patent on the employer. 
 
 
3.4.3.3.3  Acquisition by common law: Implied rules and tacit terms 
 
We now turn to whether the common law may serve as the basis for the acquisition 
of rights by the employer, through either an implied term or a tacit term in the 
employment agreement.  
 
Neither the Supreme Court of Appeal nor its predecessor courts has fully considered 
the ownership of patentable employee-inventions; the closest the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has come to dealing with the matter is in a footnote to King v SA Weather 
Service.186 The court rejected a submission that the phrase ‘course of employment’ 
in section 21 of the CA 1978 should be interpreted restrictively to mean ‘in terms of’ 
the employment contract’.  Harms JA’s view was that the  
 ‘submission may have had some merit had the [Copyright] Act provided as s39 of the 
 British Patents Act 1977 provides, namely that the employer is the owner of an 
 invention made “in the course of” the “normal duties” of the employee. This provision 
 changed the common-law test, which does not refer to “normal duties” but it retained 
 the “in the course of” requirement’.187 
In a footnote to this sentence, the judge notes that: ‘Presumably the common-law 
approach still applies to South African patents since the current Patents Act 57 of 
1978 does not deal with patents by employees’.188 This is the sum total of the 
reference. There is no mention of the English common law rule referred to having 
been accepted as part of the South African law in any South African case. The 
sentence itself is somewhat ambiguous as there is no reason why the English 
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common-law provision should automatically apply. In any event, the reference in this 
case is obiter and, in itself, is not binding precedent. 
 
What follows is a chronological investigation of the available reported case law to 
determine whether any of the cases are precedent for a South African common-law 
position that there is an implied allocation rule, or are examples of how tacit terms 
may be read into the contract and thus serve as a basis for employer-acquisition. 
Regrettably, the paucity of detail necessitates lengthy reproduction of parts of the 
cases for the sake of clarity. 
 
One of the earliest cases in the South African literature on ownership of employee-
inventions is Brown NO v Simmons .189 Brown was an application under the 
Rhodesian Patents Act before the Southern Rhodesian Court in Salisbury for the 
revocation of a patent for an invention involving furnaces.190  The respondent, 
Simmons, had been employed by the applicant, Brown, as part of an effort ‘to get the 
services of an engineer interested and experienced in the question of thermal 
efficiency of furnaces to supervise experiments’.191 Brown wanted Simmons 
performs tests to determine the comparative efficiency of four different types of 
furnaces.192One of the furnaces was not available and, upon Simmons’ request, 
Brown authorised him to use a furnace which he (Simmons) had designed.  
Simmons applied for, and was granted a patent on the furnace.  
 
Brown sought, unsuccessfully, to revoke the patent for lack of novelty and 
inventiveness. The alternate claim was that Simmons had made the invention while 
performing work he was employed to do and that as such, Brown ought to be co-
patentee. Although the court expressed doubt as to the (procedural) correctness of 
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this claim,193 it nonetheless rejected the claim on the basis that the evidence showed 
that the Simmons 
‘respondent was employed for the sole purpose of carrying out tests as to the 
comparative efficiency of various types of furnaces. He was not asked to conduct 
experiments with a view to designing a better type of furnace and it was only 
because one of the furnaces which it proposed to test was not available that he was 
given permission, at his own request,to install and test a furnace designed by 
himself. It is true that he built the Eureka [furnace] while employed by the board, 
presumably at the board’s expense, and that he furnished reports on it.  But the 
designing of furnaces was not part of his employment and it cannot properly be said 
that he evolved the Eureka while doing work and conducting experiments along the 
lines which his employer had employed him for and directed him to follow’.194 
 
This paragraph is all that the court had to say on this point. It does not deal 
specifically with the nature of the relationship between the parties, and while it may 
well be that the employment referred to was an ongoing contract, it appears that 
Simmons was employed for a very specific task. There is nothing to suggest that the 
court’s interpretation was based on an implied term, or that it was reading in a tacit 
term in light of the particular facts. In any event, as authority for a common-law 
implied term, it is submitted that as a Rhodesian case it has weak (if any) precedent 
value in South Africa today. 
 
Interestingly, Gerntholtz says of Brown that ‘[i]t was held that in the absence of an 
express agreement all rights in an invention, made by an employee in the course of 
his employment, belong to the employer if made in the course of the employee’s 
employment’.195 It is submitted that the case is not authority for so broad a 
statement, or even for an implied term.196 
 
Rattray appears to regard the case as of value to South Africa because the 
‘influence of English law on the development of South African law hardly needs 
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emphasising, and it is apparent how influenced the court was in Brown N.O. v 
Simmons supra by the judgments appearing in the official British case reports’.197 
Interestingly, the reported judgment refers to no English cases dealing specifically 
with this aspect. 
 
Another Rhodesian case which has found its way into the South African literature is 
Morewear Industries (Rhodesia) (Private) Limited v William Michie Irvine198 which 
was heard by the Patents Tribunal of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and required the 
court to make a declaration in terms of section 46 of the Rhodesian Patents Act of 
1957 as to which of the parties was entitled to the patent.  The invention related to 
hitches had been made by the respondent, Irvine, during the period of his 
employment in the applicant company, Morewear. The issue was whether the design 
of the hitch fell within the ambit of what he had been employed to do. The court 
accepted that if this were the case, Morewear would own the invention. The court 
relied on the English case of Patchett v Sterling Engineering as source for a rule by 
which to decide two main issues in the case at hand:  
 ‘1. Did the respondent make the invention in the course of his duty, as an employee 
 of applicant company? The onus is on the applicant to establish this.  If applicant 
 discharges that onus, then applicant must succeed unless respondent establishes; 2. 
 That there was a special agreement between applicant and respondent entitling 
 respondent to rights in respect of the patent, notwithstanding that the invention was 
 made in the course of his duty as an employee’.199 
 
Much of the case is concerned with the first leg, namely to determine whether the 
respondent’s invention fell within the course of his duties. The court found that on 
applying the principles it had culled from the English cases, ‘it would be inconsistent 
with the duty implied from his contract of service that he should be allowed to hold 
the patent for that invention otherwise than as trustee for his employer’.200 The court 
clearly considered that the common law in Rhodesia implied such a rule where the 
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parties were in an employment relationship. However, issues similar to those in 
Brown arise with regard to Morewear’s value as precedent for South Africa.  
 
Morewear, along with Patchett v Sterling, was referenced in Pressings and Plastics 
(Pty) Ltd and another v Sohnius (‘Sohnius TPD’)201 – arguably the closest our courts 
have come to expressly stating that there is an implied common-law rule. The matter 
is unusual because the employee, Sohnius, was effectively also the employer at the 
time of the invention.  Sohnius was the sole employee of the two companies he ran. 
He sold his shares in the companies to the applicants, but had earlier applied for a 
patent on an invention he had made. The new owners of the two companies claimed 
that they had acquired the patent when the companies had been transferred 
because Sohnius had been an employee when the inventions were made. They 
claimed revocation of the patent under section 61 of the PA 1978 on the basis that it 
had been fraudulently obtained. 
 
In Pressings and Plastics (Pty) Ltd v Heinrich Sohnius202 (‘Sohnius CP’) the 
Commissioner of Patents found that the applicant’s decision to proceed under the 
revocation provision rather than section 28 was ‘misconceived’203because section 28 
was in fact  
  ‘clearly designed to apply to the case where a dispute arises between the employer 
 and a person who is, or was at the material time his employee, as to the rights of the 
 parties in respect of an invention made by the employee or in respect of a patent or 
 patent application covering the invention’.204  
Therefore, in response to the applicant’s reliance on the two cases, the 
Commissioner found them irrelevant to section 61 as they had no ‘bearing on the 
situation of an employee who applies for a patent in his own name with the express 
or tacit agreement of his employer’.205 
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On appeal, the court also found that section 28 was the appropriate provision, but 
held the appellants to their election to proceed under section 61(1) which meant that 
they had to show that the respondent had acted fraudulently. The appellants 
submitted that ‘arising out of the fact that the respondent was employed as the 
person who supervised and controlled the technical sides of the appellants, with the 
general duty to improve their products, what was imported into his employment was 
a term that an invention was the property of his employers’, and alternatively ‘by 
reason of the respondent’s managing directorship, it was inconsistent with his duty of 
good faith for him to benefit or profit against the appellants’.206 
 
The basis for their argument in support of the first claim was that the ‘rule as stated 
in these cases [the English case of Patchett v Sterling and the Rhodesian Morewear 
v Irvine case], and in other decisions to the same effect, applies automatically by 
operation of law in a case such as the present in which the respondent’s [inventor’s] 
relationship to each of the appellants was that of an employee responsible for, inter 
alia, technical management and technical innovation’.207 
 
The court also referred to Morewear where it was held that ‘it would make no 
difference to the application of the rule that the employee developed the invention at 
home and after hours’.208 The TPD noted further that the appellants ‘conceded that 
the operation of the rule could be excluded if the employer consented thereto, but 
contended that the onus in this case rested on the respondent to show such 
consent’.209 
                                                          
206 Sohnius n201 528. 
207 Ibid. The court noted further that the appellants ‘relied on Patchett v Sterling Engineering Co Ltd 
[1955] 72 RPC 50; [1955] 1 All ER F 369 (HL).  In that case Viscount SIMMONDS said…: “It is 
elementary that, where the employee in the course of his employment (ie,in his employer’s time and 
with his materials) makes an invention which it falls within his duty to make, …he holds his interest in 
the invention and in any resulting patent, as trustee for the employer unless he can show that he has 
a beneficial interest which the law recognises.”  And at 58 Lord REID said… “…it is, in my judgment, 
inherent in the legal relationship of master and servant that any product of the work which the servant 
is paid to do  belongs to the master: I can find neither principle nor authority for holding that this rule 





The difficulty with this case is that the respondent was also effectively the sole 
shareholder of the appellant companies at the time. This meant that he had to prove 
that he had given himself consent to retain the invention. On the evidence it was 
found that he had in fact done so in a way that had not breached the good faith 
fiduciary relationship between him and the appellants.210 The appellants were not 
able to show that the patent had been secured in fraud of their rights, as they were 
required to prove under section 61(1)(b) of the PA 1978.  
 
It would appear that the court accepted the appellants’ submission that the rule in the 
two cited cases should apply. However, given that, based on the argument put 
forward by the appellants, the court was only required to determine whether there 
had been fraudulent behaviour on the part of Sohnius under section 61, the question 
arises as to the value of this case as precedent for an implied rule. The court was not 
actually called upon to determine the rights of the parties, as it would have been had 
the appellants relied on section 28 of the PA 1978.211 In addition, no South African 
authority was introduced, and the court failed to explain its reliance on these cases 
as authority for the South African position.  If anything, reliance on a tacit term to 
support employer ownership would be more appropriate, and the facts would likely 
have supported a finding in favour of the appellants, if one considers that the 
respondent supervised and controlled the technical side of the companies and had a 
general duty to improve their products.212 
 
In Firm Construction Co Ltd v P G Kusel213 the issue was whether an assignment of 
a patent application by an employee to its employer was required before the 
employer could acquire rights in an invention made by the employee. The applicant 
was employed by WJM Rail (Pty) Ltd as a director. It was claimed that subject matter 
of the invention fell directly within the scope of the business of the company. 
According to the court in response to this information from the respondent, ‘[t]he 
conclusion which is drawn in this statement obviously refers to the fact that the 
inventor was, at the time of the invention, acting within the course of [sic] scope of 
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his duties with his employer, and that therefore the invention became the property of 
the employer’.214 
 
The applicant argued that an employee-inventor, ‘even though he has no rights, also 
has the duty of assignment of his invention to the satisfaction of the registrar before 
a right of application to the patent accrues’.215 Therefore, because there had been no 
assignment, the employer had not acquired rights in the application. The court 
rejected this argument by finding that ‘t]here is authority that no assignment is 
necessary as between the employer and the employee where he acted within the 
course and scope of his duties and if any proof should be needed, it can be provided 
either by submission of the contract of employment or by an affidavit, if it is an oral 
agreement, and I have no doubt that the Commissioner of Patents will act thereon in 
considering the application’.216 
 
It would seem that this case confirms that where the employer has derived title from 
the employee, it is not necessary to provide an assignment document as proof for 
the Registrar, but that lodging the contract of employment or other proof would be 
sufficient.217 It is not clear whether this short statement on the issue by the court 
means that a contract of employment – without reference to employee-inventions 
tacitly or expressly – would suffice because it is indicative the type of relationship 
which attracts an implied common-law rule that vests ownership in the employer; or 
whether it is required that the employment contract or affidavit lodged must speak to 
the issue expressly or tacitly.  In other words, in the latter case the interpretation of 
the provision means simply that the written assignment requirements as the basis for 
acquisition, will be fulfilled in this way.  It could also simply be referring to the use of 
a tacit term in the contract of employment as the basis for the employer’s acquisition. 
The employment contract and the allocation term it contains, whether tacit or 
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express, serve as proof that the employer acquired the rights through an assignment 
in the contract. Similarly, the affidavit would serve as proof of the same thing.218 
 
The uncertainty is compounded by the lack of authority cited in the case. There is 
also no reference to any sources for the formulation of an implied rule in the nature 
of ‘course and scope of employment’. Consequently, it is submitted, this case on its 
own cannot be viewed as (sufficient) authority for an implied common-law rule 
relating to patentable inventions, and at best would be an example of an acquisition 
on the basis of a tacit term. 
 
In Galison, discussed in relation to inventorship above, it was proposed by Galison 
and accepted by the respondent, that the employer was entitled to apply for the 
patent by virtue of the invention having been made in the course and scope of its 
employees’ employment.  Unfortunately, there was no further engagement with this 
proposed rule since it was argued on the basis that  
‘[t]he defendant  accepts that if Thorburn and Skelton devised the invention, they did 
so in the course and scope of their employment with the plaintiff and that the plaintiff 
will be entitled to be registered as patentee of the patent.  If the plaintiff cannot prove 
that Thorburn and Skelton devised the invention of  the patent then the plaintiff will 
not be entitled to any relief’.219 
 
It is not clear whether the plaintiff came to this conclusion based on a written term in 
the employment contract to that effect, or whether it was assumed by the parties that 
this was an implied term, or whether it was a tacit term. This agreement between the 
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parties does not translate into binding precedent as to the existence and nature of an 
implied common-law rule to that effect. 
 
Makate v Vodacom220 concerned an employee’s claim to compensation for an 
invention which had resulted in substantial financial success for his employer. The 
technology developed was not a patentable invention but rather a business idea and 
no patent was filed. However, it potentially raised the question of ownership in the 
innovation, mainly as a defence by Vodacom to Makate’s contractual claim for 
compensation. By the time the matter was heard by the High Court, it had been 
reduced to whether or not the person who had entered into the agreement with 
Makate, had had the authority to do so. However, in an earlier application for 
discovery, references to ownership of products made during employment had been 
raised. The court had noted that Vodacom’s defence to Makate’s claim was that ‘any 
rights  attaching to a product originated by him during the course and scope of his 
employment with Vodacom belonged to it’,221  but that ‘[i]n this regard the applicant 
claims that he was employed in Finance and not in the Research and Development 
Department’.222  The only other reference was in the same case that 
‘the main issues relate firstly to whether the applicant is the originator of the product 
or the idea for the product, and, if so, whether there was an undertaking by Vodacom 
to remunerate him, either on a specific basis, based on an implied or tacit term of 
reasonable remuneration to a person in the position of the applicant employed in that 
type of industry […] or whether he was not entitled to any  additional remuneration 
because he was working for Vodacom at the time and , as a result, any innovation on 
his part (irrespective of  the fact that he happened to work in accounts), immediately 
became the property of the company which employed him’.223  
 
This is the sum total of the references to the issue. It may well have been a 
reference to a tacit term but it is certainly not precedent for an implied term relating 
to the issue of ownership of inventions. 
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From the available case law, it is submitted that it is not possible to conclude that the 
common law supports an implied term entitling the employer to inventions made by 
the employee in all employment contracts. The case law specifically dealing with 
patentable inventions provides no convincing evidence of such rule – whether or not 
in the same formulation as the English common law – forming part of our body of 
judicial precedent. One could even argue to the contrary - the scope of the right has 
not been clearly articulated. While English law has certainly played a role in the 
development of both our labour and patent laws, principles in early cases like 
Patchett v Sterling are not automatically part of South African common law.224  At 
best, where courts have found in favour of employers, an argument in favour of a 
tacit term would be better supported by the various factual scenarios. 
 
There does appear to be legal opinion in support of an implied common-law rule, 
usually formulated along the lines that ‘an invention made in the course and scope of 
employment belongs to the employer’. However, none of the proponents expresses 
the rule with any certainty or provides compelling authority.  
 
Norman-Scoble, for example, bases his entire commentary on ownership of 
employee-inventions on foreign sources. Writing in 1956, he was of the view that the 
answer to the question of who is entitled to the benefit of an invention made by a 
‘servant’, was that ‘[w]here a servant is employed to prosecute research work on 
behalf of his  master then the master is entitled to the benefit of the result of the 
servant’s labours [...]’, but that ultimately ‘[m]uch however depends on 
the terms of the contract and the nature of the employment. 225 
  
As regards patentable inventions, Norman-Scoble’s comments are somewhat 
difficult to understand.  For example, he notes that   
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 ‘[t]he ordinary rule is that if an employee’s invention is patented in the joint names of 
 the employer and employee, the employee holds his interest as trustee for the 
 employer.  The rule can only be excluded by an express agreement to the contrary 
 (Sterling Engineering Co Ltd v Patchett  1955 (1) All ER 369 (H of L))’.226  
 
His reliance on English law for this observation makes little sense in the context of 
the PA 1952 which applied at the time. As Rattray notes, the ‘rule’ espoused by 
Norman-Scoble is likely a reference to the pre-BPA 1949 rule that the inventor had to 
be an applicant for the patent. Where, as between the employer and employee, the 
employer was entitled to the invention, it was a custom for employees and employers 
to file the application in their joint names and then have the employee assign his or 
her ownership to the employer. Because the BPA 1949 changed the rule to reflect 
that an applicant need not be the inventor, the practice would have had no relevance 
since the passing of that Act.227 Furthermore, in South Africa, assignees have always 
been allowed to apply for patents on inventions they have not invented. 
 
According to Gerntholtz 
‘[i]f no contract exists between an employer and employee, the general view 
is that the rights in an invention made by an employee belong to the 
employer if: 
  1. The invention was made in the course of the employment of 
  the employee, and 
  2. the invention is applicable in the line of business of the  
  employer, and 
  3. it could be expected from the employee to make the  
  invention’.228  
 
Gerntholtz clearly advocates an implied common-law rule but does not substantiate 
this with any judicial precedent or common-law historical sources. The reference to 
‘general view’ further points to the possible lack of authoritative sources. 
 
                                                          
226 Ibid. 
227 See further Rattray (n127) 156. 
228 Gerntholtz (n83) 73; Gerntholtz  (n54). 
124 
 
In 1999, Burrell appears to support a rule favouring employer-ownership which can 
be traced to the common law, but sees it as now being implicit in the PA 1978 by 
virtue of section 59(2)(a).229  As explained previously, this is a shift from his earlier 
view which appeared to insist on a contract passing ownership from the employee to 
the employer. The reason for the shift is not clear. He relies on Morewear as his only 
authority. No further sources are added save for a reference to an ‘interesting 
analysis’ in an article by Moubray. The shift may simply be to clarify his earlier view, 
but it is clear that he recognises a common-law rule that an ‘invention made by an 
employee within the course and scope of his employment would rightfully be the 
property of the employer’. 230 Given the uncertain status of Morewear as precedent 
for South Africa, it may be concluded that even if the rule is not contentious, it was 
certainly not found in that form in South African precedent. 
 
Abrahamson and Hooper expressly state that:  
‘South African common law provides that the rights to an invention made by an 
employee during the course and scope of his employment belong to the employer. 
This is so whether there is a formal employment contract or not. S59(2)(a) of the 
Patents Act specifically provides that a condition in a contract which requires an 
employee to assign to his employer an invention made otherwise than within the 
course and scope of his employment shall be null and void’231 
 
However, they continue that  
‘[t]here can be no doubt that an individual employed to carry out research in relation 
to business activities of his employer, has an obligation to assign the rights to that 
invention to the employer. So the rights of a research engineer, employed to carry 
out research on new and improved mining skips for a company making skips, have 
already passed to the employer by operation of law’.232 
 
The authors provide no authority or reference for this. Furthermore, it is submitted 
that under the PA 1978, where the rights have passed by operation of law an 
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assignment is unnecessary since operation by law is used in contradistinction to 
assignment. The Registrar would simply need proof of the acquisition. 
 
Van der Merwe also notes that where ‘a contract of employment does not deal with 
inventions made during the course and scope of employment’, the common law 
applies.  He posits that the common law is that ‘inventions made during the course 
and scope of employment are broadly accepted as belonging to the employer’.233 No 
references are provided to support the statement. 
 
While there is sentiment supporting a common-law basis for employer-ownership in 
certain cases, the failure of the authors to provide compelling precedent or sustained 
argument, combined with the variations in the formulation of such a rule, are factors 
which call into question the legitimacy and scope of the claim. 
 
3.4.4  Attribution of Employee-inventors 
 
The PA 1978 makes no specific provision for the right of the employee to claim 
attribution as the inventor. The formal requirements governing the inclusion of the 
inventor’s details in the patent documentation irrespective of changes in ownership 
of the patent, apply equally in the employment context. 
 
3.4.5  Preliminary Comment 
 
The PA 1978 makes very limited explicit provision for the employee-invention 
paradigm. Section 59(2)(a) is the only reference to the employment relationship and 
it introduces familiar-sounding terms like ‘employee’ and ‘course and scope of 
employment’, without defining them. This concern extends beyond the interpretation 
of section 59(2)(a) to concern with the acquisition of title under a common-law 
implied or tacit term. Again, terms like ‘employee’, ‘employment’, and ‘course of 
employment’ emerge from the case law and opinions, but without a clear indication 
of their meaning in the particular context. 
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In both the section 59(2)(a) situation and the common-law bases, the approach to 
interpreting the rule will determine the effect on either party. In other words, a broad 
interpretation of terms will affect the impact of the rule by, for example, favouring a 
particular party.  The concern for this thesis is to understand what effect this has on 
the allocation of ownership. Since the concern arises as a consequence of the work 
relationship between the firm and the inventor, the nature and effect of such a 
context must inform the interpretation. In the next section, ‘The Regulatory Context  
for the Employed Inventor in South Africa’, I engage with the legal regulatory 
environment which exemplifies the employment context. 
 
 
3.5 THE LABOUR REGULATORY CONTEXT FOR THE EMPLOYED 
INVENTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
 
3.5.1  General 
 
To understand the prevailing paradigm in which ownership of patentable inventions 
is allocated between employer-corporations and employee-inventors, it is necessary 
to establish the potential effect, if any, of the existence of an employment 
relationship on the regulatory context.  To this end, attention is drawn to six 
propositions about the regulation of employment relationships in South Africa. These 
are not intended to be a detailed or analytical study of South African labour law but 
they serve to highlight pertinent features and policy considerations underlying the 
regulation of work relationships of the kind under consideration. References to the 
‘corporation’ and ‘inventor’ are references to the employer and employee 
respectively. 
 
3.5.2 Characteristics of the South African Labour Regulatory Framework  
 





The first proposition is that the basis for any employment relationship is a legal 
nexus between the parties.234  The nature of that nexus is generally contractual.235 In 
the absence of such a relationship, rules regulating employment will not apply.  Once 
a work arrangement between inventor and corporation is characterised in law as 
‘employment’, then, notwithstanding how parties have structured their relationship 
and the terms they may have negotiated in respect of the ownership of inventions, 
the juridical nature of their relationship will attract an array of implied common-law 
and statutory rights and duties. It is the status of the parties, as employer and 
employee, which results in each being subject to these rights and duties.236  The 
issue is one which has seen courts shifting in their approach between focusing on 
the actual contract and the employment relationship as the basis. 
 
However, employment relationships are used as a touchstone to serve different 
purposes and consequently a person who is an employee for the purposes of one 
set of legal consequences – for example, vicarious liability – would not necessarily 
be an employee where the employment relationship is used to allocate social 
security benefits. 
 
Proposition 2: Common law ‘contracts of employment’ reflect the 
historical nurturing of a binary division between dependent 
and independent workers – a phenomenon captured in the 
classification of work arrangements as locatio conductio 
operarum or locatio conductio operis 
 
Although, much of the discretion to contract over employment has been lost to 
statutory regulation, the common law remains relevant where there are no statutory 
alternatives by which to determine the rights and duties regulating the employment 
relationship between the corporation and inventor.237 There is no single way of 
                                                          
234 See Wallis M ‘The LRA and the common law’ (2005) 9(2) Law, Democracy and Development 181. 
235 See Universal Church of the Kingdom of God v Myeni and others (2015) 36 ILJ 2832 (LAC) 
par[51]. 
236 See Van Staden M & Smit N ‘The regulation of the employment relationship and the re-emergence 
of the contract of employment’ (2010) 4 TSAR 709; Theron ‘Who’s in and who’s out: Labour law and 
those excluded from its protection’ (2011) LDD 32. 
237 See, for example, Wallis (n234) 190; Bosch C ‘The implied term of trust and confidence in South 
African labour law’ (2006) 27 ILJ 28, 29. Van Staden & Smit (n236) 712-718; Theron (n236) 31; See 
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encapsulating the essential nature of the contract of employment and ‘[f]actors 
identifying the contract of employment will depend to a large extent on how the 
contract is defined and vice versa’.238 Given the range of work arrangements which 
drive the modern economy, this is unsurprising and indeed is arguably a pointless 
endeavour because a single definition can never adequately represent the myriad 
manifestations of work relationships.  
 
Nonetheless, historically, judicial preoccupation with the use of the employment 
relationship as a basis for holding corporates vicariously liable for the delicts of their 
workers, has led to the now conventional conceptualisation of the contract of 
employment as reflecting a binary divide between those who are ‘employed’ and 
those who are not. As the courts have struggled to determine whether a sufficient 
nexus exists between the corporate and its workers’ delicts to impute liability, the 
issue has morphed into an enquiry based on whether the relationship is one of 
ongoing service - and hence also dependency - on the employer or one for the 
provision of services in terms of which the worker is independent of the firm. The 
former is styled as employment or locatio conductio operarum, in contrast to the 
latter which reflects an independent contractor arrangement or locatio conductio 
operis.239  In this way the existence of an employment relationship automatically 
makes the corporate employer potentially liable for the delicts of its employees. 
 
The fruits of the judicial deliberation over who qualifies as an employee for purposes 
of vicarious liability, has provided the impetus for relying on ‘employment’ as a 
touchstone for rights and obligations in other contexts. The tests developed in the 
vicarious liability context have been used as a basis for imposing labour, social 
security, and even tax law rules, regardless of the differences in underlying policies.  
Attempts to define ‘employment’ has, and continues to be, the subject of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 6ed (2015) 110, and for the general 
discussion 109-10; McKenzie (n166); Le Roux R & Jordaan B ‘Part E Contract of Employment’ in 
Thompson C & Benjamin C South African Labour Law vol 2 (2010/3) E1-2. 
238 Le Roux & Jordaan (n237) E1-5. 
239 See Smit  v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) 56-64 on the 
developments in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. 
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considerable scholarly engagement far beyond the scope of this thesis.240 However, 
a brief excursus is necessary.  
  
One of the courts’ earlier approaches was based on the control exerted by the 
employer over the worker. In terms of this ‘control test’, the main feature of an 
employment relationship is the control and supervision the employer exercises over 
how the employee performs his or her tasks.241 This test developed in the context of 
vicarious liability, but was eventually used in relation to labour legislation.242 
However, the prevailing approach is to regard control as simply one indicium of a 
contract of service with its value dependent on the specific contract as a 
whole.243Similarly, the ‘organisation’244 test would be a factor even though it has 
been described as ‘juristically speaking of such a vague and nebulous nature that 
more often than not no useful assistance can be derived from it in distinguishing 
between an employee (locator operarum) and an independent contractor (conductor 
operis) in our common law’.245 
 
The most prevalent approach is the ‘dominant impression’ test which aims to 
establish the dominant impression from the facts at hand. This approach does not 
focus on any single aspect of the relationship, but considers the relationship as a 
whole. It gained popularity in Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 246 in 
which Joubert JA promoted it as preferable to both the control and organisation tests 
for ‘marginal cases’.247 This case was concerned, not with vicarious liability, but with 
                                                          
240 See for example Le Roux R ‘Employment: A dodo, or simply living dangerously?’ (2014) 35 ILJ 30 
-1. For more on the development of contract (history) see Van Staden & Smit (n236); 703-05; Le 
Roux R ‘The worker: Towards labour law’s new vocabulary’‘ (2007) 124 SALJ 469. 
470-472; Le Roux, R ‘The regulation of work: Whither the contract of employment?’ published PhD 
thesis 2008 on the concerns attendant on trying to define the contract of employment. 
241 See Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society v McDonald 1931 AD 412. See further du Toit et al 
(n237) 91; Le Roux & Jordaan (n237) E1-6. 
242 Le Roux & Jordaan (n237) E1-6. 
243 Smit (n239) 62. 
244 R v AMCS 1959 (4) SA 207 (A). See du Toit et al (n237) 91; Le Roux & Jordaan (n237) E1-7. 
245 Smit (n239) 63.  
246 Smit (n239).  
247 Id 62. 
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whether the appellant was a ‘workman’ as contemplated in the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act 30 of 1941 to enable him to claim compensation for injuries 
sustained in a motor vehicle accident while working as an agent for an insurance 
company.248 It has been criticised for its ‘question-begging nature’ but remains 
popular.249 The dominant impression test, or variations of it – for example the ‘reality 
test’250 – has since been used for various purposes, including statutory labour law, 
even though it developed in the context of ascribing benefits under workmen’s 
compensation.  So, for example, it has been applied to interpret the statutory 
definition of employee under the LRA in SITA (Pty) Ltd v CCMA.251In this case the 
Labour Appeal Court, in applying the dominant impression test, identified the 
following key factors in creating the dominant impression: the employer’s right to 
supervise and control; the employee’s position as an integral part of the organisation; 
and the economic dependence of the employee on the employer.252  
 
Even with this fluidity, characteristic features of the common-law contract of 
employment can be discerned.  Grogan sums it up as ‘an agreement between two 
parties in terms of which one of the parties (the employee) undertakes to place his or 
her personal services at the disposal of the other party (the employer) for an 
indefinite or determined period in return for a fixed or ascertainable remuneration, 
and which entitles the employer to define the employee’s duties and to control the 
manner in which the employee discharges them’.253  
 
                                                          
248 Id 56. The Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941 s3(1) provided that a ‘workman’ was ‘any 
person who has entered into or works under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or learnership, 
with an employer, whether the contract is express or implied, is oral or in writing, and whether 
remuneration is calculated by time or by work done, or is in cash or in kind …’. 
249 Du Toit et al (n237) 9; See Le Roux & Jordaan (n237) E1-8. See the factors in SABC v McKenzie 
[1999] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC). 
250 See du Toit et al (n237) 92. 
251 [2008] 7 BLLR 611 (LAC); Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 
252 SITA  (n245) paras [12]-[13]. See further Benjamin P ‘An accident of history: Who is (and who 
should be) an employee under South African labour law?’ (2004) 25 Industrial Law Journal 787.  
253 Grogan J Employment Rights (2014) (‘Grogan 2014a’) 44. 
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The most basic duty of the employee is to tender his or her services to the 
employer.254 This is the quid pro quo for remuneration by the employer.  Duties of 
the employee include the obligation to perform agreed tasks with reasonable 
efficiency, to obey the employer’s instructions in relation to the performance of the 
work, to refrain from misconduct, to ‘further the employer’s business interests’,255  
and to act in good faith. The latter forms the basis for a range of implied terms such 
as the undertaking not to steal the employer’s materials.  Bosch notes that many of 
the employee’s common-law duties ‘derive from the employee’s subordinate position 
in the employment relationship and the fact that the employee is hired to further the 
employer’s business interests’.256 The employer’s duties generally are to receive the 
employee into service,257 to remunerate the employee,258 to provide reasonably safe 
working conditions,259 and to treat the employee fairly.260  The ownership of 




Proposition 3:  South African labour law has developed in aruond the 
conceptualisation of labour as contractual  
 
The formulation of work arrangements through contract means that parties can 
contract on almost any terms provided that they do not conflict with legislation and 
are not contrary to public policy. However, reliance on contract as the basis for work 
arrangements has historically been associated with the abuse of the power 
differential inherent between those who can afford to employ the services of workers, 
and those who seek to be employed. As a consequence, labour law has developed 
as a countervailing force to the power differential between the employer and 
employee.261 Although this is not a development unique to South Africa, it must be 
                                                          
254 See for example Grogan J Workplace law 11ed (2014) (‘Grogan 2014b’) 52-3. 
255 Grogan 2014b (n254) 55. 
256 Bosch (n237) 31. 
257 Grogan 2014b (n254) 58-9. 
258 Id 60-1. 
259 Id 59-60. 
260 Id 62.  For more on the employer’s duties see Bosch (n237).   
261 See Van Staden & Smit (n236) 705; Theron 2011 (n236).  
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seen against the backdrop of not only the historical shift from the master and servant 
status to contract as the basis for the relationship, but also the racial segregation that 
has characterised South Africa’s workplace history.262 
 
In order to mitigate the harsh effects of the imbalance in bargaining power on 
employees’ conditions of employment, two broad developments emerge.263 The first 
is the inclusion in the employment relationship of measures introducing substantive 
protection for employees.  The second is the development of procedural methods to 
bolster employees’ bargaining power.  
 
In respect of the first, while the common law implies certain protective measures in 
the contract of service – for example, the duty of the employer to provide safe 
working conditions and to treat the employee fairly – the parties’ unequal bargaining 
power means that these offer no recourse against the exclusion of these protective 
implied terms or the imposition of iniquitous ones. As a consequence, intervention in 
the form of statutory minimum conditions of employment, serve to ensure that 
employees retain a minimum level of rights. This is evident, for example, in the rights 
against unfair dismissal264 and unfair labour practices265in the LRA, as well as the 
BCEA which implies minimum basic conditions including the regulation of working 
time, leave, and notice periods for termination of a contract.266 Generally, while 
                                                          
262 See further du Toit et al (n237) Ch1 for the historical development of labour relations in South 
Africa. 
263 See further Langille B ‘Labour law’s back pages’ in Davidoff G & Langille B (eds) Boundaries and 
Frontiers of Labor Law (2006) 12ff  for more on this approach to the conceptualisation of labour law 
generally. 
264 LRA ss185(a) and186(1). For details see du Toit et al (n237) Ch VII. 
265 LRA ss 185(b) and 186(2). The LRA 1995 provides for a closed list of conduct short of dismissal by 
the employer which would constitute an unfair labour practice during the course of the employment. 
These include, for example, unfair conduct in relation to promotions and demotions, unfair 
suspensions of employees, and a failure to reinstate an employee in terms of an agreement. See 
further du Toit et al (n237) Ch VII 545-78; Govindjee A & van der Walt AJ ‘Labour law and the 
Constitution’ in van der Walt AJ, Le Roux R and Govindjee A (eds) A Labour Law in Context (2012) 
74-84. 
266 See du Toit et al (n237) at Ch X for details of the BCEA. 
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employers are permitted to institute work conditions better than those stipulated in 
the legislation, they may not fall below the minimum threshold. 267 
 
Other legislative interventions affecting the employment relationship include the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (‘EEA’) and the Skills Development Act 97 of 
1998 (‘SKA’). However, as mentioned in Proposition 2, the statutory provisions do 
not replace the common-law contract of employment unless they specifically so 
provide. Consequently, substantive protection under the common law would subsist 
unless superseded by a statutory rule.268 
  
The second line of evolution in labour law in South Africa is the recognition of the 
power of collective action as a way of increasing employees’ bargaining power. 
Although the recognition of trade unions and employers’ organisations, as well as of 
collective bargaining, have been a feature of South African labour law development 
at least since the Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924, implementation was racially 
exclusive269 and was just one of a range of policies to segregate the workforce along 
racial lines.270 Currently, the LRA is the pivotal legislation for the recognition of 
collective action as a countervailing force, and provides the framework for collective 
bargaining by trade unions and employers’ organisations over ‘wages, terms and 
conditions of employment and other matters of mutual interest’.271 The Act 
recognises the right to freedom of association in the form of employer and employee 
organisations, although it limits membership of bargaining councils and statutory 
councils to registered trade unions and employers’ organisations.   
 
The collective bargaining model is based on voluntarism, and du Toit et al identify 
four defining features: it brings parity by equipping employees and unions rights to 
organise and strike, amongst others,272 it encourages conciliation and the refusal to 
                                                          
267 See BCEA ss4(a)-(c) and 49. 
268 See McKenzie (n166). 
269 See also Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956. 
270 For further discussion of the developments that led to the current dispensation, see du Toit et al 
(n237) 6-14. 
271 LRA s1(c). This is just one of the stated purposes of the Act in s1. 
272 Du Toit et al (n237) 281-282. 
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bargain will precipitate an unprotected strike;273it favours sectoral over plant-level 
bargaining; and in certain cases, requires de facto bargaining.274 
  
The main point of Proposition 3 is that in South Africa, contract as the sole 
determinant of rights and duties between employers and employees, has been 
rejected in favour of a system that attempts to counteract some of the consequences 
of the inequality in bargaining power. While none of these relates specifically to 
ownership of employee-inventions, they form part of the policy space in which the 
issue arises. 
 
Proposition 4  A common-law contract of employment is not always 
necessary to establish an employment relationship for the 
purposes of labour law  
 
Statutory labour law as discussed in Proposition 3 will only apply to the inventor and 
corporation if their relationship is of the type which attracts the provisions of the 
particular statute. It has been noted that ‘establishing whether a particular individual 
is an employee or not depends on why the question is asked in the first place’.275 
Therefore, the LRA and the BCEA, for example, apply only to ‘employees’, within the 
meaning prescribed by statute. Whether or not an inventor is protected by the 
legislation, will depend on whether he or she falls within the statutory definitions.276 
This mechanism for extending the operation of the legislation to a particular sector of 
the workforce is a response to the inadequacies of the common-law conception of 
the contract of employment for these purposes. In other words, relying on contract to 
determine whether a worker is an employee, places the worker at risk in light of the 
possibility of structuring the relationship in a way that does not appear to meet the 
common-law requirements for a locatio conductio operarum. 
 
The LRA and the BCEA provide essentially the same definition of ‘employee’, 
namely ‘any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another 
                                                          
273 LRA s64. 
274 Du Toit et al (n237) 282. 
275 Le Roux & Jordaan (n237) E1-4. 
276 See further on statutory definitions of ‘employee’ Van Staden & Smit (n236) 706-08; Le Roux 2007 
(n240) 470-73; Theron 2011 (n236) 25. 
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person of for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; 
and any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of the employer’. 277 There is no distinction between employees based on 
their position in the enterprise. Consequently, directors and managerial staff are 
regarded as employees and there are no sectoral distinctions. 
 
At first glance the definitions appear quite broad and even workers who would not be 
regarded as ‘employees’ under the common law, may be protected under the 
legislation – provided they are not ‘independent contractors’.278 Even so, concerns 
over ensuring that workers are not denied protection led to the introduction of 
statutory presumptions to assist in the interpretation of ‘employee’ in both the LRA 
and the BCEA.279 Both statutes provide for a presumption in favour of a person being 
an employee unless he or she earns in excess of an amount determined by the 
Minister of Labour.280 Consequently, section 200A of the LRA provides that  
‘for the purposes of [the LRA], any employment law, and section 98A of the 
Insolvency Act, 1936 … a person who works for, or renders services to, any other 
person is presumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an 
employee, if any one or more of the  following factors is present: 
a) The manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of 
another person; 
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another 
person; 
                                                          
277 LRA s213; BCEA s1 definition of ‘employee’. However, there are various qualifications, for 
example, employees of certain organisations, such as the National Defence Force (‘SANDF’) and the 
National Intelligence Agency are excluded from the LRA; and in respect of the BCEA, the Minister of 
Labour may, on the advice of the Employment Conditions Commission, deem any category of 
persons employees for the purposes of the Act. 
278  See du Toit et al (n237) 73 on the second part of the definition. 
279 On the presumptions See du Toit et al (n237) 513; Theron 2011 (n236) 34ff. 
280 The determination is in terms of s6(3) Basic Conditions of Employment Act.  See LRA s200A(2). 
du Toit et al (n231) 93-4 note that while ‘[c]onceptually there can be no reason for distinguishing 
nature of the relationship between parties solely on the basis of income’ the presumption ‘conforms 
that the purpose of the amendment is to protect those workers who are economically most vulnerable 
by reversing the burden of proof for establishing the existence of an employment relationship only in 
the case of lower-paid workers’. 
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(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person is part of that 
organization; 
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours 
per month over the last three months; 
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom that 
person works, or renders services; 
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other 
person; or 
(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person’.281  
 
Continued concerns, however, led the Department of Labour to issue the ‘Code of 
Good Practice: Who is an Employee’282 to be considered when determining whether 
someone is an employee for the purposes of the LRA, the BCEA, the EEA and the 
SKA.283 One of the purposes of the Code is to ensure that employees are not 
deprived of the protection of the legislation by entering into disadvantageous 
contractual arrangements with employers.284 The Code may also be used for the 
enquiry in the context of other legislation such as the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act (‘OHSA’),285 the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act (‘COIDA’)286and the Unemployment Insurance Act.287  The relatively lengthy 
Code arguably does little more than repeat the interpretations of the courts.288 
                                                          
281 LRA s200A(1). For more on the effect of the presumption see du Toit et al (n237) 79. See 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God v Myeni and others (2015) 36 ILJ 2832 (LAC) paras [36]-[52] 
for the application of the presumption. The presumption does not operate where there is no contrail 
undertaking between the parties.  
282 Dept of Labour ‘Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee’ Gen Notice 1774 GG 29445 of 1 
December 2006 (‘Code of Good Practice’). 
283 Id reg 3. 
284 Id reg 2(d). 
285 85 of 1993. 
286 130 of 1993.   
287 63 of 2001. See Code of Good Practice reg 4, especially the caveat therein that ‘it must be borne 
in mind that the definitions of an employee in those statutes differ from that contained in the LRA. 
However, there are sufficient similarities for the Code to be of considerable assistance in determining 
who is covered by these statutes’.   





In determining whether a worker falls within the definition, it is the substance of the 
relationship between parties as opposed to its form. Therefore, even if parties 
structure their relationship in a way that appears to exclude the operation of statutory 
provisions, the courts will look past the form of the contract to determine the status of 
the parties.289 The point to be made in Proposition 4 is that the status as an 
employee is a necessary requirement for access to statutory protection. Labour law 
has sought to define ‘employee’ in a way that ensures that those whom it seeks to 
protect, indeed fall within the purview of the legislation. It is the substance of the 
relationship rather than its form which will determine rights.  
 
However, while it may be said that the legislative developments are evidence of an 
attempt to counter attempts by employers to avoid the statutory protections by 
framing the work relationship as something other than employment, it is not always 
the case that a relationship as opposed to an actual contract setting out the intention 
to employ, will be appropriate. While SITA may have suggested that the relationship 
is more relevant than the existence of an actual contract this approach is by no 
means generally accepted.290 This is clear, for example, from the emphasis that the 
LAC in Universal Church placed on the contract as the basis for employment.291 
 
Proposition 5:  A-typical employment relationships pose challenges to the 
protective purpose of labour laws 
  
The traditional binary divide between the locatio conductio operarum and the locatio 
conductio operis has been called into question for its failure to recognise the myriad 
work arrangements which in fact operate outside of this singular conceptualisation of 
employment. The LRA responds to this by moving away from the common-law 
contract of employment as the basis for protection to one of status.   This, coupled 
with the broad definition of ‘employee’ would seem to speak to the concerns of those 
in non-standard employment. Only genuine independent contractors should be 
precluded from claiming the protection of labour laws as they are expressly excluded 
                                                          
289 Denel (n251); SITA (n251).  
290 SITA (n251). 
291 Universal (n235) 
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from the definition of ‘employee’. However, although statutory definitions of 
‘employee’ may be aimed at mitigating the possible exclusion of workers from 
benefits, the interpretation of ‘employee’ gravitates towards an alignment with the 
locatio conductio operarum, likely as a consequence of the effort to distinguish them 
from independent contractors. The result is that it remains possible to contract in a 
way that avoids the statutory obligations by structuring the work arrangement in a 
way that does not conform to what is essentially a single employment model. 
However, courts have responded to this by considering the substance of the 
relationship, not its form.292 
 
One such example is the use of labour brokers or temporary employment services to 
supply labour. The use of  ‘triangular’ relationships, it has been noted, ‘creates a 
glaring exception to all the tests which have been relied upon by the courts to identify 
an employment relationship, as the employee of the labour broker is effectively 
controlled by and subsumed within the organisation of the client’.293 The LRA 
provides that ‘a person whose services have been procured for or provided to a 
client by a temporary employment service is the employee of that temporary 
employment service, and the temporary employment service is that person’s 
employer’.294 The recent amendments to the LRA295 seek to alleviate the 
vulnerability of workers employed by temporary employment services, and include 
measures for deeming workers to be the employees of the client in certain cases.296 
                                                          
292 See Proposition 4. 
293 Du Toit et al (n237) 99. 
294 LRA s198(2). 
295 Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014, commenced 1 January 2015. 
296 The interpretation of this provision was first considered in Assign Services (Pty) Ltd and Krost 
Shelving & Racking & another (2015) 36 ILJ 2408 (CCMA) in which it was found that the client of the 
temporary employment service became the sole employer of the employees. However, this was set 
aside by the Labour Court in Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & 
Arbitration & others (2015) 36 ILJ 2853 (LC) on the basis of material errors of law. In making the 
order,  Brassey AJ was of the view that ‘the expression is a fertile source of confusion and, even were 
I willing to make an order on an issue framed in such   abstract terms, I should want it to be far more 
precise. In my view, therefore, it is highly undesirable to make an order substituting the 
commissioner's award with a substantive order of my own’ (para [26]). Consequently, it is unclear 
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In this way, attempts to obfuscate the true nature of the contract and reduce labour 
costs by, for example, avoiding statutory payments for social insurance for workers, 
are counteracted.297 
 
Proposition 6: The employment relationship has, over the years, been 
used as the touchstone for legal consequences which do 
not fall squarely within the countervailing purpose of labour 
law 
  
The use of an employment relationship as a touchstone for rights and duties 
appears, for example, in the context of vicarious liability and social security laws.298 
In the case of the latter, the provision of insurance against workers’ temporary or 
permanent loss of ability to earn an income is generally tied to their employment. 
The COIDA299 and the Unemployment Insurance Act,300 each provide their own 
definition of ‘employee’ independently of the labour legislation.301  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
whether the approach of the CCMA stands. For more on a-typical employment see van Staden & Smit 
(n236) 707. 
297 See, for example, Le Roux 2014 (n240) 35-40.  
298 It also appears in other areas of law like occupational health and safety (see OHSA) ‘employee’ is 
defined in s1 as ‘subject to the provisions of subsection (2), any person who is employed by or works 
for an employer and who receives or is entitled to receive any remuneration or who works under the 
direction or supervision of an employer or any other person’, and see s1(2).); and taxation. 
299 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993. See definition of 
‘employee’ s1 as ‘a person who has 'entered into or works under a contract of service or of 
apprenticeship or learnership, with an employer, whether the contract is express or implied, oral or in 
writing, and whether the remuneration is calculated by time or by work done, or is in cash or in kind’; 
see also s22(1) and s22(4) for the scope and application of the Act. See MEC for the Department of 
Health v D[…]N[…] (924/2013) [2014] ZASCA 167 (8 October 2014) on whether the plaintiff’s rape 
while on duty arose out of and in the course of employment to enable the plaintiff to bring a claim 
under COIDA. 
300 Act 30 of 1966. See definition of ‘employee’ as ‘any natural person who receives remuneration or 
to whom remuneration accrues in respect of services rendered or to be rendered by that person, but 
excludes any independent contractor’ s1. 
301 However, the Code of Good Practice (n282) reg 4 provides that the Code ‘should also be taken 
into account in determining whether persons are employees’ for the purposes of these statutes but 
that ‘it must be borne in mind that the definitions of an employee differ from that contained in the LRA. 
However, there are sufficient similarities for the Code to be of considerable assistance in determining 
who is covered by these statutes’. 
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 Vicarious liability is a useful example of how the status of ‘employment’ acts as a 
marker to give effect to a non-labour purpose. Interestingly, the development of the 
test in this context to determine the existence of a relationship, which would form the 
basis for holding employers strictly liable for the delicts of their workers, was later 
used in labour law.302  
 
The law of delict is broadly concerned with reallocating loss for harm suffered.303 It 
provides a remedy, generally in the form of compensation, for the harm. As 
Neethling notes, ‘the fundamental premise in law is that damage (harm) rests where 
it falls, that is, each person must bear the damage he suffers’.304 Vicarious liability is 
a form of strict delictual liability because it holds the employer vicariously liable for 
the delicts of its employees – even where the employer is not at fault – provided that 
the delict was committed in the course and scope of the employee’s employment. 
The nature of the employment plays no role in the courts’ decision, and employers 
may be held liable for the delicts of professional and highly-skilled employees.305  
 
There are various theories to justify holding the employer liable. These include that 
the employer has control over its employees, that it has created the risk,306 that ‘the 
employer can be considered to be the actor where he or she acts through an 
employee’,307 that the employer must bear the burden of the loss in the same way 
that it derives benefit from the employee’s actions,308 and that from a social welfare 
perspective, the employer is in a better financial position to carry the loss.309 
 
                                                          
302 See further discussion of Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society v McDonald 1931 AD 412 in Le 
Roux PhD Thesis (n240); Le Roux & Jordaan (n237) E1-6. For an overview of the various 
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306 See K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
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The employer’s liability is dependent on the existence of an employment relationship 
at the time of the delict.310 To determine this the courts look to the common law to 
show whether or not the corporation is an employer, and thus vicariously liable.311 
However, the way that they interpret the common-law test relates back to the 
purpose for the enquiry, for example in Midway Two Engineering & Construction 
Services v Transnet Bpk,312 where  the court found that a labour broker’s client was 
the employer for purposes of vicarious liability, as it was more closely related to the 
risk creation. The limiting factor is that the delict must have been committed in the 
course (and scope) of employment,313 The courts have not distinguished between 
‘course’ and ‘scope’ as a necessary element in the enquiry, and the meaning 
appears to be dependent on what needs to be achieved. Ultimately, therefore, the 
finding will depend on the court’s rationale in imputing liability.314 
 
Similarly, the consideration of who is an employee for the purposes of statutory 
workmen’s compensation in Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 
1979(1) SA 51 (A),315 has been appropriated as a test for the existence of an 
employment relationship in other contexts, for example, labour law and even 
copyright.316    
 
                                                          
310 Id 339. 
311 See also Goldberg v Durban City Council 1970 (3) SA 325 (N) that parties cannot avoid 
employment simply by labelling the relationship ‘independent contractor’. On the case, see Neethling 
(n304) 340. 
312 Midway Two Engineering & Construction Services v Transnet Bpk 1998 (3) SA 17 (SCA) 23. 
313 See Crown Chickens (Pty) v Rocklands Poultry v Rieck  2007 (2) SA 118 (SCA). See also Calitz K 
‘The close connection test for vicarious liability’ (2007) Stell LR 451 who notes that this requirement is 
the ‘ensures that there is a measure of fairness towards the employer who is held strictly liable’ 451. 
314 For example, intentional wrongdoing by the employee even though it was done while carrying out 
authorised work, eg, Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank 2001 (1) SA 1214 (SCA); 
ABSA Bank v Bond Equipment (Pretoria) Pty Ltd 2001 (1) SA 372 (SCA) involving a frolic of their 
own; but see State liability in Minister of Safety and Security v Luiters 2006 (4) SA 160 (SC), 2007 (2) 
SA 106 (CC); K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); Minister of Finance v Gore 
NO 2007 (1) SA 111 (SCA). See further Loubser (n303) -91; Calitz K ‘Vicarious liability of employers: 
reconsidering risk as the basis for liability’ (2005) TSAR 215. 
315 Smit (n239).  
316 See comments in Benjamin (n252) 788. See Chapter 4. 
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The thrust of Proposition 6 is that it is possible to link legal rights and obligations to 
the existence of an employment relationship, but this entails, or ought to entail, 
reconceptualising employment for the particular purpose. The reasons for wanting to 
identify a worker as having a particular status – which may be labelled ‘employment’ 
– must inform the criteria for that status. Tests developed in the context of vicarious 
liability, for example, must be understood in the context of the policy underlying the 
desire to impose strict liability on someone other than the worker. The understanding 
of employment in that context must therefore align with the purpose of such liability. 
Similarly, using employment as a touchstone for other purposes, for example tax 
liability, social security, or allocation of ownership of intellectual property, must be 
informed by the appropriate policy.317 This in turn will shape how employment is 
defined in that context. 
 
 
3.6 THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH AS AN INCENTIVE MECHANISM 
 
When one considers the South African approach through the framework for an 
optimal allocation which was established in 2.5, the conclusion is that the current 
regulatory framework does not clearly direct the incentive potential of the patent and 
the right of attribution to employers and employees in a way that expressly furthers 
the purpose of patents. This is primarily because the system does not stray far from 
the international patent paradigm introduced in Chapter 2. 
 
Simplistically, the system works to reward the individual inventor and as a result, the 
employer’s financial resource contribution is not recognised either through the 
allocation of default ownership or through attribution. If one reviews this against the 
principles in the model framework, then it clearly acts as a disincentive for the 
employer to invest because irrespective of whether the employer had directed 
resources specifically to the development of the invention and the employee’s 
                                                          
317 See for example the discussion in MEC for the Department of Health in respect of the policy 
behind COIDA and how this affects the determination of whether an accident arises out of an 
individual’s employment. Because the aim of the legislation is to assist workers, it has consistently 




motivation was to meet his or her obligations under the contract of service (in other 
words, motivated by the employer’s needs), the employee-inventor is recognised as 
the first owner.  
However, it has been shown that the PA 1978 does provide for employers to acquire 
the rights in the invention from the inventor. Whether or not this serves to counter 
what appears to be an employee-friendly approach depends on the degree to which 
the system enables employers to assume ownership as a matter of course in those 
cases where the resource contribution needs to be recognised. Firms are not 
recognised for their contribution of resources and their only claim to ownership of 
employee-inventions which they have funded and initiated must be derived from their 
relationship with the employee.  
 
The employer can acquire the right to apply through either assignment or operation 
of the law. In the first case, contract will form the basis for the assignment.  However, 
the freedom to acquire title in this way is limited by section 59(2) which puts in place 
measures to limit the scope of the inventions which can be transferred to the 
employer.  It is limited to contracts of ‘employment’ and further, to assignments made 
outside the ‘course and scope’ of the employment contract. The tenor of the 
provision is clearly to keep certain inventions out of the employer’s reach in certain 
circumstances where a particular type of relationship – namely employment - exists. 
Thus s59(2) recognises the power differential between the employee and employer 
at the inception of the employment relationship, and is a means of ensuring that 
employees are not divested of future inventions as a matter of course.  
 
However, the legislation does not provide guidance as to how the provision should 
operate. It is clear that it anticipates an employment relationship but ignores that fact 
that labour law in South Africa has developed in a way that points to an increasing 
difficulty in defining ‘employment’. This is further supported by the use of ‘course and 
scope’ which appears to further limit the types of inventions which can be the subject 
of preinvention assignments. However, its actual effect will be determined by the 
approach of the courts to interpreting these provisions. If one considers this provision 
against the labour regulatory context for employment relationships, it seems to 
reflect the policy considerations which underlie the development of labour law, 
namely to protect employees who are generally in a weaker bargaining position. 
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However, a failure to appreciate this, could result in an interpretation which limits the 
application, for example, by restricting employment to a common law contract (as 
opposed to the broader statutory approach in the LRA and BCEA), or by using 
vicarious liability as a basis. 
 
However, the failure of the system to provide a statutory first-ownership rule in favour 
of employers and the limitations of section 59(2) must not be seen as necessarily 
disadvantageous to employers. It can also be viewed as identifying those inventions 
which an employer can lay claim to through a preinvention assignment – namely 
inventions not made in the course and scope of employment. If the employer wishes 
to acquire such an invention, it must engage with the inventor outside of the 
employment relationship. Here the employee will be in a less dependent position 
than if the negotiation formed part of the terms of ongoing employment. 
 
Where the employee is obliged to assign inventions he or she is not entitled, as a 
matter of course, to compensation from the employer. Where the assignment is part 
of the employment contract, the employee is entitled to his or her salary in the 
normal course. There is no statutory requirement that the employer share in the 
benefits derived from the patented invention, regardless of how successful the 
commercialisation may be. Therefore, where the employee is divested of ownership, 
the salary from the employer must serve as the incentive for him or her to reinvest 
his or her intellectual effort into making another invention.  
 
In the absence of an assignment from the employee, rights may devolve on the 
employer by operation of law. Various concerns arise.  Where the inventor is 
divested of first ownership through operation of law, whether by an implied statutory 
provision or by a common-law rule, this is an external source of regulation.  As an 
external source, the reason for the rule and its effect on allocation, may or may not 
align with the purpose of the patent system in South Africa. 
 
For example, as regards the argument that there is an implied common-law rule that 
employers own employees’ inventions, the reason for implying the rule will likely not 
be directly aligned with the innovation purpose of patents and would depend on the 
relationship between the inventor and the investor conforming to the common-law 
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requirements. This raises concern about the nature of the relationship that attracts 
these common-law consequences. This requires a consideration of the definition of 
employment which would attract the concerns associated with relying on existing 
definitions from other areas of law; at present there is a quagmire of definitions for 
‘employee’, none of which we can assume fits the patent purpose. It is submitted that 
the current position is, at best, uncertain, and that even if it could be said that there is 
a common-law rule which allocates ownership in patentable inventions, its scope and 
application have not been developed by the courts in a way that speaks to the 
purpose of granting a patent. 
 
There is also no provision for a clear right of attribution although the registration 
requirements make it implicit that the employee-inventor will be identified.  
 
In closing, it is submitted that the current regulatory framework does not clearly direct 
the incentive potential of the patent and the right of attribution to employers and 
employees in a way that expressly furthers the purpose of patents, mainly as a result 
of the lack of clarity surrounding the scope and functioning of acquisition through 
assignment or operation of law, and the failure to ensure that in cases where the 
invention is not vested in the employee-inventor, there is a way to ensure that the  









THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT: 
COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE RULES FOR THE 




4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Thus far the analysis of the South African position has been narrowly focused on the 
allocation of ownership in inventions under the PA 1978. However, a more complete 
understanding of the legislative context in which the ownership in employee-
inventions operates requires an understanding of the alternative and complementary 
intellectual property rules which regulate intellectual property produced during the 
innovation process.   
 
Since intellectual property rights in general, are regarded as tools for innovation in 
South Africa,318the survey aligns with the framework in Chapter 2 that sees both 
economic and attribution rights conceptualised as part of the incentive function. This 
is not a detailed analysis of each statute or area of intellectual property, but is limited 
to showing how the legislature has elected to allocate the economic and attribution 
rights in intellectual products which are associated to patentable inventions in the 
innovation process. The common concern is the effect of the employment 
relationship on this allocation in each case. 
 
To this end, this chapter examines the ownership rules when: 
* patentable inventions are made under the IPPFRD Act;319  
                                                          
318 See Chapter 3. 
319 Act 51 of 2008. 
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* preparatory work such as compilations of data and technical drawings 
generated in the course of the inventive process attract copyright under the 
Copyright Act;320 
* designs for industrial products which may or may not incorporate patented 
inventions, are registered under the Designs Act321(‘DA 1993’);322and 
* plant varieties are developed and, based on their exclusion from patentability, 
are protected under the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act323(‘PBRA 1976’). 
 
 
4.2 PUBLICLY-FINANCED PATENTABLE INVENTIONS 
 
4.2.1 The Relationship between the IPPFRD Act and the PA 1978 
 
Although this thesis is primarily concerned with inventions made wholly in the private 
sector, the IPPFRD Act324 is instructive in light of its role in furthering innovation 
goals.325 The purpose of the IPPFRD Act is to ensure that ‘intellectual property 
emanating from publicly-financed research and development is identified, protected, 
utilised and commercialised for the benefit of the people of the Republic whether it 
be for a social, economic, military or any other benefit’.326 The Act defines 
‘intellectual property’ broadly as ‘any creation of the mind that is capable of being 
protected by law from use by another person…and includes any rights in such 
creation’.327 Patentable inventions, including the right to apply for an invention to be 
registered as a patent, fall squarely within the ambit of the legislation.328 Therefore, 
                                                          
320 Act 98 of 1978. 
321 Act 193 of 1995. 
322 The CA 1978 and the DA 1993 have been amended by the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment 
Act, 2013, to allow for the recognition and protection of indigenous knowledge. As the amendment Act 
is not yet in force and no date for its commencement has been proclaimed, it is not included in this 
exposition. 
323 Act 15 of 1976. 
324 Note 319. 
325 See Chapter 3. 
326 Section 2. 
327 Section 1. 
328 DST (n329) 6-8; NIPMO ‘Practice Note to Guideline 1 of 2012’ 4 December 2012. 
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in the ensuing discussion reference is made to ‘inventions’ as opposed to ‘intellectual 
property’ generally. 
 
The IPPFRD Act specifically includes higher education and statutory institutions in its 
purview.329Private sector corporations are affected by the Act where they have 
collaborated with a recipient of public finance. Consequently, the statutory ownership 
rules in the relevant enabling legislation must defer to the IPPFRD Act. It is 
submitted that this allows for the devolution of the right to apply for the patent by 
operation of law, consistent with sections 27 and 59(1) of the PA 1978. The IPPFRD 
Act makes no reference to employee-inventors but applies to employee-inventions 
made with public finance. 330 
 
4.2.2  Entitlement to Employee-made Inventions 
 
The IPPRD Act provides for a default allocation rule that the ‘recipient’ of the public 
finance owns the invention.331 A ‘recipient’ is ‘any person, juristic or non-juristic, that 
undertakes research and development using funding from a funding agency and 
includes an institution’.332  Recipients are distinguished from `intellectual property 
creators’.  An ‘intellectual property creator’ is ‘the person involved in the conception 
of intellectual property in terms of this Act and identifiable as such for the purposes 
of obtaining statutory protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
where applicable’.333   
  
                                                          
329 IPPFRD Act s1. See also DST Guideline 1 of 2012 ‘Interpretation of the Scope of the Intellectual 
Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act (51 of 2008): Setting the 
Scene’ GN 1047 GG 35978 of 12 December 2012 19-20. 
330 The Intellectual Property from Publicly Financed Research and Development Bill Gen N 719 GG 
29950 of 8 June 2007 (‘IPPFRD Bill’) mentioned employees specifically. For a detailed discussion see 
Visser C ‘Intellectual property rights from publicly financed research: The way to research hell is 
paved with good intentions’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 367-8; Geyer S, Kelbrick R & Visser C  ‘Intellectual 
Property Law’ (2009) Annual Survey of SA law 624-5. 
331 IPPFRD Act s4(1). 




This default position may be reduced to co-ownership where the intellectual property  
results from collaboration with a private entity or organisation. In such a case the 
external funder will be co-owner under certain circumstances.334A failure by the 
private entity or organisation to acquire co-ownership could trigger acquisition by the 
state.335 
 
In cases where the recipient ‘prefers not to retain ownership in its intellectual 
property or not to obtain statutory protection for the intellectual property’336 and gives 
notice of this choice, the National Intellectual Property Management Office (‘NIPMO’) 
may do so. 337 If NIPMO takes assignment, ‘the recipient, any private entity or 
organisation that contributed to funding the research and development … and 
relevant intellectual property creators will retain an irrevocable, non-transferable, and 
royalty-free licence to use the intellectual property for research, development and 
educational purposes’.338 This does not affect the rights of a co-owner as 
contemplated in section 15(2) of the Act. If NIPMO does not acquire ownership, then 
where the intellectual property was made with a contribution from a private entity or 
organisation, that contributor has the option to acquire ownership.  If there is no such 
contributor, the ‘intellectual property creator’ must be given the option by the 
recipient to acquire ownership and protection.339 
 
If one considers the above in the employee-invention paradigm, the employee-
inventor is the intellectual property creator, and the employer is the recipient of the 
finance. It equates practically to employees at universities and recognised 
institutions. Therefore, the employer would be the default owner of the invention and 
entitled to apply for the patent. In relating this to the PA 1978, which provides the 
only basis on which to apply for a patent, the provisions of the IPPFRD Act constitute 
                                                          
334 IPPFRD Act s15(2). See further NIPMO Guideline 4.1 of 2015 31 March 2015. 
335 IPPFRD Act s15(3), read with s14. 
336 Section 4(2).  
337 See IPPFRD Act ss 4(3), 4(2)(b) and 5(1)(e) and s2 of regulations made in terms of s17 of the 
IPPFRD Act GN R675 GG 33433 of 2 August 2010, which detail the considerations that must inform 
the decision by the recipient and the NIPMO (‘IPPFRD Regulations’). 
338 See IPPFRD Regulations s2(12). 
339 See further Adams & Adams Practitioner’s Guide to Intellectual Property Law (2011) 13-14. 
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a devolution by operation of law which vests the right to apply for the patent in the 
recipient-employer.  
 
This interpretation is confirmed by the most recent guideline issued by NIPMO which 
provides that in the ownership scenario where the ‘[e]mployee creates outside the 
scope of employment’,  
‘[p]rivate or outside work may include, amongst others, work completely unrelated to 
the role of the employee, that does not require usage of any recipient facilities and 
does not involve the employee employing/or being assisted by a staff member who 
reports to him/her…In the instance where IP is generated within the general 
understanding of private work and no public funds are used, the IP generated will fall 
outside the scope of the IPR Act’.340 
Furthermore, it is submitted that whether or not the employee made the invention as 
part of his or her duties is irrelevant – provided that the invention was made using 
public finance, the IPPFRD Act will regulate first ownership. 
 
It has been suggested that there must be an assignment from the employee which 
must conform to section 59(2)(b) of the PA 1978. This means that it is necessary to 
engage with the ‘course and scope’ enquiry in that section.341 However, it is 
submitted  that this is incorrect and that the IPPFRD Act does not require an 
assignment as the basis for the acquisition of rights by the recipient-employer in that 
it vests in the recipient by operation of law. There is no contractual basis for a 
transfer. Therefore, in an application for a patent under section 27 of the PA 1978, 
the (employer) recipient would be the applicant, its right to apply having been 
acquired from the (employee-inventor) IP creator by operation of law (the IPPFRD 
Act).342 The employee-inventor consequently has no claim to the invention from the 
                                                          
340 NIPMO (n334) s3.1. 
341 See Van Harmelen J ‘Ownership of patentable inventions at academic institutions (Part 2)’ 20 
March 2013 https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Ownership-of-patentable-inventions-at-academic-
institutions-Part-2?Id=960&STitle=IP%20ENSight (Date of use 30 November 2015.); Van Harmelen J 
‘Ownership of patentable inventions at academic institutions (Part 3)’ 20 March 2013 
https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Ownership-of-patentable-inventions-at-academic-institutions-Part-
3?Id=961&STitle=IP%20ENSight (Date of use 30 November 2015.). 
342 PA 1978 s27(1) read with s59(1) and the IPPFRD Act. See also van der Merwe A ‘The Law of 
Patents’ in van der Merwe A (ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2011) 294.  
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outset unless he or she is also the recipient. The effect is that the employer owns the 
invention outright. However, it remains possible that neither the recipient, NIPMO, 
nor any contributor wants ownership in or statutory protection for the invention, in 
which case the employee-inventor will, at some point in the chain, have the 
opportunity to acquire such rights. Consequently, employee-inventors employed by 
recipients potentially have an opportunity to own the invention. 
 
Interestingly, the early Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research 
Bill provided for a first-ownership rule that: ‘Employees shall be deemed to have 
assigned their Intellectual Property as set out in this Act to the Institution’.343  The 
current formulation, which vests ownership directly in the recipient, appears to be a 
more efficient regulatory mechanism than a deeming provision.  
 
4.2.3  Rights of the Employee-inventor 
 
4.2.3.1 Financial reward 
 
Among the objectives of the IPPFRD Act is that ‘human ingenuity and creativity are 
acknowledged and rewarded’.344 To this end, the Act provides specifically for 
intellectual property creators at institutions to share in the revenue derived from their 
intellectual property until the expiry of the intellectual property right.345 Therefore, 
although ownership in an invention made by an employee may vest in the employer, 
the inventor will always have a claim to the resulting benefits. The inventor must be 
paid within twelve months of receipt of the benefit by the recipient.346 Outside of this 
context, employee-inventors do not have a similar right to financial benefits derived 





                                                          
343 IPPFRD Bill (n330) cl 3(2); Visser (n330) 367. 
344 Section 2(2)(d). 
345 Section 10(1). See s10(2) for the formula and further IPPFRD Regulations (n337).   
346 IPPFRD Regulations (n337) s9(1). 
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4.2.3.2  Attribution 
 
The IPPFRD Act makes no special provision for a right of attribution. The provisions 
of the PA 1978 apply in this regard. 
 
 
4.3  COPYRIGHT 
 
4.3.1 The Relationship between Copyright and Patentable Inventions 
 
During the inventive process preparatory materials will be generated alongside the 
final patentable invention.  These may constitute valuable intellectual property in 
their own right and arise from the efforts of the inventor or other contributors. In the 
employment context, the preparatory materials are made by employees who can – 
but need not also be – the inventors. Some preparatory materials, such as 
compilations of data, written reports, memoranda, flowcharts, and technical 
drawings, attract copyright and the ownership in these intellectual by-products is 
established using copyright principles. As a consequence the ownership of copyright 
in the preparatory materials and the ownership of the patent will not necessarily vest 
in the same person, even though the intellectual property has been generated as 
part of a single process. In this chapter, the effect of this dichotomy is examined with 
compilations of data and technical drawings as examples of preparatory materials 
which invoke copyright ownership rules. It is also limited to the private sector 
inventive context.347 
 
South African copyright law, like patent law, has British roots although the current 
legislation, the CA 1978, is more closely aligned to the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886, (‘Berne Convention’) to which South 
Africa is a signatory.348 The influence of the common-law approach with its emphasis 
                                                          
347 Works made under s5 of the CA 1978 are not discussed. For discussion of state copyright see 
Pistorius T ‘Part 3 Copyright Law’ in van der Merwe A (ed) Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 
(2011) 177-8.  
348 South Africa has acceded to the Brussels revision and in part to the Paris text of 1971. The first 
statute to deal with copyright in South Africa was the PDTCA 1916 which was substantially the same 
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on the economic aspects of the monopoly rather than the Continental author’s-right 
approach, persists.349  
 
Unlike the PA 1978, which defines an invention in relation to what does not 
constitute eligible subject matter,350 the CA 1978 prescribes a closed list of 
protectable subject matter or ‘works’: literary works, musical works, artistic works, 
sound recordings, computer programs, cinematograph films, broadcasts, program-
carrying signals, and published editions.351  The definition of ‘literary work’, which 
includes ‘tables and compilations, including tables and compilations of data’,352would 
include compilations of data generated during the inventive process. Similarly, 
technical drawings are accommodated under the definitions of ‘artistic work’353 and 
‘drawings’, the latter is defined to include drawings ‘of a technical nature’.354  
 
Unlike patents, and in keeping with South Africa’s international obligations under the 
Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, copyright is not conditional upon 
registration.355  Therefore, copyright will subsist in a work once the requisite statutory 
requirements have been met.356 The fundamental requirement for the subsistence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
as the British Copyright Act of 1911. This was followed by the Copyright Act 63 of 1965, modelled on 
the 1956 British Copyright Act. The current Act must, with effect from 1 January 1979, be read with 
the Copyright Regulations, 1978, GN R1211 GG 9775 of 1978  7 June 1985 as amended by GN 1375 
GG 9807 of 28 June 1985. Further on the historical development, see Copeling  AJC ‘Copyright’ in 
Joubert WA (ed) The Law of South Africa vol 5 (1978) 225-6; Dean O ‘Changes to the law of 
copyright brought by the Copyright Act 98 of 1978’ (1979) April De Rebus 192; Dean O Handbook of 
South African Copyright Law (2012) 1.3-1.4; Pistorius (n347) 148-54. 
349See Pistorius (n347) 143-8 for more on authors’ rights versus copyright. See further Pouris A & 
Inglesi-Lotz R ‘The Economic Contribution of Copyright-Based Industries in South Africa’ 
WIPO/RSA/Institute for Technological Innovation, University of Pretoria, 2011. 
350 PA 1978 s25. 
351 CA 1978 s2(1). See CA 1978 s1(1) for definitions. For a closer examination of the characteristics 
of these works, see Copeling (n348) 232-8; Dean 2012 (n348) 1.6-1.19; Pistorius (n347)  155-60. 
352 Section 1(1) ‘literary work’. 
353 Section 1(1) ‘artistic work’.  
354 Section 1(1) ‘drawing’. 
355 Berne Convention art5(2) which is incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement.   
356 See Copeling (n348) 238; Dean 2012 (n348) [1.27]; Pistorius (n347) 161 n4, 168-70. It is not clear 
whether a common law requirement of propriety is necessary. 
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copyright in all works is that they must be ‘original’.357  Originality does not imply 
newness or novelty but merely that work is the product of the independent skill, 
judgment and labour of the author.358 Unlike patent law, it is possible for copyright to 
arise in multiple identical works provided they do not involve reproduction.  Further 
requirements are that the literary and artistic works are reduced to a material 
form359and that the requirements of authorship and publication in sections 3 and 4 
respectively, be met. 
 
The copyright owner enjoys a set of exclusive rights which act as an economic 
monopoly over the exploitation of the protected works.360  Therefore, literary works 
and artistic works attract specific combinations of exclusive rights that make up the 
set.361The core right is reproduction to the exclusion of others. Like patents, 
copyright is transferable and may be licensed.362 It is also of limited duration.363 
 
In addition to this economic monopoly, section 20 of the CA 1978 provides for two 
‘moral rights’: the right ‘to claim authorship of the work’; and the right ‘to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work where such action is or would 
be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author’.364 Unlike patent law, 
therefore, there is specific attribution or ‘paternity’ right. However, the nature and 
scope of the right is unclear.  The reported case law appears to be limited to 
Technical Information Systems v Marconi365in which it was found that the removal of 
information identifying the author of a computer program when an adaptation of the 
                                                          
357  Section 2(1). See Haupt t/s Soft Copy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence [2006] SCA 39 (RSA) para 
[35]. 
358 See Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd 1987 (2) SA 1 (A) 22;  Appleton v 
Harnischfeger Corporation 1995 (2) SA 247 (A) 262; Haupt (n357) para [35]. For discussion on the 
originality requirement see Copeling (n348) 239; Dean 2012 (n348) [3.3]; Pistorius (n347) 163-4.  
359 CA 1978 s2(2). Further Dean 2012 (n348) [3.4]. 
360 The owner’s control is in fact extended by s23(2) which provides for secondary infringements 
which are not specifically termed ‘rights’ in ss6 and 7.  
361 CA 1978 s6-7. 
362 Id s22. 
363 Id s3. 
364 Section 20(1).  There is a limited proviso to this in some cases. 
365 2007 BIP 303 (T).  
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program had been made, constituted an infringement of the author’s moral right to 
claim authorship of the work.366 
  
This lack of statutory and judicial guidance has resulted in differing views regarding 
moral rights – for example, the opposing views on the transferability of moral rights. 
Under one approach, moral rights are authors’ personality rights and, as such, 
cannot be transferred.367 An alternative view is that moral rights are transferable368 – 
in part because they are statutory rights rather than true personality rights. The 
duration of moral rights is similarly contested with some arguing that because they 
are personality rights, they can only endure for the lifetime of the author.369 The 
counter argument is that they endure for while copyright endures and can, in some 
cases, survive the death of the author. 370 However, it appears to be accepted that an 
author may choose not to enforce his or her moral rights.371 
 
4.3.2  Entitlement to Copyright in the Employment Context 
 
4.3.2.1   Authorship as the basis for ownership 
 
Unlike the patent law approach, there is express statutory provision for the allocation 
of first ownership in copyright in literary and artistic works made in the employment 
context. These are formulated as exceptions to a general vesting of default 
ownership in the author of the work.372 Only those relevant to compilations of data 
                                                          
366 Id para [56]. 
367 See Dean O ‘Protection of the Author’s Moral Rights in South Africa’ (1996) 59 Copyright World 38 
39; Dean 2012 ((n348) [10.3], [10.9]. 
368 See Pistorius (n347) 194. 
369 See Dean (n367) 40-1; Dean 2012 (n348) [10.5]. However, that the ‘author’s moral right endures 
for the duration of the term of copyright in the work and is a right which always attaches to the author 
or his heir, notwithstanding the fact that the author might have assigned the copyright in his work to 
someone else.’ Dean 1979 (n348) 1) 196. This suggests that moral rights can be transferred and 
appears contradictory to his later view that moral rights only endure for the life of the author. 
370 See Pistorius (n347) 181. 
371 Dean 2012 (n348) [10.9]. 
372 See s21. 
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and technical drawings as literary and artistic works, respectively, are discussed 
here.  
 
Section 21(1) of the CA 1978 provides that copyright will ‘vest in the author or, in the 
case of a work of joint authorship, in the co-authors of the work’.373  In some 
respects, authorship is akin to inventorship in patent law. However, unlike patent law 
which does not define ‘inventor’, the CA 1978 provides definitions of ‘author’ which 
vary depending on the type of work in question. Therefore, the author of a literary or 
artistic work is ‘the person who first makes or creates the work’.374  This means that 
under section 21(1)(a) both the employer and employee-author can claim under this 
title if they meet the definition of ‘author’.  This, in turn, depends on the meaning of 
‘makes or creates’ which is a reflection of the nature of the contribution to the literary 
or artistic work required to secure ownership.    
 
Although the requirement of originality appears to indicate that the author’s input 
need not be substantial or meritorious, the courts have held that as regards literary 
works, it is not sufficient for one to simply be the mechanical means by which an idea 
has been reduced to a material form.375 Tthere must be an intellectual contribution to 
the expression of the idea. On this basis, a contribution of resources, for example 
financial investment in the inventive process, would not sustain a claim to authorship. 
For the employer, whose contribution is resource-based, this approach would 
exclude it from ownership on the basis of authorship. 
 
A related issue is whether the definition sustains an interpretation that supports 
juristic authorship. In other words, could the employer ‘create’ or ‘make’ the work 
through the agency of its employees’ intellectual contribution?  The position in 
respect of literary and artistic works has not been settled, but it is submitted that the 
approach inherent in the CA 1978 is not to exclude juristic authorship outright.376  For 
some works authorship is clearly removed from the individuals involved; for example, 
the author of a computer programme is ‘the person who exercised control over the 
                                                          
373 Section 21(1)(a). 
374 Section1(1) definition of ‘author’. 
375 See, for example, Peter-Ross v Ramesar and another 2008 BIP 306 (C). 
376 This is evident from s3 which provides that a qualified person can include a juristic person. 
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making of the computer program’377 and for sound recordings and cinematographic 
films, the author is ‘the person by whom the arrangements for the making’ of such 
work are made.378 This reflects the reality of the corporate development of works and 
is captured in the observation by the Supreme Court of Appeal that ‘[t]he definition of 
‘author’ in s1 also covers a large number of persons who, in the ordinary sense of 
the word, are not authors but persons with financial interests in the end result’ and 
that ‘[o]ne consequently does not have to be a cynic in order to be skeptical about 
the philosophical premise’.379 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Statutory allocation of ownership in employee-authored works 
 
Under section 21(1)(a) the employee as author will generally be the first holder of 
copyright. However, this is subject to three exceptions set out in section 21(1)(b), (c), 
and (d).380 With regard to the literary and artistic works under discussion, only 
section 21(1)(d) is directly relevant.  
 
Section 21(1)(d) creates a first-ownership rule in favour of an author’s employer for 
all works made in the course of employment. It provides that where ‘a work is made 
in the course of the author’s employment by another person under a contract of 
service or apprenticeship, that other person shall be the owner of any copyright 
subsisting in the work by virtue of section 3 or 4’.381  Although this is not an 
assignment of copyright from the employee to the employer but rather a statutory 
first-ownership rule,382 the employer and employee-author may agree to exclude its 
                                                          
377 Section 1(1) definition of ‘author’ (j). See Haupt (n357) para [41]. See further Tong L ‘Authorship of 
computer programs under South African copyright law: Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing 
Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2005 SALJ 518-9; 522-3; and Tong L ‘Copyright protection for computer 
programs in South Africa: Aspects of sui generis categorization’ (2009) 12 JWIP 273-5. 
378 Section 1(1) definition of ‘author’ (c ), (d).  For more on the nature of authorship see Copeling 
(n348)   230-1; Dean 2012 (n348) [1-31]-[1-33]. 
379 Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group plc par [12]. 
380 See discussion in Tong L ‘Employee-made intellectual property: Statutory considerations for the 
contractual regulation of ownership’ (2015) 36 Industrial Law Journal 870. 
381 Section 21(1)(d). 
382 See Tong 2009 (n377) 276. 
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operation,383 in which case the default rule that the author is the first owner applies. 
384 In the employment context it is, of course, unlikely that the employer would readily 
enter into an agreement excluding the operation of section 21(1)(d).  
  
There are two main elements in the application of this provision: firstly, whether the 
author must be under a ‘contract of service’ or contract of ‘apprenticeship’; and 
secondly, whether the work has been made ‘in the course of the author’s 
employment’385 by the other party to the contract of service or apprenticeship. In the 
absence of statutory guidance, it has been left to the courts to provide meaning and 
so to determine the scope of the provision.  
 
With regard to the first issue, this provision is relevant only when there is a ‘contract 
of service’ or ‘contract of apprenticeship’ in terms of which the author is employed by 
the other party.  The author’s status as an employee means that he or she will be 
affected by the provision, 386  although it must be noted that the CA 1978 does not 
use the terms ‘employee’ or ‘employer’ in this provision. In the absence of a statutory 
definition, the courts have interpreted the provision to refer to the distinction between 
contracts of service and contracts for services which is made under the common-
law. 387 
 
In Marais v Bezuidenhout388 the architect’s client argued that the copyright in building 
plans produced by the architect vested in the client by virtue of  section 21(1)(d). The 
client regarded itself as the ‘other person’ for the purposes of the provision. The 
                                                          
383 See Freefall Trading 211 (Pty) Ltd v Proplink Publishing (Pty) Ltd 881 JOC (C)  para [16]; Marais v 
Bezuidenhout  1999 (3) 988 (W) 991. 
384 CA 1978 s21(1)(e).  There is no indication that the agreement must be in writing or comply with 
any formalities. See Stiff v Reid-Daly 2004 BIP 240 (W).  See further Copeling ACJ Copyright Law in 
South Africa  (1969) 25 in relation to the CA 1965 s5(4). 
385 Section 21(1)(d). 
386 See further Klopper H ‘Copyright in works produced in the course of employment’ (2010) 73 
THRHR 477-8 for the importance of this aspect and its effect on the determination of the second 
element, namely what ‘course of employment’ means. See also Dean 2012 (n348) [5.3.3] to 1-23 
387 See for example Marais (n383); Ferntext (Pty) Ltd v Premier Springs Industrial Manufacturers (Pty) 
Ltd 838 JOC (T); Trewella Bros (UK) Ltd v Deton Engineering (Pty) Ltd 57 JOC (A). 
388 Note 66. 
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court rejected this reasoning and confirmed that the reference to section 21(1)(d) 
was to a contract of service as envisaged in the employment context. According to 
Cloete J observed that ‘[t]here can be no doubt that the phrase ‘contract of service’ 
in s 21(1)(d) does not include a contract of work.  If it did, para (c) would (except for 
the remuneration aspect) be superfluous, and so would the words ‘under a contract 
of service or apprenticeship’ in para (d) itself’. 389 More specifically, the distinction 
between the two situations was that of a contract of service (locatio conductio 
operarum) and a contract of work (locatio conductio operis) as found in  Smit  v 
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner. 390 An architect could not be said to be an 
employee in terms of this common-law distinction. 
 
In Ferntex (Pty) Ltd v Premier Springs Industrial Manufacturers391 similar reliance 
was placed on Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner.392 The court had to 
determine ‘whether the artists [of a fabric design] entered into a contract of service 
(locatio conductio operarum) or into a contract of work (locatio conductio opens 
(sic))’.393 It was noted in deciding which of the two work contract applied, ‘[o]ne of the 
most important indications that a contract is indeed a contract of service is the 
element of control which the employer retains over the employee and the way the 
latter performs his task.394 There was no question that there had to be recourse to 
the common-law employment contract. In this case, despite the fact that the alleged 
employer ‘involved herself in the process which led to the eventual product, and may 
have participated enthusiastically in the conceptualisation thereof, she did not, would 
not and could not exercise control over the way in which the art work was developed 
and produced’.395 
 
                                                          
389 Id 990. 
390 Id 990. Smit  v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A). 
391 Note 387. 
392 1979 (1) SA 51 (A). 
393 Ferntex (n387) 846. 
394 Ibid.  See further Masanzu K ‘The silent debate: Ownership of copyright in literary works within 
universities’ (2014) 2 IPLJ 74. 
395 Ferntex (n387) 846; also Haupt (n357) para [41]. 
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While both cases relied on Smit, the court in Ferntex recognised that there is no 
definitive test as to whether a person is an ‘employee’, and that the tests may 
change over time. Neither court considered the actual facts of Smit or why the court 
sought to distinguish between contracts of service and contracts of work. Therefore, 
the inherent difficulty in relying on the common law is that it is always uncertain 
which factors and approach the court will take as indicative of a contract of service in 
the context of the CA 1978. Similarly in Nel and Another v Ladismith Co-Operative 
Wine Makers and Distillers Ltd396  the court had to interpret the meaning of ‘contract 
of service’. It found, based on the authority of Marais v Bezuidenhout amongst 
others, that the ‘contract of service referred to in section 21(1)(d) is the contract 
known in our law as locatio conductio operarum’.397 
 
In these cases there is little interrogation of the context in which the distinction is 
made in Smit.  The concerns raised in Chapter 3 about the challenges attendant on 
finding an employment relationship, would arise in this context as well. 
 
The second issue raised by section 21(1)(d) is the determination of whether the work 
was made in the ‘course of employment’. The significance of this phrase in the 
allocation of ownership between employers and employees makes the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s decision in King v SA Weather Service particularly important, given 
the previous absence of guidance. 398 
  
King was employed as a meteorological technical officer by the SA Weather 
Bureau.399 He wrote various computer programs during his period of employment – 
                                                          
396 [2000] 3 All SA 367 (C). 
397 Nel and Another v Ladismith Co-Operative Wine Makers and Distillers Ltd [2000] 3 All SA 367 (C). 
398 King v SA Weather Service (716/2007) [2008] ZASCA 143 (27 November 2008) (‘SCA’). 
 See, for example, Blignaut H ‘Copyright and employees – King flies into a storm’ (2007) Oct De 
Rebus 26; Klopper (n386)) 475; Masanzu (n394); Muswaka L ‘Ownership of copyright in works 
created in the course of employment: King v South African Weather Services 2009 3 SA 13 (SCA)’ 
(2011) 2 Speculum Juris 105; Tong 2009 (n377) 266ff; Tong (n380);  Visser C ‘Copyright in works 
created in the course of employment: The Supreme Court of Appeal gives guidance. King v South 
African Weather Service’ (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 591; Honey E & Alberts W ‘Ownership of copyright by 
employers’ (2009) October Without Prejudice 31. 
399 SCA paras [2], [4]. 
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partly in his own time and partly at work – which he used to perform his duties which 
included transmitting weather data and generating reports.  There was no dispute 
that King was the author of the computer programs.400 However, both he and his 
employer claimed ownership of copyright in the programs: King on the basis of 
section 21(1)(a); and the employer in terms of section 21(1)(d).  The main point for 
the appeal court was whether King had authored the programs in the course of his 
employment.  
 
The High Court in King v SA Weather Services401 (‘King TPD’) found for SA Weather 
Bureau which based its argument on a combination of delictual principles and 
American jurisprudence. 402 Interestingly, even though the court acknowledged that 
the principles of copyright and delict differ, it nevertheless appeared to rely on the 
latter to justify a broad interpretation of section 21(1)(d).  Claassen J noted that ‘it 
seems to me that a distinction might well be drawn between cases dealing with 
copyright and cases dealing with delict.  It would seem to me that in cases of 
copyright a rather wider than a narrower meaning can be or should be ascribed to 
the words “course of employment”, because it is not punitive or disciplinary in nature 
as being saddled with another’s wrongful acts’.403  However, the court also appeared 
to rely on delict to determine whether King’s actions in fact fell within the course of 
employment. In this respect the court considered that if one adopted a delictual 
approach – which it regarded as fairly flexible – then ‘in general, where the 
employee’s actions generally are in line with the employer’s business, enhances it 
and or facilitates either the employee’s own functioning as an employee or the 
functions of the employer, it would fall within the course of his employment’.404  
 
King appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the court a quo, 
but rejected its reliance on the USA position and on delict.  As regards the USA 
position, the court found that ‘agency law principles, which were developed in the 
                                                          
400 Id para [12]. 
401 1007 JOC (T) 1007. 
402 TPD 1013-16. 
403 Id 1017. 
404 Id 1013. 
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context of tort law, do not necessarily fit the copyright context’.405  In relation to 
reliance on the delictual principles of vicarious liability, they too did not necessarily fit 
the copyright context.406 Harms JA noted that ‘[a]gain, it appears to be wrong to 
apply delictual “principles” without more to determine questions of ownership in the 
arcane area of copyright especially since policy considerations must differ’.407 
 
The approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal was that the phrase ‘in the course of 
employment’ had in the main always been part of South African law, and that it is ‘a 
stock concept in employment law’ which is ‘unambiguous and does not require 
anything by way of extensive or restrictive interpretation.  A practical and common 
sense approach directed at the facts will usually produce the correct result’.408 
Furthermore, the court pointed out that to formulate general principles would be 
‘dangerous’. Instead, its decision was to be regarded as one based simply on the 
facts.  The determination was not limited to whether it fell within the terms of his 
contract of employment that King write computer programs. 
  
The factors leading the court to find that the programs had been made in the course 
of employment, related to the employer’s business, were to the advantage of the 
employer, and had been incorporated into the employer’s system.409  Whether or not 
something was made in the course of employment, was not to be determined by 
‘dissecting the employee’s task into its component activities’ but had to be 
considered broadly.410 It was not part of Kings’ job as a meteorologist to write 
programmes and he would not have been remiss had he not written them.  However, 
he had done so in order to fulfil his functions as a meteorologist. Of particular 
significance was the finding that ‘his employment was the causa causans of the 
programs’411 given that some ‘were specifically written for other weather stations of 
the employer at their request and for their use.  They were not created for external 
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use by others; instead, they were purely work related. Importantly, the employer 
prescribed the format of the programs and had to approve of them before they could 
be implemented and used in the system’.412 
 
This approach clearly has far-reaching effects, even if the court was not formulating 
general principles.  Klopper, for example, argues that the judgment fails to take into 
account the significance of the element of control that characterises the contract of 
service. He notes that the 
 element of authority and control is of particular significance.  This element 
 distinguishes a contract of service from a contract of work and at the same 
 time gives substance and meaning of ‘in the course of employment’ as used 
 by the legislature in section 21(1)(d)…It is only when a copyright work is 
 created under control and direction of an employer that it can be said that it 
 was done in the course of employment.413 
 
Consequently, according to Klopper,  
 [w]here a copyright work affected by s 21(1)(d) is created, this means that the 
 employer must have the power, ability or right to direct the inception and 
 execution of the work.  It cannot be said that such work was created ‘in the  
 course of employment’ if either the work falls outside the agreed services and 
 where therefore the employer could not or did not exercise any authority in 
 relation to the creation of the work.414 
 
The point is valid. Even if one accepts that the duties of an employee are not 
confined to what was expressed in the actual contract when it was concluded, those 
duties must nevertheless be determined by considering the employee’s daily tasks or 
other actions. It cannot be that all activities performed by an employee while ‘on duty’  
automatically fall to be regulated as duties to the employer.  This brings into play the 
very concerns that have plagued labour law: how to determine who qualifies as an 
employee. Alternatively, if ‘course of employment’ simply means ‘during the period of 
the employment relationship’, then the application in King is beyond criticism. Indeed 
it may be argued that the rationale for copyright is different – hence this approach. 
                                                          
412 Id para [20]. 




However, the Klopper’s view holds that this would require that the term ‘contract of 
service’ be overlooked because the term itself is associated with a specific, 
restrictive approach to whether or not the parties are in an employment relationship. 
The SCA by no means overlooked the characterisation of the relationship as one of 
a contract of service in the common law sense. 
 
While the decision may certainly appear to speak to the concerns of employers in 
securing a return on their contribution to the development of intellectual material, it is 
unfortunate that the court did not elaborate on the copyright policy issues that 
supported a finding in favour of the employer. Although the outcome may have been 
the same had delictual principles or foreign jurisprudence been relied upon, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal rejected these because their underlying policies differ from 
copyright. However, what the court failed to do, was to be explicit about what those 
copyright policies are or even what policies, if any, informed the decision. Instead, it 
claimed to be relying on standard employment law principles to give effect to the 
copyright policies. Given that labour laws also develop in response to policy 
concerns, and that there is arguably no ‘stock concept’ of ‘course of employment’,415 
reliance on labour law in the copyright context ought possibly to attract the same 
circumspection as reliance on delict, or even on foreign jurisprudence.  
 
4.3.2.3        Comment on CA 1978 section 21(1) 
 
The provisions of section 21(1) have been part of South African copyright law since 
the PDTCA 1916 which incorporated section 5(1) of the British Copyright Act of 
1911.416 This situation subsisted until the introduction of the CA 1978 when the 
provisions were removed leaving as default position, that: ‘(1) The copyright 
conferred by sections 3 and 4 shall vest in the author, or in the case of a work or joint 
authorship, in the co-authors of the work’.417 The reason for this, as explained by 
Harms JA in Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group plc,418 was that  
                                                          
415 See Ch 3 for a discussion of labour law in South Africa. 
416 British Copyright Act 1911 s5(1). 
417 CA 1978 s21; Gen N 1349 GG 6092 of 30 June 1978. See further Marais (n383) 990-1; Dean 1979 
(n348) 192-3; Visser (n398) 596-7. 
418 2002 (4) SA 249 (SCA). 
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 ‘[t]he present Act, in its original form, attempted to be kinder to authors.  The concept 
 of “copyright” was replaced with an author’s right, the “ownership” of which vested 
 principally in the author.  In this and other regards the object was to move in the 
 direction of Continental law, where the emphasis is on the rights (moral and other) of 
 the author and not on the economic rights of employers and entrepreneurs’.419  
 
Copeling supports this view; when the Act was introduced without the provisions, he 
noted that  
 ‘[a]lmost certainly, the legislature’s decision to delete these additional exceptions 
 from the Act of 1978 was prompted by the consideration that, whatever their 
 merits on the grounds of expediency, they did not justify the erosion of the author’s 
 inherent right to dispose of the fruits of his creative ability according to the manner of 
 his own choosing’.420 
 
However, this position was soon substituted with a move back to the original 
approach in the Copyright Amendment Act 56 of 1980421 ‘when from a practical view 
it was considered no longer expedient to continue without them’.422 Consequently, 
the provisions were absent between the commencement of the Act on 1 January 
1979 and the commencement of the Amendment Act on 23 May 1980. In the words 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal, ‘[t]he good intentions did not last and hardly a year 
had passed when the Legislature (by amending s 21) reverted, as far as ownership 
was concerned, to the Anglo-American model where commercial rights tend to reign 
supreme’.423 
 
The Act does not restrict employers and employees who contract over copyright. 
Therefore, the parties may agree that the employee will assign copyright in works 
made during the period of employment but falling outside the course of employment, 
either as part of the employment contract, or in terms of a separate agreement. The 
protections offered by patent legislation are not evident here. 
 
                                                          
419 Id para  [12]. 
420 Copeling  (n384) 232. 
421 Copyright Amendment Act 56 of 1980 s9, commenced 23 May 1980. 
422 Pistorius (n347) 175 n3. 
423 Biotech (n418) para [12]. 
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From this is appears that the Act is clearly designed to facilitate corporate ownership 
of copyright works.  It seems that the references to labour and employment are not 
geared towards the protection of employees but rather to facilitate a default position 
in favour of the employer who would otherwise have had to incur transaction cost of 
contracting with the employee.  
 
  
4.3.3 Attribution of Authorship in the Employment Context 
 
The author’s entitlement to be associated with the literary or artistic work manifests 
in the two moral rights provided in section 20(1).  Section 20 is the only reference to 
moral rights in the CA 1978, and the ownership provisions of section 21 do not apply. 
Consequently, only the author of the literary or artistic work can be vested with moral 
rights at the outset. Generally, where an author assigns copyright the moral rights 
remain with him or her. Whether or not the author can choose also to assign the 
moral rights to the same or a different assignee, depends on whether one accepts 
that moral rights can be transferred. As explained earlier, there are conflicting views 
on this.  
 
As there are no specific provisions addressing the employment situation, the general 
provisions of section 20, together with the statutory definition of ‘author’, apply. 
Consequently, where an employed author is vested with copyright and transfers it to 
another party, he or she retains the moral rights to the work, as with any other 
author. However, the situation is arguably different where the employee-author is not 
the first copyright holder, as would be the case under section 21(1)(d). There are 
different views on the vesting of moral rights when the first-ownership rules created 
by section 21(1) of the CA 1978 apply. 
 
One view is that the first-ownership rule does not affect the vesting of moral rights in 
the employee-author. Dean notes that ‘[t]he same applies where there is from the 
outset the separation between authorship and ownership of copyright, e.g. in the 
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case of a work made by an employee’.424 This coincides with Pistorius’s view where 
she states that ‘despite the fact that copyright vests in the employer when the work 
was created by his or her employee in the course of the author’s employment under 
a contract of service, the employee-author is still able to enforce his or her moral 
rights in the work’.425 On this approach, even though the employer would own the 
copyright, this would be subject to the employee-author’s moral rights; a result also 
achieved by applying article 6bis of the Berne Convention – the origin of the 
provision in the legislation.  
 
However, the wording of the Berne Convention differs slightly from that of the CA 
1978 in that, while the Convention uses the phrase ‘[i]ndependently of the author’s 
economic rights, and even after the transfer’,426 the CA 1978 excludes 
‘independently of’.427 It is this difference, combined with section 21(1)(d), that forms 
the basis for the alternative view that moral rights do not arise when works subject to 
the first-ownership provisions of section 21(1) are made.  The argument is that the 
CA 1978 does not provide for moral rights to arise independently of copyright.428 In 
fact, when moral rights were introduced into the Act, they appeared as ‘residuary 
rights’429 – ie rights that arise when the copyright is transferred which are residual in 
that they are what remains with the author.430 Since the effect of the first-ownership 
rules in section 21(1) is that the employee-author is not vested with copyright at all, 
no copyright assignment from the employee-author to the employer can take place, 
and no moral rights can arise. Further, as the employer is not the author of the work 
under the definitions in the CA 1978, it too has no basis on which to claim moral 
rights even though it has been vested with copyright.  This approach avoids the 
arguably untenable situation were employee-authors to retain moral rights in works 
                                                          
424 Dean 1979 (n348) 42. See also Dean O ‘The employee and the Copyright Act: A pitfall for many 
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owned by their employer.431It is also one which aligns with s21(1)(d) which aims to 
facilitate control by employers.  
 
Alternatively, if moral rights are transferable the parties may agree to transfer them 
to the employer. 
 
 
4.4  REGISTERED DESIGN RIGHTS 
 
4.4.1 The Relationship between Industrial Designs and Patents 
 
While a patent protects the idea underlying a product, the visual appearance of the 
product is more appropriately protected through a design right. Therefore, during the 
development of an invention, the final physical form of the product could constitute a 
registrable industrial design independent of the patent. Because they are not 
mutually exclusive, both forms of protection can arise in relation to a single product. 
There may also be situations in which reliance is placed on design protection 
because the underlying technology is not patentable. In such cases, others may use 
the technology but are limited in how the replicable product ultimately looks.  
 
Like patent law, the development of a registered design right in South Africa has its 
roots in the British system,432although the current enabling legislation – the Designs 
Act 195 of 1993 (‘DA 1993’)433 – introduced a distinction between aesthetic and 
                                                          
431 See for example, Tong (n428) 316-7. 
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functional designs – an unorthodox approach which does not accord with the 
internationally accepted approach which does not make this distinction.434  
Under the DA 1993 industrial designs for articles may be registered as both a 
functional and an aesthetic design and in one or more class.435  
 
An ‘aesthetic’ design is defined as one which is ‘applied to any article, whether for 
the pattern or the shape or the configuration or the ornamentation thereof, or for any 
two or more of those purposes, and by whatever means it is applied, having features 
which appeal to and are judged solely by the eye, irrespective of the aesthetic quality 
thereof’.436 A ‘functional’ design is one which is ‘applied to any article, whether for the 
pattern or the shape or the configuration thereof, or for any two or more of those 
purposes, and by whatever means it is applied, having features which are 
necessitated by the function which the article to which the design is applied, is to  
perform’.437   
 
The criteria for protection reveal both differences and similarities. Both require that 
the design be ‘new’.438 This imposes an ‘absolute novelty’ standard requiring that the 
design be different from, or not form part of, the state of the art immediately before 
                                                          
434 For more on this, see Pistorius & van der Merwe (n433) 231. See also for the effect of this 
distinction on the overlap between copyright and industrial design protection, specifically the use of 
copyright to protect functional designs historically: Dean O ‘The great copyright controversy’ (1988)  
July De Rebus 469; Dean O ‘The Interplay between Copyright and Design Protection’ Designs’ in 
Visser (n114) 78-84. Dunlop A ‘The Protection of Aesthetic Designs’ in Visser (n114) 349ff; Dunlop A 
‘Do people understand the implications of industrial copyright protection’ (1988) May De Rebus 349; 
Momberg D ‘The design copyright issue’ (1980) March De Rebus 129; Pistorius T ‘Aesthetics and 
economics? An overview of the copyright protection of utilitarian works in South Africa’ (2006) 2 
Speculum Juris 141; du Plessis (n433) 59-61 and 65-6 for comment on whether the Act complies with 
the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. 
435 DA 1993 s14(4), 15. For further discussion of the intrinsic and extrinsic requirements for 
registrability, see Pistorius & van der Merwe (n433)) 232-43; Burrell T South African Patent and 
Design Law (1999) 453-60. See also Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft v Grandmark 
International (722/12) [2013] ZASCA 114 (18 September 2013) para [7]. 
436 DA 1993 s1(1) definition of ‘aesthetic design’. See further Clipsal Australia (Pty) Ltd v Trust 
Electrical Wholesalers [2007] SCA 24 RSA para [8]. 
437 DA 1993 s1(1) definition of ‘functional design’.  
438 DA 1993  s14(1)(a);  DA 1993 s14(1)(b). 
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the date of application or the release date.439 It is therefore similar to the ‘newness’ 
requirement in the PA 1978. Further, an aesthetic design must also be original,440 
while a functional design must not be commonplace.441   
 
The nature of the statutory monopoly is economic and there is no express right of 
attribution which recognises the creator of the design. The effect of a registration of 
an industrial design is similar to that of a patent.  The registered proprietor, defined 
as the ‘person whose name is for the time being entered in the register as the 
proprietor of the design’,442 has the right ‘to exclude other persons from the making, 
importing, using or disposing of any article included in the class in which the design 
is registered and embodying the registered design or a design not substantially 
different from the registered design, so that he shall have and enjoy the whole profit 
and advantage accruing by reason of the registration’.443  Like patents, the rights in 
an application for registration of the design or in the registered design can be 
assigned and devolved by operation of law.444 The duration of protection is, generally 
speaking, fifteen years for the former, and ten years for the latter.445 
 
The rights may be revoked on a number of grounds, including that the application 
was not made by a person entitled to do so, and that the application was in fraud of 
the rights of another person.446 
                                                          
439 DA 1993 s14(2) and (3); read with s1(1) definition of ‘release date’, s14(2) proviso. See Clipsal 
Australia (Pty) Ltd v Trust Electrical Wholesalers  paras [13], [14], [17]. For further discussion of the 
newness requirement, see Pistorius & van der Merwe (n433)  236-40.  
440 It has been put forward that the meaning is similar to that in copyright law (Clipsal (n436) para [20]. 
This appears to be supported Pistorius & van der Merwe (n433) 240; du Bois M & Visser C ‘Aesthetic 
design rights to spare parts? Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft v Grandmark 
International (Pty) Ltd’ (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 91. However, such reliance on copyright has been 
criticised, see Joffe F ‘Designs registered under the Designs Act’ (2007) 15 JBL 26. 
441 DA 1993 s14(1)(b).  See further for the meaning of ‘commonplace’, Pistorius & van der Merwe (n 
n433) 241; see also du Plessis (n433)  59-62 for comment prior to case law on the provision. 
442 Section 1(1). 
443 Section 20(1). 
444 DA 1993 s29. 
445 DA 1993 s22(1)(a)-(b) for details. 
446 DA 1993 s31. For further discussion of grounds for revocation of a design registration see Cilliers L 
‘Chapter 7 designs’ in Dean O & Dyer A (eds) Introduction of Intellectual Property Law (2014) 318-21. 
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4.4.2   Entitlement to Registered Designs in the Employment Context 
 
An industrial design right only arises through registration and the right to apply for 
registration is limited to the ‘proprietor’ of the design, including joint proprietors.447 
Under the definition of ‘applicant’, this is extended to the ‘legal representative of a 
deceased applicant or of an applicant who is a person under legal disability’.448 The 
DA 1993 makes no provision for alternative ways of determining first ownership and 
consequently, the definition of ‘proprietor’ operates as a first-ownership rule.  
 
Practically, first ownership is decided by whether the applicant is a proprietor. The 
DA 1993 defines a ‘proprietor’ as:  
 ‘(a) the author of the design; or (b) where the author of the design executes the work 
 for another person, the other person for whom the work is so executed; or (c) where 
 a person, or his employee acting in the course of his employment, makes a design 
 for another person in terms of an agreement, such other person; or (d) where the 
 ownership in the design has passed to any other person, such other person’.449   
 
There does not appear to be any reported case law on this provision or its 
predecessor, section 1(1) the DA 1967, which echoed the provision save for (c). It is 
submitted that an approach akin to that in section 21(1) of the CA 1978 ought to be 
adopted in interpreting the definition so that subsection (a) will only hold true if it is 
not excluded by either (b), (c), or (d). In addition, (b), (c) or (d) will apply in that order.  
This will ensure that there are no conflicting claims to proprietorship as a 
consequence of multiple parties meeting the definition.  
 
The starting point in determining first ownership is subsection (a) of the definition of 
‘proprietor’.  This subsection provides that ‘the author of the design’ is the proprietor.  
There is no definition of ‘author’, and the term does not arise anywhere else in the 
legislation, save for subsection (b). However, it is submitted that the ‘author’ here 
                                                          
447 Section 14(1) and (7). A failure to comply with the requirements of s14(1) constitutes grounds for 
revocation of the design right. See DA 1993 s31(1) for the grounds for revocation 
448 Section 1(1) definition of ‘applicant’. 
449 Section 1(1). 
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plays a similar role to that of the ‘inventor’ in the PA 1978, and that the determination 
of ‘author’ is a necessary preliminary issue to the entire proprietorship enquiry.450 
 
According to Burrell, the term  
‘must consequently be given its ordinary meaning which denotes the person who 
really represents or creates or gives effect to the idea or fancy or imagination; the 
person who is most nearly the effective cause of the design when completed; the 
person who creates the novelty. Whether or not a person is the author of any 
particular work is thus in the nature of things always a question of fact’.451  
 
On this approach, authorship relates to more than simply acting as an amanuensis 
or conduit for another. Where individuals are actually involved in the creation of the 
design, the determination of authorship (and hence possible joint proprietorship) 
boils down to whether the nature of the contribution can sustain a claim to authorship 
– a matter ultimately to be resolved by the courts.  
 
Likewise, the question of whether authorship can inhere in a juristic person is not 
clear. In this regard the concerns raised in the copyright context in relation to literary 
and artistic works, arise equally here.  If we proceed on the basis that the employee 
is the author of a design, this leads to the conclusion that the employee is entitled to 
apply for the design and to be the first registrant – unless any of the other provisions 
of the definition apply.  Of course, if the meaning of ‘author’ is sufficiently wide to 
include juristic persons, the employer could possibly claim authorship, albeit based 
on the employee’s actual intellectual contribution. The rest of this analysis proceeds 
on the basis that the employee is the author. 
 
The definition of proprietor in (a) is excluded if the situation in (b) arises. Subsection 
(b) provides that ‘where the author of the design executes the work for another 
person, the other person for whom the work is so executed’ will be the proprietor. It 
is submitted that ‘execution’ refers simply to perform, or do, or to carry out the work 
necessary to be an author of the design. The crux of the provision, at least for the 
allocation of proprietorship between the employee and employer, lies in the meaning 
                                                          
450 See Joffe (n440) 27. 
451 Burrell (n435) 461 (footnotes omitted).  
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of ‘for another person’. It is submitted that this means that the design must have 
been made for the benefit of the other person, or possibly at the other person’s 
behest.     
 
If we assume that the employee is the author, then the design will, as explained 
above, be owned by the person for whom the design was executed. The ‘other 
person’ is the proprietor.  According to du Plessis, this provision may be used to 
create a first-ownership rule in favour of the employer.  She notes that ‘[t]he principle 
appears to be that the employer will be the proprietor of a design where the 
employee executed the design for the employer, i.e. in the performance of his/her 
duties, or, in other words, in the course and scope of his/her employment’.452 There 
is nothing to refute this interpretation although it is subject to juristic persons 
qualifying as the ‘other person’.  On this basis, if the employer can show that the 
work was ‘executed’ by the employee-author for the employer, there is nothing to 
prevent the employer from claiming proprietorship under this definition. However, the 
employer would have to show that the employee was in fact executing the work for it. 
The only way for the employer to do this, is to show that the work was executed in 
terms of an agreement.  It is submitted that the agreement could be a term in the 
employment contract or in any other agreement. However, as will be discussed later, 
in the former case there may be restrictions on what can be agreed upon. 
 
While it is conceivable that in many instances the effect of the relationship between 
the employer and employee may be construed to find that the making or execution of 
the design was for the employer, the provision certainly does not translate into a rule 
that designs made by employees during employment fall to the employer. The use of 
the term ‘course and scope’ of employment does not appear in the DA 1993, and 
one must be wary of introducing it as the basis on which to determine whether the 
work was executed for the employer under (b). 
 
                                                          
452 Du Plessis E ‘Employers’ rights to intellectual property’ Report Q183 South Africa Group for AIPPI 
2004 [1.2.3] available at http://aippi.org/event/39th-world-intellectual-property-congress/ (date of use 
30 November 2015) 
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The third manifestation of ‘proprietor’ provides that ‘where a person, or his employee 
acting in the course of his employment, makes a design for another person in terms 
of an agreement’, that other person will be the proprietor. The first point to note is the 
removal of the term ‘author’. Instead it refers to a ‘person’ or such person’s 
‘employee acting in the course of his employment’ who makes a design for another 
person. This provision contemplates the situation where a design is commissioned 
from a person – including a juristic person – who employs other persons. The 
proprietor of the design is the person for whom the design was made in terms of the 
agreement.  Where the author of the design is the party who has agreed to make the 
design, he or she will therefore not be entitled to apply for registration.  Where the 
agreement to produce the design is concluded between an employer and a third 
party, and the design is made by an employee, the third party would be the 
proprietor – provided that the employee made the design ‘in the course of his 
employment’.  
 
None of the key terms, for example, ‘makes’, ‘employee’ and ‘course of 
employment’, is defined in the DA 1993, and there do not appear to be any reported 
cases on their meaning in this context.  A further question is whether the term 
‘makes’ in fact refers to authorship. In other words, can we deduce from this 
subsection that the definition of ‘author’ is the person who ‘made’ the design? If so, it 
would seem that the reference to the ‘person’ possibly employing someone, 
anticipates a juristic person as author, as canvassed in the consideration of (a) 
above.  
 
The phrase ‘course of employment’ is found in the CA 1978.  In the context of  
section 21(1)(d) of the CA 1978, the King case interpreted the phrase in a relatively 
expansive way and found that even though writing computer programmes was not 
part of the author’s duties as employee, the works had nevertheless been made in 
the course of his employment.  However, it cannot be assumed that a similar 
interpretation would apply in the present context, particularly when one considers 
that the court pointed out that not only was it not laying down any principles on the 
matter, but also that the underlying copyright policies affected the suitability of 
looking to other areas of law for guidance in interpretation. The theoretical 
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underpinnings of industrial design rights arguably differ from those of copyright, and 
indeed the protection offered is more in line with patents. 
 
If, however, it is accepted that the employee made the design in the course of his or 
her employment, the proprietorship vests in the commissioner by virtue of an 
agreement with the employer.  The overall effect of the provision is limited to those 
cases where the design has been made pursuant to an agreement between the 
employer and a third party.  It does not deal with the issue of entitlement between 
the employer and employee generally, and is therefore not authority for a statutory 
default rule of employer proprietorship in all cases where the employee has made a 
design in his or her ‘course of employment’.  However, the question is whether one 
could extrapolate that ‘made in the course of employment’ implies that this is the 
default. 
 
The fourth basis for proprietorship is subsection (d) which provides that ‘where the 
ownership in the design has passed to any other person’ that person is the 
proprietor. It is assumed that this refers to where the person who would have been 
the proprietor under any of the preceding provisions, has entered into an agreement 
in terms of which the rights have been transferred. It is submitted this would also 
apply where the right has devolved by operation of law under section 29 of the DA 
1993.  Therefore, for an employer to claim proprietorship of an employee-authored 
design under this provision, it must show that the ownership has passed to it from 
the employee-author, most likely by assignment or by implication under the common 
law. In turn, this raises issues similar to those arising under the PA 1978.   
 
The two key considerations are: whether the ownership in the design passed to the 
employer in terms of an agreement; and in the absence of this, whether there is an 
implied common-law rule vesting ownership of registrable industrial designs in the 
employer. Neither of these issues will be considered further as they raise 
substantially the same concerns as those addressed in Chapter 3 in relation to 
patents.  This is supported by Pistorius and van der Merwe who note that ‘[s]ince the 
rights and obligations that exist between employees and employers are a matter of 
contract law, they are essentially the same as those that apply in relation to patent 
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law’.453  This reflects the view that in the absence of an agreement between the 
parties, the legislation does not provide for a first-ownership rule in favour of the 
employer.  
 
4.4.3   The Role of Contract in the Allocation of Ownership 
 
References to the use of contract or agreements in the preceding discussion of 
proprietorship must take into account the provisions of section 29(2) that  
 ‘[a]ny condition on a contract of employment which- 
(a) requires an employee to assign to his employer a design made by him 
 otherwise than within the course of his employment; or 
(b) restricts the right of an employee in a design made by him more than one 
 year after the termination of the contract of employment, 
shall be null and void’.454 
 
This provision is virtually identical to section 59(2) of the PA 1978.  The issues raised 
by the restrictions in that context, arise here too. However, an added difficulty in 
understanding the scope of section 29(2) of the DA 1993 arises from the fact that 
registered designs appear to be aligned with both patents and copyright.  Although 
section 29(2) echoes the PA 1978 for the most part, the phrase ‘course and scope’ is 
replaced with ‘course of employment’ – a phrase found in the CA 1978.455  The 
concerns in interpreting ‘course of employment’ in the copyright context, and 









                                                          
453 Pistorius & van der Merwe (n433) 256. 
454 Section 29(2). 
455 See further Tong (n380). 
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4.5  PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS (‘PBRS’) 
 
4.5.1   The Relationship between PBRS and Patents 
 
PBRS give the breeders of new plant varieties exclusive control over the 
commercialisation of propagating and harvested material of the newly-bred variety. 
The TRIPS Agreement, while requiring that members provide patent protection for 
inventions ‘in all fields of technology’,456 also allows members to exclude plants from 
patentability.457 However, plant varieties must nonetheless be protected ‘either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof’.458 
PBRS are a form of protection implemented in many countries, usually under 
obligations arising from membership of the International Union for the Protection of 
New Plant Varieties (‘UPOV’).459 
 
In South Africa, plant varieties and essentially biological processes for the production 
of plants, are excluded from patentability by the PA 1978.460 This was not always the 
case, however. Under the PA 1952 plant varieties were originally explicitly 
recognised in the definition of ‘invention’, which included ‘any distinct and new 
variety of plant, other than a tuberpropogated plant which has been produced 
asexually’.461 In 1960 the Act was amended to limit patenting to ornamental trees 
and shrubs. However, all plant patents were removed when the Plant Breeders’ 
Rights Act 22 of 1964 (‘PBRA 1964’) introduced registration for PBRS.  Currently, 
plant varieties are protected as sui generis PBRS under the PBRA 1976.462  The 
                                                          
456 Article 27(1). 
457 TRIPS art27(3)(b). The exclusion is limited to plants other than micro-organisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes.  
458 Ibid. 
459 See www.upov.int; further de Jonge B ‘Plant variety protection in sub-Saharan Africa: Balancing 
commercial and smallholder farmers’ interests’ (2014) 3 Journal of Politics and Law 100. 
460 PA 1978 s25(4). 
461 S 1; Weltevrede Nursery v Keith Kirsten's (Pty) Ltd and another 2004 (4) SA 110 (SCA) 115; see 
further Burrell (n435) 33. 
462 Commenced 1 November 1977; must be read with the Plant Breeders’ Rights Regulations (GN 
R1186 GG 18266 of 12 September 1997) (‘PBRA Regs’). 
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PBRA 1976 also gives effect to South Africa’s obligations as a member of UPOV and 
as a party to the 1978 Act of the UPOV Convention of 1961.   
 
Under the PBRA 1976, applicants may apply to register a PBR in respect of plant 
varieties recognised in the regulations to the Act.463  The variety must meet the 
intrinsic requirements of newness,464 distinctiveness,465 uniformity,466 and stability.467 
Newness here differs from that in patent and design legislation in that it does not 
relate to absolute novelty but rather to whether the variety has been 
commercialised.468 
 
A PBR entitles the holder to prevent others from performing certain acts in relation to 
propagating material or to certain harvested material, without a licence.469  The acts 
are production or reproduction, conditioning for the purpose of propagation, sale or 
marketing, exporting, importing, or stocking for the purposes of these acts.470  It is an 
infringement to use the denomination of a protected variety in relation to other plants 
or propagating material, or to sell protected plants or propagating material under any 
name other than the approved denomination.471 The duration of the right is 25 years 
for vines and trees, and twenty years in all other cases.472PBRS may be assigned.  
 
                                                          
463 PBRA Regs  reg 2. 
464 PBRA 1976 s2(2)(a).   
465 Id s2(2)(b). See Peppadew International v OMC Marketing 2006 BIP 398 (TRPBR) para [10.1]; 
Weltevrede Nursery (n461) 122; van der Spuy P ‘Part 6 Plant Breeders’ Rights’ in van der Merwe A 
ed Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa (2011) 344-345. 
466 PBRA 1976 s2(2)(c). 
467 PBRA 1976 s2(2)(d). See also Peppadew (n465) para [10.1]; Piquante Brands International (Pty) 
Ltd v OMC Marketing (Pty) Ltd and Another 2007 BIP 453 (RPBR) 459. For more on the intrinsic 
requirements generally, see Cochrane D ‘Chapter 6 Plant Breeders’ rights’ in Dean & Dyer (n446) 
286-7. 
468 PBRA 1976 s2(2). See van der Spuy (n465) 344; see Weltevrede Nursery (n461) 120-3 for the 
position prior to the 1996 amendment Act. 
469 PBRA 1976 s23(1); see also s23(2) and s23(4). There are, however, limitations to the exclusivity 
afforded by the legislation. See PBRA 1976 s23(6); Cochrane (n467) 291-2. 
470 PBRA 1976 s23(1); s23A(a).  
471 PBRA s23A(c), (d). 
472 PBRA s21. 
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There is no clear attribution right although the ‘breeder’ is recorded in the register.473 
 
4.5.2   Entitlement to PBRS in the Employment Context 
 
The PBRA 1976 does not explicitly provide for ownership of PBRS but does so in 
practice by limiting applications to ‘the breeder’.474  This functions as a first-
ownership rule as the person to whom the application has been granted will be the 
holder of the right.475 Natural and juristic persons are expressly recognised as 
potential applicants.476 Unfortunately, to date there do not appear to be any reported 
decisions dealing in any substance with the interpretation of the definition. Given the 
paucity of case law on PBRS generally, this is not surprising.477 
 
A ‘breeder’ is 
 ‘(a) the person who bred, or discovered and developed, the variety; (b) the   
 employer of the person referred to in paragraph (a), if that person is an 
 employee whose duties are such that the variety was bred, or discovered and 
 developed, in the  performance of such duties; or (c) the successor in title of 
 the person referred to in paragraph (a) or the employer in paragraph (b)’.478  
 
With regard to subsection (a), the terms ‘bred’ and ‘discovered and developed’479 are 
not defined.480 According to van der Spuy, ‘[i]f one person discovered the variety and 
another developed it, both should be entitled to apply for a plant breeder’s right’.481 
                                                          
473 PBRA 1976 s4; PBRA Regs reg 20(1)(d). 
474 Section  6(1). 
475 PBRA 1976 s1 definition ‘holder. 
476 PBRA 1976 s6(2), s1 definition of ‘agreement country’, ‘convention country’, and ‘breeder’. 
477 See Koster, B ‘Plant Breeders’ Rights Act gets teeth. Decision of special appeal board – first of its 
kind’ (1997) April De Rebus 258; Weltevrede Nursery (n461) 119 in which it was assumed that the 
alleged discoverer did so as an employee of the appellant. 
478 Section 1 definition of ‘breeder’. 
479 The pre-amendment legislation provided for discovered or developed. 
480 For the meaning ‘discovered’ and ‘developed’ see Weltevrede Nursery (n461) 119-20. See further 
Cochrane (n467)  285-6. 
481 Van der Spuy (n465) 235. 
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They would then hold the right jointly in equal undivided shares.482 Where an 
employee meets the definition in (a), he or she will be the breeder and entitled to the 
registration.  
 
However, if the employee acts in the circumstances set out in (b), he or she will no 
longer satisfy the definition. The employer is deemed to be the ‘breeder’ and is 
entitled to apply for the rights under section 6.  To determine whether this deviation 
from the rule in (a) applies, one must determine whether the person who would have 
been the breeder under (a), is an employee of the employer.  The PBRA 1976 
provides no guidance.  It islikely that a court would regard it as a reference to an 
employment relationship in the nature of the common law locatio conductio 
operarum.  
 
Once it has been established that the appropriate relationship exists, the next issue 
is whether the employee is one ‘whose duties [were] such that the variety was bred, 
or discovered and developed, in the performance of such duties’.483  The use of 
terms like ‘duties’, ‘are such’ and ‘in the performance of such duties’, indicate that the 
employee must have been involved in carrying out work he or she was employed to 
do. However, it does not state that the employee must have been employed 
specifically to breed, develop, or discover new varieties, and it may consequently be 
possible to interpret the provisions to extend the employer’s reach to situations 
where the employee was not specifically employed to generate new plant varieties. It 
is unclear exactly what this would mean for the potential scope of the employer’s 
claim. It is noteworthy that the Act does not base the employer’s claim on more 
common phrasing like ‘course’ or ‘course and scope’ of employment. 
 
An employee who breeds, or discovers and develops a plant variety outside of these 
circumstances is the breeder and is entitled to apply for the registration.   
 
The third iteration of the definition of ‘breeder’ provides that the successor in title of 
the person who bred, or discovered and developed the variety, or of the employer, is 
                                                          
482 PBRA s28(1)(a). 
483 Section 1 definition of ‘breeder’. 
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the breeder. Where an employee qualifies as a person under (a), his or her 
successor in title is the breeder. The issue arising here is whether the employer can 
be the employee’s successor in title, in which case it would be the breeder under (c). 
This would likely turn on whether there is an agreement in terms of which the 
employee has transferred his or her rights in the application to the employer under 
the employment contract. There are no statutory prohibitions on such assignments 
forming part of the employment agreement. 
 
This definition of ‘breeder’ and the approach to first ownership were introduced into 
the PBRA 1976 by the Plant Breeders’ Amendment Act 15 of 1996.  The original 
definition in the PBRA 1976 was simply that a breeder was ‘the person who directed 
the breeding of the new variety, or who developed or discovered it’.484 In order to be 
a breeder only one of the characteristics was required. The PBRA 1976 originally  
provided that an application could be made by the breeder ‘[p]rovided that where the 
breeder is an employee and his duties are such that they involve plant breeding 
activities related to the plant in question, the application shall be made by the 
employer of the breeder, irrespective of whether or not such breeder is paid a 
salary’.485 
 
The Plant Breeders’ Rights Amendment Act 5 of 1980486 introduced three bases on 
which to apply: as breeder; as employer; and as successor in title. As regards 
employee, the redrafted provision read that ‘(b) if the breeder is an employee 
(irrespective of whether or not he is paid a salary) whose duties are such that they 
involve plant breeders’ activities relating to the kind of plant in question, and the new 
variety in question was bred in the performance of such duties, the employer of such 
breeder’ could apply for the right.487 This position remained until the commencement 
of the Plant Breeders’ Rights Amendment Act 15 of 1996488 which amended the 
                                                          
484 PBRA 1976 Notice 473 GG 5027 of 24 March 1976 s1 definition of ‘breeder’. 
485 Id s6(1).  
486 Plant Breeders’ Rights Amendment Act 5 of 1980 GG 6908 of 28 March 1980, in effect from 2 
January 1981 (‘PBR Amendment’). 
487 Id s4.  
488 Plant Breeders’ Rights Amendment Act 15 of 1996 GG 17138 of 19 April 1996. 
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definition of ‘breeder’489 and the provisions relating to who may apply for registration 
to their current form.  
 
It is evident that there has been a shift towards facilitating employer-ownership of 
plant varieties from the outset. Previously, the employer could apply only if the 
employee’s duties involved plant breeding activities related to the plant in question. 
However, the employee remained the breeder.  The current provision is less specific 
as to the limitations on the employer’s reach to varieties which are produced by 
employees who are not specifically employed to breed the variety in question.  More 
importantly, it removes the employee from the process entirely by deeming the 
employer the breeder.   
 
 
4.6 OBSERVATIONS ON COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS AND PLANT BREEDERS’ 
RIGHTS 
 
Although patents, copyright, registered designs, and plant breeders’ rights vary in 
both nature and scope, each plays a role in the development of knowledge goods. 
Where the intellectual property rights arise from a common or related process, this 
variation affects the possibility of consistency in ownership across the rights. In the 
employment context, this results in the employer who has contributed to the 
development of the subject matter, being in different first-ownership positions 
depending on the underlying right. The following observations sum up the main 
observations which will inform the conclusions in Chapter 6. 
 
Firstly, in each case, corporate title is made possible where employees have 
effectively made the work, design, or plant variety. This is in obvious contrast to the 
approach to patent ownership. However, despite a common acknowledgement that a 
deviation from the default position in favour of the individual is necessary, there is no 
consistency in the substance or form. The PBRA 1976 achieves this through a 
‘breedership’ rule which defines the ‘breeder’ in a way that results in the employer 
displacing the employee as the breeder where the latter has acted in the 
performance of his or her duties. This is arguably appropriate if plant breeding simply 
                                                          
489 Id s1(b). 
183 
 
involves the employee carrying out the employer’s instructions – particularly if the 
level of discretion to deviate from the required output (variety) is limited.  
 
The CA 1978 has a broad first-ownership rule extending to all works made in the 
‘course of employment’. Again, this may be appropriate if one considers the nature of 
the protectable works. In many situations, employees will generate works which 
attract copyright as part of performing their general duties. These will include 
administrative works, such as memoranda and reports, many of which are generated 
alongside patentable invention and often regardless of what the employee is actually 
employed to do.   
 
The DA 1993 also appears to align with a default position which deviates from 
vesting ownership in the employee even though he or she is the author.  However, 
the Act is not explicit in creating a first-ownership rule in favour of the employer, 
although it may be interpreted in this way. Reference is made to employment but, as 
with the other statutes, there is no explanation of what is intended. 
 
Although the employee’s loss of first ownership is a consequence of his or her status 
as an ‘employee’, which is, in turn, dependent on the relationship between the 
corporate and him or her, none of the statutes explains the nature of the relationship 
to which the rule applies.  This is even though terms like ‘employer’, ‘employee’, 
‘contract of service’ and ‘employment’ to limit the application of the rule. It is only in 
the copyright context that the courts have been called upon to consider the nature of 
the relationship and have turned to the common law to substantiate a meaning in the 
guise of a locatio conductio operarum. 
 
A second observation relates to the use of contract to regulate title. Neither the 
PBRA 1976 nor the CA 1978 overtly limits the employer’s right to contract with the 
employee for assignment of rights to intellectual property made outside of this default 
position. However, the DA 1993 is clear in its rule limiting an employer’s reach to 
designs not made in the course of employment. In this respect it aligns, almost 
identically, with the PA 1978 save for the use of ‘course’ in instead of ‘course and 
scope’. A key difference however, is that the DA 1993 does appear to create the 
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possibility of an ex lege employer-ownership in the definition of ‘proprietor’, in which 
case. 
 
Thirdly, only copyright provides expressly for attribution of the individual where he or 
she has relinquished ownership. However, where the employer is the default 
copyright owner, the existence of the right to be named as the author is uncertain.  
Neither designs nor PBRS expressly provide for any form of analogous moral rights. 
Indeed, the PBRA 1976 provides for the breeder to be named in the registration – a 
question of fact dependent on who meets the definition, and the effect of which is 
that the employee may not be associated with the plant variety at all. 
 
Fourthly, in all cases where the legislation divests an employee of rights which he or 
she would have acquired were it not for the employment relationship, the employee 
is left with nothing. There are no residual economic rights entitling the employee-
creator to any form of compensation or other reward where the employer acquires 
ownership.  It is left to the contract between the employer and employee to 
determine the nature and value of the employee’s return for the work, design, or 
plant variety created.  
 
Finally, save for PBRS, there is general uncertainty about the application of certain 
ownership-related provisions to juristic persons, and by implication, to employers. 
However, generally involvement of the employer in the generation of intellectual 
property in these areas is recognised in the allocation provisions. In limited instances 
the recognition is through a complete removal of the employee from the ownership 
chain by not recognising him or her as the contributor of the intellectual effort him or 
her. In others, the role is recognised but not associated with vesting of ownership. In 







ENTITLEMENT TO PATENTABLE INVENTIONS: 
CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE 




5.1  INTRODUCTION 
  
National responses to the challenges of balancing employer and employee interests 
in the ownership of inventions vary, with some jurisdictions choosing to deviate from 
the archetypal patent law approach. However, there is no singular deviation common 
to all. This chapter examines the responses of the British and American systems to 
the challenges of the employee-invention paradigm identified in Chapter 2.  This will 
provide insight into the potential strengths and weakness of two divergent regulatory 
approaches which have been adopted by technologically innovative countries.  
 
Although both offer deviations from the archetypal patent law recognition of the 
inventor as the first owner, Britain does so by statute, while the USA relies 
predominantly on the common law. The decision by the former to embark on a 
drastic overhaul of its system, and by the latter to rely on the development of the 
common law, are the result of domestic drivers which are not the same as those in 
South Africa. Consequently, the aim here is not to determine whether either system 
ought to be transplanted wholly into South Africa, but rather to identify those aspects 
which could serve to contribute to the answer to the question: How ought South 









5.2  THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 
5.2.1  Introduction 
  
In Britain entitlement to patents for employee-inventions is regulated primarily by 
sections 39 to 43 of the Patents Act of 1977 (‘BPA 1977’)1 which provide for the 
allocation of ownership and for the payment of compensation by employers to 
employee-inventors.   Before the enactment of the BPA 1977, entitlement to 
employee-inventions was governed by the common law.  In the run up to the BPA 
1977The Board of Trade was tasked with reviewing the British laws in anticipation of 
the UK’s ratification of the European Patent Convention (‘EPC’). 2  The Banks 
Committee, which was responsible for the review, proposed no changes to the 
existing legal position, noting in its report that ‘[w]hile employee inventors should be 
given every encouragement and recognition, we doubt whether, in the context of 
British industrial relations, this is best done by the imposition of statutory obligations 
on the employer’.3  The government’s response to the report, however, included a 
proposal for statutory compensation for employee-inventions if it could be shown that 
‘employee inventors were being unfairly rewarded under voluntary arrangements 
with their employers’.4 According to Hough & Spowart-Taylor, one of the reasons for 
the shift from the common law to a statutory allocation rule and the introduction of 
compensation for employees, was a concern ‘that the national economic interest 
could be served by stimulating innovation and that this project could be realized 
more effectively if inventors received a more just distribution of the economic benefit 
                                                          
1 For the historical development of the  British provisions on employee-inventions, see Saxby P 
‘Employees’ inventions and English law’ in Phillips J (ed) Employees’ Inventions: A Comparative 
Study (1981) 108; Phillips J ‘The English patent as a reward for invention’ (1983) EIPR 41ff; Pila J 
‘“Sewing the fly buttons on the statute”: Employee Inventions and the employment context’ (2012) 32 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 265; Hough B & Spowart-Taylor A ‘Realising “Partnership” in 
employment relations: Some legal obstacles’ (2002) 13 KCLJ 158-64. 
2 Board of Trade ‘The British Patent system: Report of the Committee to examine the patent system 
and patent law’ (Cmnd 4407) 1970 (‘Banks Committee’). For more on the historical background to the 
report, see Pila (n1) 286-90; Phillips 1983 (n1) 32-3. 
3 Chapter 16. 
4 White Paper ‘Patent Law Reform’ Cmnd 6000 1975 para [37]. 
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which employers derive from their inventions’.5The resultant provisions have been 
described as a compromise aimed at rewarding exceptional cases only.6  
 
Interestingly, although a key reason for the enactment of the BPA 1977 was to bring 
the UK in line with the EPC,7 the complexity of the statutory provisions stand in 
contrast to the EPC’s relatively non-committal approach to the issue.8 
 
5.2.2 Patentable Inventions Made in the Employment Context 
 
5.2.2.1 Basis for ownership and attribution  
 
The British patent system operates on a first-to-file basis so that generally the first 
person to file an application for the patent is entitled to the patent.9 The BPA 1977 
provides that ‘[a]ny person may make an application for a patent either alone or 
jointly with another’10 subject to a rebuttable presumption that the person making the 
application is entitled to the patent.11   Therefore, who may file is integral to first 
ownership in the invention.  While there is no limitation on who may apply for a 
patent,12 only recognised persons may be granted the patent.  Section 7(2)(a) 
provides that  an invention will be granted ‘primarily to the inventor or joint 
inventors’.13  
                                                          
5 Hough & Spowart-Taylor (n1) 159, see generally 158-64. 
6 Wotherspoon K ‘Employee inventions revisited’ (1993) 22 Industrial Law Journal 119-20.   
7 See Cornish W, Llewelyn D & Aplin T Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and 
Allied Rights 8ed (2013) 119-21. For more on the historical development of the PA 1977 generally, 
see Michaels P ‘The British Patents Act of 1977’ (1979) 13 International Lawyer 667.  
8 For more on the relationship between the BPA 1977 and the EPC, as well as the EU unitary patent 
(which is not yet in effect), see Cornish et al (n7) 151-6. 
9 See further Monotti A & Ricketson S Universities and Intellectual Property Ownership and 
Exploitation (2003) 145. 
10 Section 7(1). 
11 Section 7(4). See also Bainbridge D Intellectual Property 9ed (2012)  496; Cornish et al (n7) 158. 
12 See Hart T, Fazzani L & Clark S Intellectual Property Law 4ed (2006) 40; Phillips J & Firth A 
Introduction to Intellectual Property Law 2ed (1990) 55. 
13 Section 7(2)(a). For the effects of joint inventorship on ownership see BPA 1977 s36(2)(a) and 




Non-inventor applicants may be first patentees, provided they fall into one of two 
categories provided in the BPA 1977.  The first is ‘persons who, by virtue of any 
enactment or rule of law, or any foreign law or treaty or international convention, or 
by virtue of an enforceable term of any agreement entered into with the inventor 
before the making of the invention … were at the time of the making of the invention 
entitled to the whole of the property in it (other than equitable interests) in the United 
Kingdom’.14   The second category consists of the successors in title.15  Non-inventor 
applicants must file a statement ‘identifying the person or persons whom he believes 
to be the inventor or inventors’16 and ‘the derivation of his or their right to be granted 
the patent’.17 The provisions of section 7(2) are the sole determinants of entitlement 
to a patent and are regarded as comprising an ‘exhaustive code’ in this respect.18   
 
Irrespective of who is entitled to apply for the patent, the BPA 1977, like its 
predecessor, recognises the right of the inventor to be named. Under section 16 of 
the Patents Act of 1949, a person could request that he or she be named as the 
inventor in the patent. For this purpose ‘the actual devisor of an invention or part of 
an invention’ was deemed to be the inventor.19 The current legislation provides that 
the ‘inventor or joint inventors of an invention shall have the right to be mentioned as 
such in any patent granted for the invention and shall also have a right to be so 
mentioned if possible in any published application for a patent for the invention and, 
                                                          
14 Section 7(2)(b).  
15 Section 7(2)(c). 
16 Section 13(2)(a).  
17 Section 13(2)(b). A failure to do so will render the application withdrawn, s13(2). 
18 Section s7(2) ends with the phrase ‘and to no other person’, indicating that this is a closed list. See 
Cornish et al (n7) 282. See Yeda Research & Development Co Ltd v Rhone-Poulec Rorer 
International Holdings Inc [2008] RPC 1 10-11. This case overruled the approach adopted by the 
Court of Appeal in Markem Corp v Zipher Ltd [2005] RPC 31 (CA) in which it was held that for an 
entitlement enquiry under s8(1), a breach of an independent  rule is necessary. See further Carter A & 
Ayrton S ‘Is making the invention not enough? Analysis of the Court of Appeal’s approach to 
entitlement in Markem v Zipher’ (2006) 28(10) EIPR 51; Briggs N ‘Entitlement’ (2006) 28 (12) EIPR 
611;  Hart et al (n12) 41; Moore S & Meale D ‘Patents – Patent ownership’ (2008) 30 EIPR 30ff; 
Torremans P Intellectual Property Law 5ed (2008) 94-5; Bainbridge (n11)  495-7. 
19 BPA 1949 s16(2). See further Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 144 n15. 
189 
 
if not so mentioned, a right to be so mentioned in accordance with rules in a 
prescribed document’.20 The inventor may, however, waive his or her right to be 
named but would have to provide reasons to the Comptroller in support of this 
request.21 This express recognition of the ‘moral right of the inventor’ was introduced 
in 1938 as a legally enforceable right.22 
 
The general provisions above also apply to the employment situation and are 
discussed next.   
 
5.2.2.2 Allocation of ownership of employee-inventions under the British 
Patents Act 1977  
 
5.2.2.2.1   General 
In so far as entitlement to apply for the patent is concerned, the general situation 
would also apply to inventions made by employee-inventors.  Where the employee is 
the inventor, he or she is entitled to the patent, unless the employer has a better title. 
For the employer to qualify as a grantee, it must be an inventor or show that it meets 
the requirements of section 7(2)(b) as a non-inventor applicant.  In respect of the 
latter option, the employer must show it acquired the title through a rule of law. In this 
case the provisions of the BPA 1977 relating to employee-inventions apply.  The 
alternative is for the employer to prove that an agreement was entered into with the 
inventor before the invention was made.23 The effect of these three bases for first 
ownership: inventorship; the rule in section 39 of the BPA 1977;24 and contract on 
the recognition of employers and employees as grantees of the patent, are 
considered next.  
 
5.2.2.2.2   Entitlement through inventorship 
Section 7(2)(a) provides that a patent may be granted ‘primarily to the inventor or 
joint inventors’. A claim to entitlement by the employer or the employee depends on 
                                                          
20 BPA 1977 s13(1). 
21 Id s24(2). See further Bainbridge (n11) 495. 
22 See Meinhardt P Inventions, Patents and Monopoly (1946) 16. 
23 BPA 1977 s7(2). 
24
 See p 193 below. 
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which of the two qualifies as an inventor under the Act.   Section 130(1) provides that 
the term ‘inventor’, ‘has the meaning assigned to it by section 7 above’. Section 7(3), 
in turn, provides that for the purposes of the Act, the ‘“inventor” in relation to an 
invention means the actual devisor of the invention[…]’.25  There are no provisions to 
assist in the interpretation of ‘actual devisor’.26 Although it has been observed that 
‘[f[ortunately, it is getting on for a century since there was any serious litigation as to 
the legal definition of an inventor, so the problem is not likely to ruffle overmuch the 
anxious wig’,27 the question arises as to how this definition aligns with the 
international patent system, and particularly whether as a juristic person, the 
employer can claim ownership on this basis.   
 
The determination of inventorship depends on knowing what constitutes the 
invention.28 The BPA 1977 provides that  
 ‘[f]or the purposes of this Act an invention for a patent for which an application has 
 been made or for which a patent has been granted shall, unless the context 
 otherwise requires, be taken to be that specified in a claim of the specification of the 
 application or patent’.29  
 
For the purposes of entitlement claims under the BPA 1977, one need not prove that 
the invention is patentable30 as the determination of inventorship for entitlement 
purposes is independent of a subsequent claim that a granted patent is invalid.31 The 
elements of the claim to which the person must have contributed have been 
described in various ways: in  Henry Brothers (Magherafelt) Ltd v Ministry of Defence 
                                                          
25 Section 7(3). On joint inventorship see further Marchese (n13) 365; Staeng Ltd’s Patents [1996] 
RPC 183 (PO) 188-90. 
26 See Phillips & Firth (n12) 57. See further Norris Patent [1988] RPC 159; Chandler A ‘Ownership of 
employees’ inventions: Duties, expectations and variable objectivity’ (2008) EIPR 164. 
27 Phillips & Firth (n12) 57. 
28 See, for example, University of Southampton’s Applications  [2006] RPC 21; Yeda (n18) 10; and 
further Bailey A ‘Patents – Inventorship – Ownership’ (2001) 23 EIPR 181; see also Bainbridge (n11) 
496-8. 
29 Section 125(1). See Stanelco Fibre Optics Ltd’s Applications [2005] RPC 15 326. 
30  See Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 146. 
31 See Viziball Ltd’s Application [RPC] 213 PatC; Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 147.  
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and Northern Ireland Office, it is the ‘inventive concept’;32 while Monotti and 
Ricketson speak of ‘the essential elements of the invention disclosed in the patent 
application’.33 For Cornish et al it is the ‘inventive step – the ‘“heart” of what is 
disclosed’ that must be determined.34 
 
The next step is to determine what it means to devise the invention.35 In Markem 
Corporation v Zipher Ltd (No1) the court stated that the word ‘devise’ had a slightly 
broader meaning than ‘make’ or ‘implement’,36 and suggested the planning of a 
particular course of action even before that course of action is actually implemented.  
The difficulty in interpreting the term is compounded by the reference to ‘actual’.  For 
Phillips and Firth this opens it ‘to speculation as to whether there is a subtle but 
significant difference between a devisor and an actual devisor’.37 It is arguable that 
the reference to ‘actual’ is not an indication that juristic persons are excluded, but 
rather a means of distinguishing the nature of the contribution necessary for 
inventorship from legal definitions which are deemed. In Stanelco Fibre Optics Ltd’s 
Applications – which dealt with a dispute over the inventorship of patents related to 
the manufacture of capsules used in the medical field – Floyd J noted that the term 
‘seems to have been carried forward from s.16(2) of the 1949 Act, which uses the 
term to distinguish between the persons who are actually responsible for making the 
invention and a mere importer [sic]’.38  
 
This ambivalent approach was evident before the BPA 1949. Wadlow notes in his 
discussion of the attempt at the turn of the twentieth century to introduce a British 
Empire patent law to harmonise the laws in all the British colonies, that ‘[e]ven before 
the Statute of Monopolies, and ever since, English law had adopted an ambivalent 
                                                          
32 [1999] RPC 442 CA  448. See Hull J ‘Ownership of rights created in sponsored academic 
collaborations - a note on the Ida, Statoil and Cyprotex decisions’ (2007) 29 EIPR 6 8-9. 
33  Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 146. 
34 Cornish et al (n7) 282. 
35 See Cornish et al (n7) 282. 
36 [2004] RPC 10. See further on this case Hull (n32) 9-11. See also Cornish et al (n77)  283 on the 
effect of Yeda Research (n18) on the later Court of Appeal decision in  Markem Corporation v Zipher 
Ltd (n18) related to  the requirement of an independent obligation for inventorship. 
37 Phillips & Firth (n12) 56. 
38 Stanelco Fibre (n29) 326. 
192 
 
definition of “inventor” which embraced both the actual devisor of a new invention in 
the intellectual sense, and the first person to introduce it (e.g. by applying for a 
patent on it) in a territory in which it was previously unknown, even if the latter 
“inventor” had simply copied it from abroad’.39The court in Yeda Research & 
Development Co Ltd v Rhone-Poulec Rorer International Holdings Inc following the 
approach in University of Southampton’s Applications that ‘[t]he word “actual” 
denotes a contrast with a deemed or pretended devisor of the invention’ accepted 
that it is a reference to ‘the natural person who “came up with the inventive 
concept”.’40   
 
According to Bainbridge, to determine who the inventor is, one must ‘identify who in 
substance was responsible for the invention’. 41 It is submitted that ultimately the 
inventor is the person who contributes, in a way that is not merely mechanical, to the 
inventiveness that is recognised by the granting of the patent.42 Furthermore, it is 
likely that only natural persons qualify as inventors. 
 
These issues apply equally to the determination of whether an employee is an 
inventor for the purposes of sections 39 to 42 of the BPA 1977.  The Act provides as 
regards employee-inventions,  
 ‘references to the making of an invention by an employee are references to his 
 making it alone or jointly with another person, but do not include references to his 
 merely contributing advice or other assistance in the making of an invention by 
 another employee’.43  
It would appear, then, that the making of an invention in this context is akin to the 
requirement of inventorship in order to be granted a patent.  Therefore, it is 
submitted that an employer will not qualify as a grantee of the patent on the basis of 
                                                          
39 Wadlow C ‘The British Empire patent 1901-1923: The “Global” patent that never was’ (2006) 4 IPQ  
315. 
40 Yeda Research (n18) 10. See also IDA Ltd v University of Southhampton [2006] RPC 567. See 
further discussion (British) Intellectual Property Law Office ‘Manual of Patent Practice’ (2013)  (MoPP)  
[7.12]. 
41 Bainbridge (n11) 451. 
42 See further Marchese (n13) 365 and the reference there to Smith’s Patent (1905) 22 RPC 57.  
43 Section 43(3). 
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inventorship given the association of inventorship with the intellectual input of a 
natural person which is required to ‘devise’ the inventive concept. 
5.2.2.2.3   Entitlement through an enactment or a rule of law 
  
(a)  Section 39(1) of the BPA 1977 and the common law 
 
Section 7(2)(b) provides that the inventor will not be granted the patent where ‘any 
person or persons, who by virtue of any enactment or rule of law … was or were at 
the time of the invention entitled to the whole of the property in it’.  The provisions of 
section 39(1) serve as a statutory basis for the employer to claim ownership under 
section 7(2)(b). 44 Where section 39(1) does not apply, the employee will own the 
invention as between the employee and employer,45 and will be entitled to apply for a 
patent and to work the invention without hindrance from the employer.46 
 
 Section 39 provides as follows: 
 (1) Notwithstanding anything in any rule of law, an invention made by an 
 employee shall, as between him and his employer, be taken to belong to his 
 employer for the purposes of this Act and all other purposes if -  
 (a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee or in the 
 course of duties falling outside his normal duties, but specifically assigned to 
 him, and the circumstances in either case were such that an invention might 
 reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties; or  
 (b) the invention was made in the course of the duties of the employee and, at 
 the time of making the invention, because of the nature of his duties and the 
 particular responsibilities arising from the nature of his duties he had a special 
 obligation to further the interests of the employer's undertaking. 
 
                                                          
44 For further general discussion on s39(1) see Bainbridge (n11) 478-9; Hart et al (n10) 41-4.  
45 Section 39(2). See further Jaworski A ‘Legislative incentives for inventive employees’ (2006) 13 
eLaw Journal 129; Chandler A ‘Employees’ inventions: Inventorship and ownership’ (1997) 19(5) 
EIPR 262; Stallberg C ‘The legal status of academic employees’ inventions in Britain and Germany 
and its consequences for R&D agreements’ (2007) 4 IPQ 500. 
46 See BPA 1977 s39(3). For further discussion see Hodkinson K Employee Inventions and Designs 
Law and Practical Management (1986) 32. 
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The scope of the application is determined firstly by the definition of ‘invention’. Since 
the only definition of invention in the BPA 1977 relates to patentable inventions,47 in 
the absence of a similar limitation in section 39(1) there is opinion that the provisions 
are ‘intended to govern ownership of all inventions, whether patentable or not’.48 This  
discussion is, however, limited to patentable inventions.49  
 
The provisions apply to employees. An ‘employee’ is defined in the Act as:  
 ‘a person who works or (where the employment has ceased) worked under a contract 
 of employment or in employment under or for the purposes of a government 
 department or a person who serves (or served) in the naval, military or air forces of 
 the Crown’.50  
An ‘employer’ is defined as ‘the person by whom the employee is or was 
employed’.51 The definition invited the criticism of Phillips who viewed it as ‘the latest 
in a bewilderingly long line of statutory definitions of ‘employee’ each it seems being 
marginally different from the other’. 52   
 
Before the BPA 1977,53  the ownership in employee-inventions was regulated by the 
common law.  Now, the common law is only relevant in so far as the ownership is not 
regulated by the statute 54 and would therefore be limited to certain non-patentable 
inventions.55 Although the common law is regarded as having formed the basis for 
section 39(1),56 the two are not interchangeable.57 In the LIFFE case it was made 
                                                          
47 Section 125(1). 
48 See Phillips (n52) 11; Cornish W ‘Rights in university innovations: The Herschel Smith lecture for 
1991’ (1992) 14 (2) EIPR 15. For further discussion of this see Hodkinson (n46) 9. 
49 See Liffe Administration and Management v Pavel Pinkava [2007] RPC 30 discussed below which 
dealt with unpatented inventions. 
50 Section 130(1).  
51 Ibid. 
52 Phillips J Employees’ Inventions and the Patents Act 1977 (1978) 11. Phillips’ further criticism was 
that the definition differed from the copyright legislation in that it excluded those employed under 
contracts of apprenticeship. 
53 Effective date 1 June 1978. 
54 See Cornish W ‘Employees’ Inventions’ in Vitoria M (ed) The Patents Act 1977 79. 
55 Hodkinson (n46) 5-6. 
56 See Cornish (n48) 15; Saxby (n1) 114. Also, Pila J ‘Professional and Academic Employee 
Inventions: Looking beyond the UK Paradigm’ in Pittard M, Monotti A & Duns J Business Innovation 
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clear that the BPA 1977 ‘was not a consolidating measure. As its long title proclaims 
it provided for a new law relating to patents. Employees’ inventions are dealt with in 
ss.39 to 43’;58 and furthermore that ‘the cases decided before the enactment of s.39 
can only be guidance in relation to the assessment of an employee’s duties in the 
circumstances of that case.  For my part I doubt if they are helpful in even that 
limited context’.59 Earlier, while the court in Harris’ Patent did not explicitly say that 
pre-BPA 1977 case law was no longer authoritative, it specifically noted that the 
provisions of section 39 constituted the current law.60 
 
Under the BPA 1949, an application could generally only be made by a ‘person 
claiming to be the true and first inventor of the invention’ or an assignee of the first 
and true inventor.61 An employer could therefore not claim a patent on an employee-
invention. However, employers relied on the contract between the parties to claim 
their employees’ intellectual output.  Eventually, the courts began to recognise that 
employers had an interest in employees’ inventions which they had made while 
under a duty to do so.62 As a result, in certain cases where the contract was silent, it 
was implied that the employer would own the invention.  
 
Although it appears that a rule was implied or imported into the contract to provide 
that the employer would own the employee’s patentable invention, there was ‘no 
“rule” that any invention made by an employee is inevitably the property of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and the Law - Perspectives from Intellectual Property, Labour, Competition and Corporate Law (2013) 
92; Michaels (n7) 675. 
57 See further Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 155-6; see Cornish (n54) 82 writing at the time that ‘the 
exceptions reflect the lines of the common law and it is difficult to detect any significant variation in the 
way the statutory rules have been formulated’. 
58 Liffe (n49) 685. See further (MoPP) (n40) paras [39.08-39.09]. 
59 Liffe (n49) 690. 
60 Harris’ Patent [1985] RP 19 PatC 28. 
61 Section 1(1). 
62 For the development of the common-law rules relating to employee-inventions, see  Neumeyer F 
‘Employees’ rights in their inventions’ (1962) 44 Journal of the Patent Office Society 701-06. See also 
the detailed account in Pila (2012) (n1) 267-75; Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 161-3. 
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employer’.63 As a common-law development, the conventional source is Sterling 
Engineering Co v Patchett64 in which Viscount Simmonds opined that it is an implied 
term in the sense that ‘in the contract of service of any workman that what he 
produces by the strength of his arm or the skill of his hand or the exercise of his 
inventive faculty shall become the property of the employer’, and further that it would 
therefore be for the employer to decide whether or not it is to be patented.65  In the 
same case, Lord Reid held that it is  
 ‘inherent in the legal relationship of master and servant that any product of the work 
 the servant is paid to do belongs to the master: I can find neither principle nor 
 authority for holding that this rule ceases to apply if a product of that work happens to 
 be a patentable invention’.66  
 
Cornish notes that Sterling Engineering, a decision which reflected the ‘age of 
corporate capitalism’,67 and which was ‘undeniably a capitalist view of the matter’, 68 
the approach of the courts was on a contract in favour of the employer or on an 
implied duty of trust.69  Use of the employer’s resources also did not imply such a 
term.70 
 
Under the BPA 1949 the Comptroller or court could, ‘unless satisfied that one or 
other of the parties is entitled, to the exclusion of the other, to the benefit of an 
invention made by the employee’ order an ‘apportionment between them of the 
benefit of the invention, and of any patent granted in respect thereof, in such manner 
as the court of comptroller considers just’.71 Sterling Engineering also has the 
(dubious) honour of interpreting the provision so strictly that it lost its effect as a tool 
                                                          
63 Jaworski (n45) 126. See also Harris’ Patent (n60) 24: ‘The authorities show clearly that there is no 
rule that an invention made by an employee is necessarily the property of the employer’. 
64 [1955] AC 534. 
65 Id 544. 
66 Id 547. 
67 Cornish et al (n7) 283. 
68 Cornish  (n54) 79. 
69 Cornish et al (n7) 284 n15. 
70 Id 283 n16. 




for an apportionment of benefits between employers and employees.72 As Phillips 
notes,  
 
 ‘it actually strengthened the employer’s hand against the employee by  
 supporting the contention that it was an implied term in every contract of 
 employment that what a man produces in the course of that employment by 
 the “exercise of his inventive faculty” becomes ipso facto the property of his 
 employer, the term being implied by virtue of the relation of the parties rather 
 than by inference from the content of each individual contract of 
 employment’.73  
 
Although the case reflected a shift in favour of the employer, Cornish observes that 
the presumption is limited to those situations where ‘the employee was employed to 
use his skill and inventive ingenuity to solve a technical problem’ and  ‘where the 
employee occupied a senior managerial position and so owed a general duty of 
fidelity to his employer’.74 In respect of the first situation, Michaels explains that the 
rules ‘stipulated that the invention belonged to the employer if, and only if, the nature 
of the employment was such that the employee was paid to invent’.75 In Electrolux v 
Hudson, for example, the employer claimed the employee’s invention by virtue of a 
broad term in the contract of employment. The court struck this clause down as an 
overbroad restraint of trade.76  
 
 
(b) Section 39(1)(a) of the BPA 1977 
 
Section 39(1)(a) gives rise to two situations in which the invention will belong to the 
employer: first where the invention ‘was made in the course of the normal duties of 
                                                          
72 See further Cornish (n54) 80; Phillips J ‘Employee inventors and the new Patents Act’ (1978) 7 
Industrial Law Journal 31. 
73 Phillips (n72) 32. At 32 Phillips notes further that it was ten years later that an attempt was made ‘to 
redress the effect’ of the case through a bill on employee inventions. Unfortunately, to no avail. 
74 Cornish et al (n7) 284. 
75 Michaels (n7) 675. 
76  See further Torremans (n18) 97; Hodkinson (n46) 7-8. 
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the employee’;77 and second,  where the invention was made ‘in the course of duties 
falling outside his normal duties, but specifically assigned to him’. In both cases the  
the circumstances must be ‘such that an invention might reasonably be expected to 
result from the carrying out of his duties’.78 
 
IThe only difference between them is that in the second case the employer’s reach is 
extended to inventions arising outside of the employee’s normal duties, provided that 
those duties were specifically assigned to him or her.  In either case it is necessary 
to identify the normal duties of the employee when the invention was made.79 The 
effect of this provision on entitlement hinges on how a court interprets ‘normal duties’ 
and ‘specifically assigned’.  A brief consideration of some of the reported cases 
dealing with section 39(1)(a)80 shows the complexity and the effect of the provision. 
 
* Harris’ Patent81  
Harris appealed against a decision of the Comptroller of Patents that an invention he 
had made belonged to his employer (‘Reiss’). Reiss’s primary business was selling 
Wey valves and providing after-sale service.82 Harris invented a slide valve for which 
he sought a patent and Reiss argued that the invention fell within Harris’s normal 
duties.83 Unsurprisingly, the court identified two enquiries: first, knowing what Harris’ 
normal duties were at the time of the invention and whether the invention had been 
made while he was carrying out those duties84and secondly,  whether an invention 
could reasonably have been expected to result from carrying out those duties.85 
 
At the time of the invention, Harris’s was employed as the manager of the Wey valve 
department and his main duty was the sale of Wey valves and after-sale service to 
                                                          
77 Section 39(1)(a). 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Staengs Ltd’s Patents (n25); Hart et al (n12) 43. 
80 See also Pila (n56) 99. 
81 Note 60. 
82 Id 30-1. 
83 It was also argued that s39(1)(b), discussed below, applied. 
84 Harris’ Patent (n60) 29. 
85 Ibid.  
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clients.86 He was not employed to design or invent valves.  Reiss, in turn, had never 
been engaged in solving design flaws and had a more limited reporting role. As a 
result, Falconer J found that it ‘there was no reason why they should, and no 
evidence that they did, impose on Mr Harris, their employee, as part of his normal 
duties, an obligation they never assumed themselves’,87namely to provide solutions 
to problems relating to design flaws in the valves. 
 
As regards the second aspect, the court rejected Reiss’ view that the reference to 
‘an invention’ was intended as a reference to ‘any invention whatsoever’.88 It found 
that the reference must be ‘such an invention as that made, though not necessarily 
the precise invention actually made and in question’.89 Here the nature of the duties 
would be one factor to consider. 
 
The approach in Harris’ Patent is somewhat narrow and appears to confine the 
employer’s claim to situations where his or her normal duties, determined by the 
contract and the actual performance of the job, would include inventive activity of the 
type in question.90 Even if the employee is duty-bound to invent, the actual invention 
must be one reasonably contemplated in the performance of that duty. An invention 
unrelated to the employer’s business but which arose during the course of the 
employee carrying out normal duties, would be excluded.  Therefore, the employer’s 
reach is limited to what the employee had specifically been engaged to produce in 
exchange for the employee’s usual salary. 
 
* Steang Ltd’s Patents91  
The guidelines from Harris’ Patent were applied in Staeng, although here the 
outcome favoured the employer. The employee, Neely, claimed ownership of an 
invention which had been made as part of a collaboration between his employer, 
                                                          
86 Id 31. 
87 Id 31-2. 
88 Id 29. 
89 Ibid. 
90 See further Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 155; Chandler (n45) 263; see also Bainbridge (n11) 500-01; 
(MoPP) (n40) para [39.10-39.11]. 
91 Steang Ltd’s Patents (n25). 
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Hellerman Electric (‘Hellerman’) and Staeng Ltd (‘Staeng’).   Neely and Staeng’s 
employee, Robertson, were held to be joint inventors.92  Neely’s claimed that he was 
entitled to a share of the invention to the exclusion of Hellerman in terms of section 
7(2)(a) by virtue of his inventorship, and further that section 39(1)(a) did not apply.93 
He followed the argument in Harris’ Patent that ‘it is not reasonable to imply that an 
individual’s obligations include the business of the invention that is not within the 
business of the employer’.94  The court disagreed. Given Hellerman’s wide-ranging 
activities, the court rejected the argument that because the subject matter was not 
within the employer’s field of business, the invention could not have resulted in the 
course of Neely’s normal duties.95 
 
As to whether it was within Neely’s normal duties, he had been appointed as a 
‘Business Development Manager’ primarily to source new products and new markets 
for Hellerman.96However, in light of Neely’s actual involvement in the process of 
developing the new products, the court found that the fact that his ‘role was centred 
primarily on the market rather than on the technical side’ was not particularly 
significant as his job description, ‘plainly [encompassed] an innovative and 
developmental aspect to his duties’.97 Other considerations, including that he had in 
the past been involved in inventing for the employer, supported the court’s finding 
that the activity fell within Neely’s normal duties.98 
 
* Greater Glasgow Health Board’s Application99  
Montgomery was employed by the Greater Glasgow Health Board (‘GGHB’) as a 
registrar in the Department of Ophthalmology when he invented an optical spacing 
device to measure the retina.100 GGHB claimed ownership based on section 
                                                          
92 For comment on the approach to inventorship in this case see Chandler (n45) 262.  
93 Steang Ltd’s Patents 191. 
94 Id 199. 
95 Id 200. 
96 Id 194, see also 192. 
97 Id 198. 
98 For criticism of the court’s finding based on the facts, see Chandler (n45) 264-5. 
99 [1996] RPC 207. 
100 Id 209. 
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39(1)(a), specifically  that the invention was made as part of Montgomery’s normal 
duties; and also on section 39(1)(b).  
 
Montgomery’s job description stated that his duties were ‘clinical responsibilities’ and 
further duties relating to the care of patients.  His duties were ‘primarily of a clinical 
nature concerning the assessment and treatment of patients and any teaching and 
research activities…were subsidiary’.101 The court rejected GGHB’s argument that 
Montgomery had a duty to invent new diagnostic devices as part of his duty to apply 
his mind to the problems of patients.  
 
Of particular interest is that the court noted that the nature of the medical profession 
was one where most doctors are employed and ‘frequently devise new and better 
treatments’.102 It would place them in a tenuous position if ‘just because they are 
employed and because the invention could be used for the purpose of their 
employment, the invention belongs to the employer’.103 In this case, the device, while 
being a useful accessory to the doctor’s clinical work, was not an integral part of it. 
It is submitted that this implies that activities associated with the nature of the 
profession – in this case that of a doctor – do not become ‘duties’ when the 
professional is employed.  
 
Furthermore, based on Falconer J’s reasoning on the application of section 39(1)(a) 
in Harris’ Patent,  the court found that since he had been at home doing his exam 
period when the invention was made, the circumstances were such that he had not 
been doing anything to do with carrying out his duties.104 It could, therefore, not 
reasonably have been expected.  Since the court found that the activity was not part 
of Montgomery’s normal duties, it was not necessary to consider this aspect. 
 
                                                          
101 Id 210. 
102 Id 223. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid. The Patents Court also noted that its finding was consistent with the interpretation of the 
phrase ‘course of employment’ in early copyright legislation. The court referred to Stephenson Jordan 
& Harrison v MacDonald & Evans (1952) 69 RPC 10 which dealt with copyright in academic lectures. 





* LIFFE Administration and Management v Pinkava105  
At issue was whether the employee (‘Pinkava’), was entitled to inventions dealing 
with the electronic exchange of financial instruments. When Pinkava devised the 
inventions he was employed by LIFFE Administration and Management (‘LIFFE’) as 
a product manager.  His employment contract terminated shortly thereafter and 
LIFFE claimed certain confidential information and the patent applications.  The 
Patents Court found for LIFFE on the basis that the inventive activity fell within 
Pinkava’s specifically assigned duties, and the circumstances were such that an 
invention might reasonably be expected to result from carrying out those 
duties.106Pinkava appealed.   
 
The appeal court, in its determination of whether Pinkava had invented as part of his 
normal duties, found on the facts that at the relevant date it had become part of 
Pinkava’s normal duties ‘to consider and, if he could, devise and exchange tradable 
credit derivative or its equivalent’107although this had not been the case when the 
contract was originally entered into.108The court accepted that it is possible for duties 
which had not been included in the original written employment contract to in fact 
become normal duties as a consequence of how the parties perform in terms of the 
contract. Thus, the court opined that 
 ‘it is unsafe to have regard only to the terms contained in an initial written contract of 
 employment. The actions of employee and employer in performance of the contract 
 may give rise to an expansion or contraction of the duties initially undertaken by a 
 continuous process of subtle variation. 109  
 
                                                          
105 Pinkava (n49). 
106 Id 673. 
107 Id 691. 
108 For further discussion see Chandler (n26) 166; Odell-West A ‘Kelly v GE Healthcare Ltd: 
Employee innovation in health care: Deciphering ownership and the alchemy of “outstanding benefit”’ 
(2010) 32 EIPR 453; MoPP (n61) [39.11]. 
109 Id 690. 
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In relation to the further requirement that the invention must have been reasonably 
expected, the court rejected the approach in Harris’ Patent that the words ‘an 
invention’ referred to the particular invention in question. According to the court, the 
requirement would be satisfied if an invention could reasonably be expected to result 
from the duties even if the particular invention could not.110 It consequently appears 
that if the employee has been employed to innovate this aspect will generally have 
been satisfied. The court found that 
 ‘there is no reason to interpret s.39(1)(a) by reference to any assumption of 
 an intention (a) to enact either a test substantially more favourable to the 
 employee than the old common law test or (b) to reproduce exactly the old 
 common law test’. 111 
 
Accordingly, the test was objective and there was 
 ‘no reason to imply any further condition or qualification to the effect that (1) 
 the invention is similar to what might have been expected, (2) it provides a 
 solution to a pre-identified problem, or (3) it achieves or contributes to the 
 achievement of the aim or object  of the employee’s duties’.112 
 
This approach arguably moves away from the view in  Harris’ Patent and tilts the 
enquiry in the employer’s favour.  Chandler regards this as problematic because ‘the 
Court varied its angle of objectivity, eschewing any need  to take account  of the 
employer’s assumed expectations in allocating those duties to the employee’. 113  He 
argues that 
 ‘s.39(1)(a) of the PA77 interposes the words “and the circumstances in either case” 
 between its reference to duties and the reasonable expectation criterion, thereby 
 showing that one flows from the other.  If duties have been identified by looking at the 
 facts from an employer’s perspective, yet expectation is assessed neutrally, this link 
 is broken and ‘reasonable expectation’ can so easily begin to form part of the duties 
 themselves’.114 
 
                                                          
110 For further discussion see Chandler (n26) 167-8. 
111 Harris’ Patent (n60) 695. 
112 Ibid. 




Of interest is that the court considered whether the inventor in question had personal 
attributes which would influence whether an invention could be expected to result. 
Although this was not relevant to the decision, it does raise the issue of whether 
future courts will regard it as significant. The concern is that where an employee 
invents as part of normal duties, the ownership in the invention will depend on 
whether the employee is regarded as ‘clever’ enough for an invention to have been 
expected. Crudely, a ‘clever’ employee will lose the invention, and a ‘dull’ employee 
will own the invention even though it was made in the course of normal duties. 115  
This is untenable, and more so if one adopts the broad view that the provision refers 
to ‘any’ invention. 
 
On the facts of the case, it is arguable that the invention would in any event have 
satisfied the Harris’ Patent approach. However, it is clear that the court’s rejection of 
the narrow application serves to widen the net in favour of employers. 
 
 
 (c) Section 39(1)(b) of the BPA 1977 
 
Section 39(1)(b) extends the employer’s reach to inventions made by employees 
who do not fall under section 39(1)(a) but whose position in the enterprise is such 
that they have an obligation to act in the employer’s interest.   The BPA 1977 does 
not define ‘special obligation’, but it would appear to be linked to the employee’s 
seniority in the company.116 
 
To determine whether or not a person is in such a position requires an examination 
of his or her actual responsibility in the company, as was shown in Harris’ Patent 
where the court found that even though the inventor had a senior title, his limited 
powers did not indicate that he was in a position of sufficient seniority to impose an 
obligation to further the employer’s business. According to Falconer J, ‘the extent 
and nature of the special obligation to “further the interests of the employer’s 
                                                          
115 See further Bainbridge (n11) 502. 
116 See further Torremans (n18) 97; Hodkinson (n46) 11; Howell C ‘Compensation at last for 
employee inventors: Kelly v GE Healthcare Ltd’ (2010) 1 Journal of Business Law 45; Phillips (n52) 
10-11; Bainbridge (n11) 500. 
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undertaking” will depend on the status of the employee and the attendant duties and 
responsibilities of that status’.117 In contrast, in Staeng the fact that the inventor was 
a senior marketing executive contributed to the finding that he met the requirements 
of section 39(1)(b).118 
 
Once this first leg of the enquiry has been completed, it must be shown that the 
inventive activity happened in the course of the employee carrying out work duties. 
Unlike the first two situations, the employer may have title to the invention even if no 
invention was expected.  It is likely that the invention must be one which furthers the 
interests of the employer, in other words, it must be to the benefit of the employer’s 
specific undertaking. It is not clear whether or not this means that an invention which 




(d) Observations on section 39(1)(a) and (b) 
 
The statutory entitlement provisions have not attracted particularly vociferous 
criticism or comment. This is probably because the shift was regarded by many as 
reflecting the status quo under common law.120 Pila sums up the policy reasons for 
the British legislature’s introduction of section 39 as ‘the longstanding view that 
business efficacy, industrial relations and considerations of private justice’ required 
that employers be recognised given that they remunerated employee-inventors.121 
She notes further that the decision to divest inventors of ownership as opposed to 
offering employers a licence ‘was, in 1978, unsurprising; pragmatism having long 
                                                          
117 Harris (n60) 37-8.  
118 In this case, the court found in favour of the employer under s 39(1)(a) in any case. See further 
Torremans (n18) 98; Chandler (n45) 265-6. 
119 In Greater Glasgow Health [1996] RPC 207 s39(1)(b) was raised as a ground for employer’s 
ownership but was not argued. See further Phillips (n52) at 10. See also Hodkinson (n46) 11 for a 
comment on the effect of this provision. 
120 White Paper ‘Intellectual Property and Innovation’ (Cmnd 9712, 1986) para [34]. See further 
Phillips (n52) 10 on how he anticipated the provision would be interpreted.   
121 Pila (n1) 290-1 
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been regarded as more important than the “difficult legal and constitutional 
questions”’.122 
 
However, it is not necessarily entirely in the employer’s favour. The statutory regime 
arguably improves the lot of the employee from the common-law perspective even if 
this was not the intention of the legislature, by reducing the range of inventions which 
fall into the employer’s control.123 
 
While the shift to a statutory regime signals a move away from the vagueness that 
plagues reliance on common-law rules, the provisions bring their own challenges.124 
At the time, Phillips was of the opinion that s39 was easier to apply than relying on 
implied contract and trust and which required the consideration of factors like the 
employee-inventor’s status and qualifications, and the use made of the employer’s 
resources. Indeed, it seems that the provisions attempt to avoid this external 
approach by explicitly delineating those inventions which fall within the provisions, as 
opposed to relying on general phrases like ‘course and scope of employment’.  Now 
the criteria for ownership of the invention is limited to ‘(i) the causal relationship of 
the inventor’s employment duties to the invention and (ii) the reasonable expectation 
that invention will flow from the performance of those duties’.125 Employer-ownership 
is linked to an expected inventive output associated with the employee carrying out 
his or her duties.  
 
However, it is clear from the cases that legislative terms without definition raise their 
own issues of interpretation. This is evident in the interpretation of the phrase 
‘normal duties’. The difficulty arises where it is not recorded in the employment 
contract or elsewhere what the duties are, and it is not evident from the practice of 
the parties that the inventive activity can be considered ‘normal’.  As a result, the 
                                                          
122 Ibid. 
123 For example the comments in Pinkava that it was not the intention to make it more employee-
focused.  Watts et al, however, note that:  ‘The Act was generally viewed as being narrower, and 
therefore more favourable to employee inventors than the previous (common law) test of whether an 
employee made an invention in the course of his employment’. See Watts et al ‘How to avoid inventor 
disputes with employees’ (2007) 170  Managing Intellectual Property 55; Phillips (n52) 9. 
124 See Chandler (n45) 262. 
125 Phillips (n72) 34. 
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scope of the provisions depends on the court’s approach and also potentially raises 
the temptation to turn to the common- law employment contract or elsewhere to find 
meaning. 126Phillips recognised this in his cautionary hope that ‘in interpreting this 
phrase the courts will not make undue reference to those cases which deal with the 
vicarious liability of employers for their servants torts, for in those instances the 
courts have sought what is considered to be a desirable social end by construing the 
phrase “course of employment” as widely as possible’.127 
 
Linked to this concern is the question of whether a single set of rules is appropriate 
for all sectors.  For example, it has been argued that the provisions of section 39 do 
not fit comfortably in an academic and professional setting, primarily because the 
nature of employment in those contexts is quite specific.128 According to Pila, cases 
like LIFFE, Pinkava and Greater Glasgow Health Board reflect a recognition by the 
courts that not all employment situations can be treated equally, and that, in 
particular, professional and academic contexts ‘attract different considerations when 
determining ownership of inventions’.129 Therefore, the balancing of rights between 
the academic-employee and the employer, for example, may require a different set 
of entitlement options.130 
 
5.2.2.2.4  Entitlement through agreement  
 
Section 7(2)(b) is a basis for employer ownership in circumstances falling outside of 
section 39(1).  It provides that that the invention will be owned by any person or 
persons ‘who…by virtue of an enforceable term of any agreement entered into with 
the inventor before the making of the invention, was or were at the time of the 
                                                          
126 Hough & Spowart-Taylor (n1) 159-60. The authors take particular issue with the decision in 
Staeng’s Patent as having given ‘primacy to a tenuous contractual provision rather than the day-to-
day functions of the employee’. 
127 Phillips (n52) 11. 
128 Pila  (n56) 93-4. See also Cornish (n48) 16-17 on why patents generated by university employees 
should be treated differently. 
129 Pila (n55) 99. See further Pila J ‘Academic freedom and the courts’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly 
Review 347. See Pila (n1) 265ff for her analysis of the historical context that led to s39. 
130  For more on the ownership of employee-inventions in the academic context in Britain, see 
Stallberg (n44) 501ff and Odell-West (n108) 449ff in relation to the NHS. 
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making of the invention entitled’.131 Therefore, the employer could enter into a 
preinvention contract with the employee to acquire ownership of inventions which, for 
example, are not made as part of the employee’s normal duties. 
 
However, the BPA 1977 restricts the employer’s use of pre-invention assignments to 
acquire ownership of such inventions.132Section 42 provides that any contract  
relating to inventions made by the employee ‘which diminishes the employee’s rights 
in inventions of any description made by him after the appointed day and the date of 
the contract, or in or under patents for those inventions or applications for such 
patents, shall be unenforceable against him…’. 
 
Section 42 is meant to temper the inequalities in the bargaining power between the 
parties and is a way of ensuring that employees do not assign future inventions 
which would otherwise have belonged to them.133 Where the contract is not 
unenforceable under section 42, the parties are free to enter into agreements in 
relation to the invention, subject to any other legal limitation outside the legislation – 
for example, restrictions of restraint of trade agreements.134  
 
 
5.2.2.3   Attribution for employee-inventions 
 
There is nothing to suggest that the right of the inventor to be named falls away 
where the invention belongs to the employer. Employee-inventors are therefore 
                                                          
131 BPA 1977 s7(2)(b). 
132 For the uncertainties related to this provision, see Cornish et al (n7) 288. See further Wolk S (ed) 
Ownership of the Copyright in Works and the Patent Right in Inventions Created by Employees 
(2002) 30; Gudmestad T ‘Patent law of United States and the United Kingdom: A comparison’ (1982) 
5 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 185-6. 
133 This provision ‘implements the proposal of the Banks Committee that employers should be 
prevented from securing by way of express contract the rights in any inventions which the  employee 
had not yet made and which, apart from that contract, would belong to the employee to the exclusion 
of the employer.’ Phillips (n52) 26. 
134 See, for example, Electrolux Ltd v Hudson and others [1077] FSR 312, 326. 
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entitled to the attribution right which ensures that an employer cannot suppress an 
employee’s association with the invention.135 
 
5.2.3 Compensation for Employees as a Consequence of Section 7(2)(b) 
  
5.2.3.1 Basis for compensation claims by employee-inventors 
  
Where the employer has acquired title to an employee-invention by virtue of the 
statutory ownership rule, the employer is in some instances, burdened with an 
obligation to pay compensation to the employee.  Although the employee may have 
no rights to the invention, he or she may apply for compensation under section 40(1) 
which provides that 
‘[w]here it appears to the court or the comptroller on an application made by an employee 
within the prescribed period that -  
(a) the employee has made an invention belonging to the employer for which a patent 
has been granted,  
(b) having regard among other things to the size and nature of the employer’s 
undertaking, the invention or the patent for it (or the combination of both) is of outstanding 
benefit to the employer, and  
(c) by reason of those facts it is just that the employee should be awarded compensation 
to be paid by the employer,  
the court or the comptroller may award him such compensation  of an amount determined 
under section 41 below.136 
 
Although the introduction of the compensation provision was a radical departure from 
the common-law position,137 they have been described as a ‘fairly conservative 
middle ground’.138It is submitted that the following five factors contribute to its benign 
effect. 
 
                                                          
135 See Meinhardt (n22) 64. 
136 Section 40(1). 
137 Wotherspoon (n6) 120. 
138 Tarr J & McBratney A ‘A fork in the Australian road? Ownership of patented employee inventions’ 
(2013) 35 EIPR 195. 
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Firstly, the provisions do not apply where there is already a collective agreement 
which ‘provides for the payment of compensation in respect of inventions of the 
same description as that invention to employees of the same description as that 
employee’.139The Act does not provide for the employee to bypass the collective 
agreement if the amount that a claim under the statutory compensation provision 
might yield, is greater.140  
 
Secondly, it is incumbent on the employee to initiate the application for 
compensation,141although he or she need not be in the employ of the employer when 
the application is made.  Thirdly, the application is limited to those inventions for 
which a patent has been granted.142 Where the employer has not applied for and 
been granted a patent, he or she has no claim to compensation even if the 
unpatented invention is of benefit to the employer.143 Although it appears that s39 
applies to all inventions, as mentioned above, the compensation provisions are tied 
to the grant of a patent. 
 
Fourthly, the invention, the patent, or the combination of the two must be of 
outstanding benefit to the employer.144This means that the benefit must be 
outstanding in monetary terms145 and refers to the actual, rather than potential 
benefit to the employer.146 The merit of the invention is irrelevant,147 and the onus 
                                                          
139 Section 40(3). See s40(6) for the definition of ‘relevant collective agreement’ and MoPP (n55) 
[40.16]. 
140 See Gudmestad (n132) 173ff; Wolk (n132) 30. 
141 See MoPP (n40) [40.09] for more on the application requirements. 
142 BPA 1977 s40(1)(a). 
143 See further Hodkinson (n46) 17 where the author considers whether the employee could apply for 
the patent and so claim under the provision.  
144 BPA 1977 s40(1)(b). 
145 BPA 1977 s43(7) provides that ‘benefit’ means ‘benefit in money or money’s worth’. 
146 See Hart et al (n12) 44; Wolk S ‘Remuneration for employee inventors– Is there a common 
European ground? A comparison of national laws on compensation of inventors in Germany, France, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom’ (2011) 42 IIC 294. 
147 Whether or not the invention is inventive is part of the patentability criteria.  
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lies on the employee to show the existence of the benefit.148 When the compensation 
provision was originally introduced, the employee had to prove that the patent was of 
outstanding benefit. Consequently, employers were able to refute a claim by arguing 
that the benefit had not been derived from the actual patent although it may have 
been related to the invention. The Patents Act 2004 sought to alleviate this burden 
by amending section 40(1) of the BPA 1977 to include that the invention also be 
considered relevant to the determination of whether there was an outstanding benefit 
to the employer.149 The amendment only applies to patent applications made after 1 
January 2005. 
 
Fifthly, it must be ‘just that the employee should be awarded compensation by the 
employer’.150 Simply because the benefit is in fact outstanding, does not of itself 
mean that it is just that the employer should pay the employee more than his or her 
usual salary. 
 
If an application is successful, the calculation of the amount must be made in 
accordance with section 41(1) which provides that the amount awarded must be 
such ‘as will secure for the employee a fair share (having regard to all the 
circumstances) of the benefit which the employer has derived, or may reasonably be 
expected to derive’151from the invention,152 the patent for the invention,153 or  ‘the 
assignment, assignation or grant of (i) the property of any right in the invention, or (ii) 
the property in, or any right in or under, an application for the patent’.154 
 
                                                          
148 In Memco-Meds’s Patent [1992] RPC 403 Aldous J rejected the approach in GEC Avionics Ltd’s 
Patent [1992] RPC 107 that the initial burden of proving that no benefit was derived from the patent 
fell to the patentee. 
149 Patents Act 2004 s10. The provision came into effect on 1 January 2005. See further Hart et al 
(n12) 44;  Lee Y & Langley M ‘Employees’ inventions: Statutory compensation schemes in Japan and 
the UK’ (2005) 27 EIPR 252. 
150 Section 40(1)(c). 
151 Section 41(1). 
152 Section 41(1)(a). 
153 Section 41(1)(b). 
154 Section 41(1)(c). Provision is made to ensure that employees enjoy the full benefit of a fair share 
by providing for arm’s length transactions – s41(2). 
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The court or Comptroller is directed by the Act to take the following four matters, 
along with any others, into account in the calculation of a ‘fair share’ 
 (a) the nature of the employee’s duties, his remuneration and the other advantages 
 he derives or has derived from his employment or has derived in relation to the 
 invention under this Act; 
 (b) the effort and skill which the employee has devoted to making the invention; 
 (c) the effort and skill which any other person has devoted to making the  invention 
jointly with the employee concerned, and the advice and other assistance contributed 
by any other employee who is not a joint inventor of the invention; and 
 (d) the contribution made by the employer to the making, developing and  working of 
the invention by the provision of advice, facilities and other  assistance, by the 
provision of opportunities and by his managerial and commercial skill and 
activities.155 
 
To date, there have been few reported cases on the compensation provisions with 
only one being in favour of the employee.156 The sticking point seems to be the 
burden of showing an ‘outstanding benefit’.  Because of the novelty of this provision, 
an overview of the cases provides the best means to illustrate the practical 
challenges which have emerged. 
 
* GEC Avionics Ltd’s Patent 157 
In GEC Avionics, the first case before the Comptroller to be decided under section 
40, Ellis was employed by GEC when he invented a ‘head-up display’ (‘HUD’) for 
aircraft cockpits which he patented in various jurisdictions.158 GEC owned the 
invention under section 39 of the BPA 1977. It had secured a contract for the supply 
of HUDs under the patent to the value of $72 million, as well as two other contracts 
related to other HUDs worth $75 million each. The issue was whether Ellis was 
entitled to compensation under section 40.   
 
                                                          
155 Section 41(4). 
156 See Torremans (n18) 99 for more on the first three cases heard under this provision. 
157  GEC Avionics (n148). 
158 It was accepted that the provisions of the BPA 1977 applied to the UK and all corresponding 
patents, but only applied to the other jurisdictions when explicitly claimed. GEC Avionics (n148). 
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The Comptroller’s first task was to respond to the claim by GEC Avionics that Ellis 
had not shown that any monetary benefit had derived specifically from the patent. 
The Comptroller found that the initial evidential burden showing a prima facie against 
a benefit having derived from the patent fell to the patentee.  This is because it is 
inherent in the nature of a patent that there is a benefit to be derived as ‘where one 
secures a monetary benefit as a result of a contract for the sale of goods or services 
which are the subject of an invention there is a presumption, where that invention is 
covered by a patent, that at least a part of that benefit derives from the presence of 
the patent’.159 GEC failed to show that there had been no benefit.   
 
Ellis, however, had the burden of showing that the patent was of outstanding benefit 
to GEC. For the Comptroller, ‘outstanding’ referred to ‘something out of the ordinary 
and not such as one would normally expect to arise from the results of the duties that 
the employee is paid for’. 160 This requirement is included because under section 
39(1) employer-ownership only arises where the inventor is under a duty to engage 
in inventive activities. In this case, Ellis’ salary was regarded as a reward for his 
inventive activity which arose as a consequence of the nature of his employment.161 
Since the employer was accustomed to securing contracts of that size, the patent in 
question was not outstanding benefit.162  
 
* British Steel PLC’s Patent163  
GEC Avionics was followed by British Steel in which the employee-inventor, Monk 
applied for compensation under section 40 from his ex-employer, British Steel.  The 
invention, an outlet valve for vessels containing molten material, was regarded as ‘a 
great advance’ and Monk received an MBE for it, as well as an ex gratia payment of 
£10 000 from British Steel.164 The Comptroller agreed with the approach in GEC 
Avionics that an  ‘outstanding’ benefit implied that ‘something out of the ordinary’ 
                                                          
159 Id 112-13.  
160 Id 115. 
161 Id 114-15. 
162 Id 115. See  further Lee & Langley (n149)   252 and Torremans (n18) 99. 
163 [1992] RPC 117. 
164 Id 121. 
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was required, and that this implied something ‘superlative’165 and required a 
‘correspondingly stiff’ test.166 
 
On the facts, the Comptroller found that the total benefit to British Steel for which 
there was evidentiary support was no more than 0,08 per cent of its profits and less 
than 0,01 per cent of its annual turnover. As a result, having regard to the nature and 
size of the undertaking, the patent was not of outstanding benefit to the employer.167 
In this case, although the court regarded the reference to ‘undertaking’ in section 40 
as referring to British Steel as a whole, it did not rule out that the term could refer to 
a sub-unit of the employer’s organisation, for example, a particular sector or site.168 
 
The court noted that section 40 refers to actual rather than potential benefit, and that 
‘whether an employer patentee chooses to exploit an invention may depend as much 
on his commercial strategy as on the intrinsic worth of the invention’.169 In coming to 
its finding, it rejected Monk’s argument that British Steel would have benefitted more 
had it adopted a different exploitation strategy.  Here Monk brought the application a 
mere four years after the patent had been granted – a fact which would have 
required the invention be shown to be exception in a very short period of time.170 The 
claim was rejected mainly as the benefits had not yet accrued so that ultimately the 
claim was premature.171 
 
* Memco-Med Ltd’s Patents172  
Memco-Med 173 was the first case dealing with section 40(1) before the Patents 
Court.  A key aspect is that the court appeared to differ from the two earlier cases 
which held that the onus of establishing a benefit to the employer rested initially on 
                                                          
165 Id122. 
166 Ibid. 
167 See Hart et al (n12) 44-5. 
168 British Steel (n163) 122. 
169 Id 127. See further on this case, Lee & Langley (n149) 253. 
170 British Steel (n163) 128. 
171 See further Wotherspoon (n6) 123. 
172 Memco-Med (n148). 
173 The previous two cases had been before the Comptroller. 
215 
 
the employee.174 The patent in question involved units to detect persons near lift 
doors and so prevent the doors from closing on them.  The employee-inventor, Trett, 
claimed that a sizeable portion of Memco-Med’s turnover was as a result of the 
invention. The lift detector units were sold to only one client, and although Trett was 
able to show that the employer’s sales to the client had increased, he could not 
prove that this was a result of the patent.  Memco-Med had done business with the 
client prior to the patent, and the history between the two companies was such that 
they would have continued doing business even had there been no patent for the 
invention.175 
 
As to what would constitute an outstanding benefit, the court found that while it was 
‘something special’ and ‘more than substantial or good’, a redefine ought not to be 
attempted because ‘[c]ourts will recognise an outstanding benefit when it occurs’.176 
 
* Shanks v Unilever  [2014] EWCA 1647 (Pat)  
Shanks was employed by Unilever Central Resources Ltd (‘UCR’), a non-trading 
research company wholly-owned by Unilever plc. During his employment he 
invented an electrochemical device for testing glucose levels in blood samples, and 
a method for manufacturing the device, valuable in treating diabetes.177 The 
invention belonged to UCR in terms of section 39(1) of the BPA 1977, and in terms 
of standard Unilever policy, the rights were assigned by UCR to Unilever PLC for 
£100 which, in turn, assigned some of the rights to Unilever NV for £100. Unilever 
NV further assigned its USA rights.178 
 
A number of patents (the ‘Shanks Patents’) were applied for and as Unilever was not 
interested in expanding into the field of blood-glucose testing, it licensed the patents 
                                                          
174 See further Wotherspoon (n6) 128. 
175 Memco-Med (n148) 417. See further Howell (n116) 48-9; See Wotherspoon (n6) 125. 
176 Id 414. See comment in Hobson A & Shafran T ‘Kelly and Chiu v GE Healthcare Limited: 
Pharmaceutical companies at risk of successful employee-inventor compensation claim following 
landmark ruling’ (2009) 31 EIPR 524. 
177 See Shanks v Unilever plc and others [2014] EWCA 1647 (Pat) paras [10]-[11] for details of the 
invention. 
178 Id para [13]. 
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to various other companies.179 The patents were managed by a Unilever subsidiary 
company which in 2001 was sold, together with the Shanks Patents, for £103 million.  
In the application for compensation by Shanks, the Comptroller found that the total 
gross benefit Unilever had obtained from the Shanks Patents, namely £24,5 million 
less the cost of £250 000 for maintaining the patents,180 was not outstanding, and 
consequently Shanks’s claim was rejected. Shanks appealed. 
 
The court followed the approach of Floyd J in Kelly and Chiu in so far as it explained 
the rules relating to compensation, and in particular that court’s consideration of the 
law relating to what constitutes an ‘outstanding benefit’.181 The approach adopted by 
the Comptroller and the appeal court was to quantify the benefit, consider Unilever’s 
undertaking, and then to decide whether it was outstanding.182A multifactorial 
approach which considers  
 ‘the benefit from the number of different perspectives: in light of Unilever’s profits and 
 turnover; in relation to patents in general; in the context of Unilever’s licensing 
 activities; in view of Unilever’s patent activities; and compared to Unilever’s activities 
 in general’,183   
was used by the Comptroller and approved by the appeal court. 
 
As to the first part of the enquiry – the quantification of the benefit – the amount of 
£24,5 million was contested by both Shanks and Unilever. Shanks claimed that it 
ought to be increased to reflect the time-value of the money because while Shanks 
lodged his claim in 2006 and the matter came before the Comptroller six years later, 
Unilever had received payment attributed to the patents between 1996 and 2004.184 
The court also discounted the amount to reflect the corporation tax Unilever had paid 
                                                          
179 Id para [22]. 
180 Id para [25]. 
181 Id para [2] quoting from Kelly and Chiu v GE Healthcare Ltd [2009] EWHC 181 (Pat). Although 
Kelly and Chiu was heard under the post-2004 amendment, it was decided before Shanks v Unilever  
reached the court. See Harris P ‘Employee compensation for inventions of outstanding benefit’ (2015) 
37 EIPR 63 for comment. 
182 Id para [30].   
183 Id para [65]. 
184  For a summary of the key aspects of the case, see Lee C ‘No Compensation, No Consolation – or 
no Thanks, Shanks’ IPKAT 27 May 2014.  
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on the income, since [‘t]ax paid to the State is not a benefit to the employer’.185 
However, Unilever’s further claim that its research and development costs should be 
deducted was rejected because it was not shown that Unilever would not have 
undertaken the research and development without a patent.186 
 
The court found that the money did not constitute a benefit and that even if it did, it 
was not one derived from the patents.187 
 
The second aspect of the enquiry – the size of the undertaking – saw Shanks 
claiming that the separate sectors or divisions made up the undertaking for the 
purposes of section 40. The court agreed with the Comptroller’s view in favour of 
Unilever that the structure of the company was irrelevant because the research was 
being exploited by the entire group.188In this light, the amount of the benefit was not 
outstanding, particularly when one considers that it was generated over an eight-
year period. Further, the fact that Shanks had claimed to have gone beyond his 
duties in making the invention, was not relevant to the determination of whether the 
benefit was outstanding.189 
 
As the court noted, this case was ‘unusual’ in that the calculation of the monetary 
benefit was relatively easy because the patents had been licensed by Unilever to 
third parties. Therefore, the difficulty experienced in earlier cases in trying to prove 
the benefit had been derived from the patent and not the invention, was not a 
deterrent.   
 
* Kelly & Chiu v GE Healthcare Ltd190   
In Kelly and Chiu the first (and only) reported matter in which the employee was 
successful, Floyd J observed as part of his judgment that when the Bill proceeded 
through the House of Lords, Hansard records Lord Nelson of Stafford as saying: ‘I 
                                                          
185 Id para [45]. 
186 Id paras [55]-[58]. 
187 Shanks [n176] para [40]. 
188 Id para [62] quoting the Comptroller. 
189 Id paras [70]-[81]. 
190 Kelly & Chiu (n181). 
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have never seen such a collection of vague terms in my life.  What compensation, 
who is responsible, what is outstanding benefit, what value is to be put on this and 
what on that?’ and ‘Who is to be the Solomon who will sort out all these 
vaguenesses at the end of the day and adjudicate on compensation when a claim is 
made, I hesitate to think’.191  
 
Kelly & Chiu which was heard before the amendments introduced in 2005.192 The 
matter before Floyd J in in the Patents Court was whether two of the three inventors 
of a compound sold under the name ‘Myoview’ – and in relation to which a number of 
patents had been filed – were entitled to compensation. The inventors, Kelly and 
Chiu, were research scientists employed by Amersham. Amersham was 
subsequently taken over by GE Healthcare Limited (‘GE’). The court undertook a 
comprehensive examination of employee-inventions in order to establish the 
principles on which it based its decision.193 
 
As regards what constituted an outstanding benefit, the court accepted the general 
approaches in Memco-Med, British Steel, and GEC Avionics that ‘outstanding’ 
means ‘something special’ or ‘out of the ordinary’ and more than ‘substantial’, 
‘significant’ or ‘good’194 – it must exceed the normal results of the employee’s 
execution of his or her duties for which he or she is paid. According to the court, the 
determination of the benefit ‘must be in light of all the available evidence as to what 
the patent has achieved, and may reasonably be expected to achieve. It is not a 
hypothetical valuation exercise to be performed at the date the invention was made, 
and before profits have been earned’.195 This is a qualitative assessment and while 
the inventiveness of the employee is irrelevant here, the effort and skill would play a 
role in the quantum of the award.196   
 
                                                          
191 Id para [7]; Howell (n116)  42. 
192 MoPP (n40) para [41.05]; Cornish et al (n7) 288. 
193 See Bainbridge (n11) 503 for a summary. 
194 Kelly & Chiu (n181).paras [17]-[27]. 
195 Id para [56]. 
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As to whether the benefits were outstanding, the court found that the patents were 
significant in ensuring that Amersham was able to conclude a number of lucrative 
deals on favourable terms.197 In addition, Amersham would have been in crisis had it 
not been for patents at that time. Consequently, the court did not limit the benefit to 
sales generated, but rather considered that the patents had ‘helped transform 
Amersham’.198The benefit – pegged at £50 million – was found of outstanding benefit 
having regard to the size and nature of Amersham, and was ‘far beyond anything 
which one could normally expect to arise from the sort of work the employees were 
doing’.199 Howell has criticised the court’s approach as conflicting with the 
requirement of section 43(7) that the benefit means money or money’s worth 
because it had not actually been established how much benefit the company had 
derived from its enhanced worldwide status.200 
 
In the end, after considering the factors required by the BPA 1977 on what 
constituted a fair share of the patent for the employee, the court found that it may ‘in 
principle lie somewhere in the broad range from nil to as much as 33% or beyond’.201   
 
As to whether an award was just, the court adopted the view that while it must relate 
to something additional to the facts which had already been established,  it was best 
not to try to ‘categorise the types of situations where an award may be unjust’ and 
that [t]he court will recognise such situations when they arise’.202 Therefore, the fact 
that the employer has derived an outstanding benefit is of itself not an indication of 
the justness of the compensation. 
 
Of particular interest is that the court considered the meaning of the word 
‘compensation’ in the Act. It rejected the view that it referred simply to a rectification 
of ‘an injustice or loss to the employee, brought about by inequality of bargaining 
                                                          
197 Id paras [120], [124], [133]. 
198 Id para [150].  
199 Id [148]. 
200 Howell (n116) 47. 
201 At [202]-[203]. See also Hobson (note 175) at 525 on the determination of the amount to be 
awarded to the two inventors. 
202 Kelly & Chiu (n181) para [41].  
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power, and ensuring that the employee’s remuneration package meets an 
acceptable level’.203 Rather, in the context of section 40, the court found that the 
provision was aimed at compensating for ‘the disparity between the benefits received 
by the employee and the benefits received by the employer’. 204 There is an 
inadequacy in the remuneration which the employee derives from invention which is 
seen in the disparity in the benefits which accrue to the employer and employee. 
This situation only arises with hindsight because at the time of the agreement 
between the parties, the actual benefit could not have been fully contemplated. 
However, it is only where the invention is of outstanding benefit and the ‘disparity in 
benefit between the employer and employee is extreme’ that the compensation in 
s40(1) kicks in.205Furthermore, the provisions speak of a ‘fair share’ and make no 
mention of remedying loss.206 
 
 
5.2.3.2   Observations on the statutory compensation provisions 
  
Torremans’s warning to employees that before they ‘emboldened by these 
provisions rush out to buy a new Daimler or two’ they need to be aware that ‘the 
legislation is not designed to produce a bonanza of payments’, now appears 
apposite.207 The cases certainly dispel the fear that the statutory compensation 
scheme would provide an ‘undeserved goldmine’ or windfall for inventive employees 
who would in any event be entitled to remuneration regardless of whether or not their 
research efforts resulted in a patent or any profit for the firm.208  
 
It is impossible to say whether or not the provisions are successful in general terms. 
This must depend on their purpose which, at least in the current formulation, is 
ostensibly to ensure an equitable distribution between the employer and employee of 
                                                          
203 Id paras [23], [43]. 
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205 Ibid. 
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benefits derived from the invention. While it is clear that the provisions of section 
39(1) are based on the common-law position, the introduction of statutory 
compensation in favour of employees is novel.  The possibility of the scheme arose 
in the context of deliberations on the efficacy of the British patent system, and 
appears to be linked to both an incentive function to encourage employees to invent, 
and to a desire to reward employees in a way that represents a fair distribution of the 
profits of the invention. It is clearly a measure to counter the reliance on the 
employment contract to ensure an acceptable balance between the employer and 
employee-inventor within the patent law context. Cornish’s view is that the 
introduction of the compensation payment has little to do with incentivisation but 
‘[r]ather expresses a resurgent feeling for the demands of natural justice – a belief 
that the inventor should not go unrewarded for the fruits of his intellectual 
endeavour’, and further that this ‘inspiration has coalesced with the recent tendency 
to cast legal protection around contracting parties who as a class may not well 
appreciate the unfavourable consequences of their bargains’.209 
 
It is impossible to determine how many companies have settled compensation 
claims given the sensitive nature of such agreements, and it is thus problematic to 
determine whether the introduction of the compensation provisions have in fact 
stimulated innovation. It may well be that the threat of a section 40(1) claim by an 
employee-inventor has encouraged employers to offer greater incentives to inventive 
employees. A number of factors would affect its efficacy as an incentive to 
encourage the employee.  
 
The first is that the possibility of a claim only arises where the benefit is outstanding 
for the employer. The purpose of the provisions is to acknowledge only those 
inventions which have had a revolutionary impact in industry’.210 It does not act as an 
incentive for the employee to engage in patentable inventive activity generally. For 
that sort of activity, in the absence of any other internal incentive schemes the 
employee-inventor’s salary is the only benefit linked to the invention, albeit very 
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generally, that can be claimed. As Bainbridge observes of this use of compensation 
in cases of outstanding benefit only,  
 ‘the employee has been given consideration for his work, that is his salary, and the 
 employer may have been prepared to pay the employee his salary even if no useful 
 invention resulted, simply as a speculative investment in the hope that a valuable 
 invention would result’.211  
This does not mean that the prospect of compensation in the Act cannot also serve 
as an incentive, but its formulation certainly does not have incentivising the 
employee as its primary goal.  
 
A second factor is the logistical difficulty in trying to institute a claim. The onus of 
showing that the invention is outstanding for the employer rests with the employee. 
The original formulation – that the outstanding benefit must be derived from the 
patent – made it difficult for employees to counter arguments from employers that 
the benefit had not been directly derived from the actual patent. Although this 
‘loophole’ may have been closed by the 2004 amendment, it does not make things 
much easier for employees. 212 It will always be an uphill battle for an employee, 
without direct and free access to the employer’s records, to establish what role the 
invention or patent actually played in the employer’s commercial success.213 The 
employee must prove that other factors – goodwill, pricing structures, and marketing 
– were not the reason for the benefit. 214 If the employee cannot prove and quantify 
his or her contribution, there is little chance of a successful compensation claim.215 In 
addition, different types of corporate structuring and its effect on the size and nature 
of the business, are additional complexities in attempts to establish the benefit. 
Unilever v Shanks offers a prime example.216 
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Furthermore, the potentially adversarial nature of the process which requires that the 
employee apply for statutory compensation against the employer, would seem 
almost inevitably to limit the claims to situations where the employment relationship 
has ended. 217  
As an incentive scheme it falls short for at least the reasons mentioned above, but 
section 40 has also been criticised as a redistributive scheme in that an invention 
may have generated millions of rand but not be classified as outstanding.218 In 
addition an invention may only prove to be outstanding after an extended 
period.219Alternately, the invention may do well initially, and then taper off so it may 
be easier to show an outstanding benefit at that early stage.220 
 
A more cynical factor is that the approach is also open to manipulation by employers 
who can avoid the compensation provision by electing not to apply for a patent and 
simply rely on secrecy or lead-time to secure a competitive edge. 221 An employer 
could assign the patent and the assignee could benefit enormously, in which case 
the employee has no claim under section 40.222 
 
Finally, deferring to a collective agreement in certain cases potentially deprives the 
employee of certain statutory rights he or she would otherwise have had.223Although 
collective bargaining is a labour law mechanism to act against the imbalance of 
power between employers and employees in the bargaining process, in this case, it 
may limit the incentive effect of compensation if it reduces the compensation the 
employee would have otherwise been able to claim. 
 
It is evident that the compensation provisions are more readily justified on the basis 
that they are a post-facto way of ensuring that the benefits associated with the patent 
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5.3  THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
5.3.1 Introduction  
 
In the USA the foundation for patents is the Constitution which empowers Congress 
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries’.224 The Patents Act, 1790, was one of the earliest pieces of US 
legislation. The current enabling patent law is in the United States Code Title 35 (‘35 
USC’). 225   
 
Because of the dual-tiered legal system comprising of national (or federal) law and 
state law, the allocation of ownership in patentable employee-inventions is regulated 
through a combination of these two sources.226 The federal law governs the creation 
and scope of patents, but makes no specific provision for the ownership of 
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employee-inventions.227 Ownership of inventions, both generally and as regards 
employee-inventions, is largely left to the states to regulate. Save for a small number 
of states which have introduced statutory provisions, the common law of the various 
states regulates entitlement.  Although this means that there is no single 
authoritative rule regulating entitlement to inventions for the country, a fairly 
consistent body of law can be seen as states rely on the same Supreme Court 
decisions.228 In practical terms, contract plays a significant role in the regulation of 
allocation.229 
 
This examination of the USA approach focuses on the federal approach which does 
not provide for specific entitlement provisions for employees, and the reliance on the 
common-law jurisprudence that has emerged from the states.  A reason for this may 
lie in the wording of the Constitution which may be strictly interpreted to keep 
ownership with inventors.  The state-specific statutory interventions will not be 
examined individually.  In addition, the focus is on employee-inventions which do not 
attract statutory regulation related to public sector employees or federally-funded 
research, such as the Bayh-Dole Act. 230  
 
 
5.3.2  Entitlement to Patentable Employee-Inventions  
 
5.3.2.1 Basis for ownership and attribution 
  
Section 101 of 35 USC provides that ‘[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and 
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useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title’. An application for a patent must ‘be made, or 
authorized to be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in 
writing to the Director’.231 
 
Until 2013, section 101 was implemented by a ‘first-person-to-invent’ system which 
generally recognised the first-and-true inventor as the person entitled to the patent. 
This approach – which was at odds with the first-to-file approach to which other 
patenting nations had gravitated – changed with the enactment of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (‘AIA’) on 6 September 2011, which along with various 
amendments to 35 USC, introduced a ‘first-to-file’ approach from 16 March 2013. 232  
The adherence to the first-and-true inventor approach for so long may be ascribed to 
the interpretation of article 1, clause 8 of the US Constitution as limiting rights to the 
first-and-true inventor.233 The possibility of future challenges to the constitutionality of 
the new first-to-file provisions has already been raised based on the ground that the 
reference to ‘inventors’ in the Constitution is to the first-and-true inventor, and not the 
first person to file for the patent.234 This shift was accompanied by various 
amendments necessary for a coherent implementation, including the amendment of 
the grace period for filing.235 Because pending applications made before 16 March 
2013 are dealt under the old system, I shall refer to both the pre- and post-AIA law.  
 
Under the pre-AIA legislation, an application for a patent could only be made by the 
person who had first invented it and had to be accompanied by an oath236 by the 
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234 See Madstad Engineering Inc v USPTO 756 F 3d 1366 (Fed Cir 2014) 1371ff although the matter 
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
235 See further Takenaka T & Adelman M ‘First-inventor-to-file under the America Invents Act: A View 
of First-to-file lawyer and a View of First-to-invent lawyer’ in Takenaka T (ed) Intellectual Property in 
Common Law and Civil Law (2013) 50-74. 
236 35USC s111(3).  
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applicant that he or she believed him- or herself to be ‘the original and first 
inventor’.237 The only basis for someone other than the first inventor to apply for the 
patent was pre-AIA section 118 which allowed a person to whom the inventor had 
assigned or agreed to assign the invention, or who had a sufficient proprietary 
interest in the patent, to make the application ‘on behalf of and as agent for the 
inventor’.238 This was only relevant where the inventor refused to apply for the 
patent, or could not be found or reached after a diligent effort. The applicant had also 
to show that the action was necessary to preserve the parties’ rights or to prevent 
irreparable damage.239  
 
The effect of the pre-AIA position was that the patent was issued to the inventor and 
not the applicant. An assignee could not apply for a patent on the invention but had 
only an equitable claim against the inventor until the patent had been transferred. 
The same applied to employee-inventions.  Even if there had been an assignment of 
the invention to the employer, the employee as inventor had to make the application. 
 
Currently, an application made under 35 USC 111240 need not be made by the 
inventor, and non-inventors who fall within section 118 are entitled to apply for the 
patent.241 The application must, however, include the name of the inventor.242 
Section 118 provides that ‘[a] person to whom the inventor has assigned or is under 
an obligation to assign the invention may make an application for patent’.243  
 
 
5.3.2.2 Allocation of ownership of employee-inventions 
                                                          
237 35 USC s115 (pre-AIA). 
238 If the inventor was dead, insane, or legally incapacitated the relevant representative could apply. 
239 35 USC s118 (pre-AIA). 
240 They also apply to US national-phase applications based on PCT applications filed under 35 USC 
s363. 
241 See Takenaka & Reboul (n228) 369. 
242 35 USC s115(a). See further USC s115(b)-(d). 
243 See further the USPTO rules implementing this provision 37 CFR § 1.42, 37 CFR § 1.46. Further 
‘A person who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter may make an application 
for patent on behalf of and as agent for the inventor on proof of the pertinent facts and a showing that 




5.3.2.2.1   General 
Inventorship is the key determinant of entitlement to the patent.244 In the employment 
context, too, the statutory provisions above apply. If the employee is the inventor, he 
or she has the right to apply for the patent unless the invention has been assigned to 
the employer, or there is an obligation to assign it, in which case the employer may 
make the application in its own name. The only alternative is for the employer to rely 
on inventorship as the basis for its claim.  
 
Therefore, under 35 USC there are three bases on which employer may apply for a 
patent for an invention made by its employee: inventorship; an assignment from the 
employee-inventor; and an obligation by the employee-inventor to assign the 
invention. These are discussed next. 
 
5.3.2.2.2   Entitlement through inventorship 
 
The grant of the patent is for an invention as defined. The statute provides that use 
of the term ‘invention’ ‘means invention or discovery’,245 and that ‘claimed invention’ 
means ‘the subject matter defined by a claim or an application for a patent’.246 The 
reference to a ‘claimed invention’ was introduced by the AIA. This, along with section 
112 which provides that the specification must conclude with ‘one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter’ which is regarded 
as the invention, indicates that resort must be had to the claims to identify the 
invention for the purposes of entitlement.247  
                                                          
244 See Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v Roche Molecular Systems 67 
USPQ 2d 1252 (Fed Cir 2003) – the Supreme Court held that even in the case of federally-funded IP 
there is no automatic assignment from the employee. See also Carson M ‘United States: Board of 
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v  Roche Molecular Systems inc’ (2010) 32 EIPR 
N11. 
245 35 USC s100(a). 
246 35 USC s100(j). 
247 Pre-AIA see McManus J Intellectual Property: from creation to commercialisation. A practical guide 
for innovators and researchers (2012) 124-5; Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 151; Collins (n233) 122. 
Where infringement is concerned, however, the determination of the invention may use various levels 




Before the move to a first-to-file system, inventorship disputes entailed two 
enquiries:248 whether  a person qualified as an inventor; and whether such an 
inventor had invented first in time.  Inventorship required both conception and 
reduction to practice. The latter was necessary to determine exactly when the 
invention had been made in order to support a claim of first inventorship.249 
Reduction to practice could be ‘constructive’ through disclosure in the patent 
application, or ‘actual’ as evinced by the inventor implementing the invention 
practically, for example by building a prototype. The inventor need not actually carry 
out the reduction to practice him- or herself.250 With the shift to the first-to-file 
system, proof of reduction to practice has been replaced by the act of filing for the 
patent. 251 Conception, however, remains relevant. 
 
Before the AIA, 35 USC did not define ‘inventor’. Now, ‘inventor’ is defined as ‘the 
individual, or if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or 
discovered the subject matter of the invention’.252 It is submitted that the use of the 
term ‘individual’ means that a juristic person does not qualify as an inventor. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
understanding of what constitutes the invention in this context. See Fellmeth A ‘Conception and 
misconception in joint inventorship’ (2012) 2 NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment 
Law 73 83-9,126-8; Chiang T ‘The levels of abstraction problem in patent law’ (2011) 105 
Northwestern University Law Review 1097. 
248 Interference proceedings could be declared under 35 USC s135 (pre-AIA) to establish the first 
inventor. See further Monheit R ‘The importance of correct inventorship’ (1999) 7 Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law 191ff on concerns that arose. 
249 See Board of Education ex re Board of Trustees of Florida State University v American Bioscience 
Inc 67 USPQ 2d 1252 (Fed Cir 2003) for a discussion of the principles of inventorship. See further 
McManus (n247) 107; Monotti & Ricketson (n9) 51; Gudmestad (n132)187-90 and the cases he cites. 
250 On actual and constructive reduction to practice, see Halpern et al (n224) 206; McManus (n247) 
107.  
251 Although much of the debate is likely to be of little relevance to future applications, there are 
matters which, as a result of the transition period, remain to be resolved under the previous law, for 
example, Sanolfi-Aventis v Pfizer Inc 12-1345 (Fed Cir Nov 5, 2013). 
252 35 USC s100(f). A ‘joint inventor’ or a ‘co-inventor’ is ‘any 1 of the individuals collectively who 
invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention’ 35 USC s100(g). On the concerns of 
acknowledging multiple contributions, see further Dreyfuss R ‘Collaborative research: Conflicts on 
authorship, ownership, and accountability’ (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law Review 1219. 
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eliminates any possibility of the employer claiming title through inventorship.253  
Under the pre-AIA approach, even in the absence of a similar statutory provision, the 
same approach was followed.254 There is no indication in the case law of employers 
being regarded as inventors. 255 While the shift to the first-to-apply system may have 
been driven by corporate interests,256 this has not extended to the possibility of 
corporate inventorship. 
 
In light of the above, the current approach to determining inventorship is that it 
inheres in the person who has conceived of the subject matter of the patent257 in line 
with pre-AIA case law.258 There is no standard ‘test’, but conception has been 
variously described as: 
* the ‘formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of 
the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in 
practice’;259 and 
* ‘the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act’ and ‘the 
formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the 
complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in 
practice’.260  
                                                          
253 Cherensky argues that corporate inventorship would be a possibility if ownership of inventions 
were justified in terms of a ‘personhood’ theory. See Cherensky S ‘A penny for their thoughts: 
Employee-inventors, preinvention assignment agreements, and personhood’ (1993) 81 California Law 
Review 595 646. 
254 See further Takenaka & Reboul (n228) 370. 
255 Simmons J ‘Inventions made for hire’ (2012) 2 NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and 
Entertainment law 1-42. 
256 See Machado (n232). 
257 See further Monheit (n248) 192.  See also Greive E ‘The doctrine of inventorship: Its ramifications 
in patent law’ (1965-66) 17 Western Reserve Law Review 1342 1343- 51 for a discussion of the 
determination of inventorship specifically in the employment context.  
258 See also the USPTO ‘Manual of Patent Examining Procedure’ (2010) which provides limited 
guidance by drawing attention to the approach in selected case law.   
259 Hybritech Inc v Monoclonal Antibodies Inc F 2d 1367, 1376, 231 USPQ 81, 87 (Fed Cir 1986). 
260 Townsend v Smith 36 F 2d 292, 295 4 USPQ 269, 271 (CCPA 1930). As to what would denote a 
sufficiently definite and permanent idea, an indicator would be when ‘only ordinary skill would be 




It is clear that inventorship is limited to the intellectual contribution and not the 
contribution of resources which may be necessary for the development of the 
invention. As a contributor of resources, the employer will therefore not be 
recognised as an inventor, even if the hurdle created by the reference to ‘individual’ 
in the definition could be overcome.  
 
5.3.2.2.3 Entitlement through assignment  
 
Since the enactment of the AIA, section 118 recognises the right of a non-inventor to 
apply for a patent where the invention has been assigned to him or her. In the 
employment context, the employer can acquire the right to apply for the patent 
through an assignment of the invention from the employee-inventor. The agreement 
to assign may be a term in the employment contract or a separate contract. There is 
no limitation on the form agreements to assign may take. The parties may agree to 
an assignment either before or after the invention has been made.  In the former 
instance, the invention is assigned when it comes into being.261 These pre-invention 
assignment agreements are a common way for employers to assert title to their 
employees’ inventions and it has been observed that inventive employees are almost 
inevitably bound by such agreements.262 Since there are no federal rules limiting or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Burroughs Wellcome Co v Barr Labs Inc 40 F 3d 1223, 1228 (Fed Cir 1994) and Monheit (n248) 194-
5. 
261 See Takenaka &  Reboul (n228) 369; Caldwell P ‘Employment agreements for the inventing 
worker: A proposal for reforming trailer clause enforceability guidelines’ (2006) 13 Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law 284-92. 
262 For a detailed analysis of pre-invention assignments of employee-inventions see Cherensky (n253) 
617-24. See also Urey D ‘Inventors in the United States’ in American Bar Association ‘Sorting out the 
Ownership Rights in Intellectual Property: A Guide to Practical Counseling [sic]  and Legal 
Representation’ Monograph of the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section (1980) 19 that  
‘various surveys indicate that over ninety percent of the employed exempt personnel in corporations 
have signed employment agreements requiring the assignment of inventions’;  Kamprath R ‘Patent 
reversion: An employee-inventor’s second bite at the apple’ (2012) 3 Chicago Kent Journal of 
Intellectual Property 190; Bobbit (n225) 40; Merges R ‘The law and economics of employee 
inventions’ (1999) Fall Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 7; Dreyfuss (n252) 1212. See also 
Dratler J ‘Incentives for people: The forgotten purpose of the patent system’ (1979) 16 Harvard 
Journal on Legislation 141. 
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prohibiting pre-invention assignments, the validity of the agreement depends on 
whether the term offends the state common law.  In principle, there are no 
restrictions on what can be included in the contract and courts tend to enforce these 
agreements.  263  
 
The concern with pre-invention assignments of employee-inventions is that an 
inequality in bargaining power may result in the employee contracting on 
unfavourable terms. Although, overbroad agreements may be limited,264 it is usually 
only in the most extreme cases that these contracts are not upheld. 265 In order to 
protect employees, some states have enacted legislation to regulate which 
inventions the employer can require the employee to assign in an employment 
contract.266  
 




Under section 118, a non-inventor is entitled to apply for a patent if the inventor is 
under an obligation to assign the invention to such applicant. The federal statute has 
no rules imposing such an obligation on the employee, and the general rule under 
                                                          
263 See Teets v Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp 83 F 3d 403 (Fed Cir 1996) 407: ‘contract law allows 
individuals to freely structure their transactions and employee relationships. An employee may thus 
freely consent by contract to assign all rights in inventive ideas to the employer’. 
264 See Takenaka & Reboul (n228) 373. 
265 Lo V ‘Employee inventions and works for hire in Japan: A comparative study against the U.S., 
Chinese, and German systems’  (2002) 16 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 292; 
Cherensky (n253) 618-9, 621-3 for a discussion on unconscionability of pre-invention assignments. 
266 The states include Delaware, Kansas, Utah, Illinois, California, Minnesota, North Carolina, 
Washington and Nevada. For further discussion of state legislation aimed at curtailing assignment 
agreements, see Gullette R ‘Employer-employee Rights’ in American Bar Association (n262) 33-41;  
Witte & Guttag (n227)  468; Lo  (n265) 293;  Stim R Patent, Copyright and Trademark: An Intellectual 
Property Desk Reference 11ed (2010) 116; Cherensky (n253) 619; Merges (n262) 8.  See also 
Coolley R ‘Recent changes in employee ownership laws: Employers may not own their inventions and 
confidential information’ (1985-1986) 41 Business Law 61-75 in which he discusses the state statutes 
for Minnesota, California, Washington, North Carolina, and Illinois. 
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common law is that the employee owns all inventions he or she has made.267 
However,  in the context of an employment relationship, an implied obligation to 
assign in favour of the employer has been recognised in at least two situations,268 
namely where the employee has been ‘hired-to-invent’; or where he or she has a 
special obligation to act in the interests of the employer. 
 
(b) Employee hired to invent 
 
The common-law ‘hired-to-invent’ rule imposes an obligation on the inventor to 
assign title to the employer where the employee has been hired specifically to make 
inventions.269 The reason for the obligation to assign the invention is simply that the 
employee has been paid to produce the specific invention through his or her salary 
or agreed compensation.270 Since the courts start from the position that the 
employee owns any invention he or she makes, it is incumbent on the employer to 
show that the invention was in fulfilment of an agreement under which the employee 
was ‘hired to invent’.  Indeed, employees may be hired to: ‘(1) invent a specific thing, 
(2) generally exercise his inventive skills, or (3) not invent at all’.271  
 
                                                          
267 See Teets (n263). For more on the development of employee inventive activity in the nineteenth 
century, see Fisk C ‘Removing the “Fuel of Interest” from the “Fire of Genius”: Law and the employee-
inventor, 1830-1930’ (1998) 65 University of Chicago Law Review 1127; Simmons (n255) 27-30; 
Takenaka & Reboul (n228) 269. 
268 See Chisum et al Principles of Patent Law 2ed (2001) 488; Teare A ‘A discussion of one phase of 
the patent law dealing with the relationship of employer and employee in patent matters’ (1923) 7 
Marquette Law Review 206-07; van Slyke (n228) 132-3; Johnson E ‘Patent rights of employer and 
employee’ (1933) 17 Marquette Law Review 224. For more on the general common-law approach see 
Clark L ‘Rights of employees to their inventions’ (1962) 22 Monthly Labour Review 12-13. 
269 For more on the hired-to-invent doctrine see Domagala D ‘Employee suggestion plans: Building a 
better mousetrap or the misappropriation of ideas?’ (1997) 31 Suffolk University law Review 401; 
Schwab A ‘The people aspects of innovation: Analysis of the relationships between US business 
entities and their employee and non-employee innovators and inventors’ (1989) 15 Canada-United 
States Law Journal 245; Simmons (n255)  15; Takenaka & Reboul (n228) 371.   
270 See United States v Dubilier Condensor Corp 289 US 178, 187 (1933) 187; Standard Parts Co v 
Peck 264 US 52 (1924) 59; Houghton v United States 23 F 2d 386 (4th Cir 1928) 388-9 all of which 
are of the view that an inventive employee is paid to be inventive. 
271 Coolley (n266) 58. 
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The mere fact that an employee invents something related to the employer’s 
business and does so while on duty, does not of itself entitle the employer to an 
assignment.272 Whether or not a ‘hired-to-invent’ situation arises, depends on the 
nature of the agreement at the time when the invention was made, regardless of 
whether or not it is expressly stipulated in a contract. 273 Coolley consequently 
explains: 
 ‘an employee hired to exercise his inventive skills generally is hired to pursue his 
 creative instincts, even if diverse from his assigned work; his employer anticipates no 
 specific result or invention. This employee does not implicitly agree to assign any 
 resulting patents to his employer, although some courts infer an agreement to assign 
 patents arising from the inventor’s work’. 274  
In this case, the common law would not imply an obligation to assign the invention. 
 
The test has been variously formulated by the courts.  In Teets v Chromalloy Gas 
Turbine Corp,275 for example, it was contested that there was an agreement that the 
employee-inventor, Teets, would assign rights in the invention of process used in the 
manufacture of aircraft turbine engine fan blades, to his employer, Chromalloy. The 
court explained that  
 ‘contract law allows individuals to freely structure their transactions and employee 
 relationships. An employee may thus freely consent by contract to assign all rights in 
 inventive ideas to the employer. Without such an express assignment, employers 
 may still claim an employee’s inventive works where the employer specifically hires 
 or directs the employee to exercise inventive faculties’.276 
 
The facts, which supported a finding in favour of the employer, were that although 
there was no contract dealing with the allocation of rights to inventions made by the 
employee, Teets had been specifically assigned to the project as chief engineer and 
had spent 70 per cent of his time working towards a solution to the problem the 
employer needed to solve for its client. Chomalloy had also not only paid Teets for 
                                                          
272 Dubilier Condensor (n270) 89.  
273 See Stim (n266) 63 and Standard Parts Co v Peck (n270) 59.  
274 Coolley (n266) 59. 
275 Teets (n263). 
276 Id 407. 
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his efforts but also paid for the development of the invention and the patent 
protection. 277  
In Solomons v United States,278 one of the earliest employee-invention cases, the 
Supreme Court noted that the general rule that the inventor is the owner is subject to 
the limitation that  
 ‘[i]f one is employed to devise or perfect an instrument, or a means for accomplishing 
 a prescribed result, he cannot, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he 
 was employed, plead title thereto as against his employer. Whatever rights as an 
 individual he may have had in and to his inventive powers, and that which they are 
 able to accomplish, he has sold in advance to his employer’.279  
 
Similarly, in United States v Dubilier Condensor Corp  the Supreme Court held that 
 ‘[o]ne employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of service, in 
 accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any patent obtained.  The 
 reason is that he has only produced that which he was employed to invent’.280 
 
In Houghton v United States the employee argued that the rule did not apply 
because he had not been employed as an inventor or to invent the particular 
invention but that his duties were more general.281 However, the court was of the 
opinion that the proper construction of whether or not the employee was employed to 
invent, was not determined solely with reference to the original terms of the contract.  
Rather it was the nature of the work which the employee was engaged in at the time 
of the invention which is relevant to whether an obligation to assign the invention 
arose.282 According to the court, this was because ‘[d]uring the period that he is so 
engaged, he is “employed to invent,” and the results of his efforts at invention belong 
to his employer in the same was as would be the product of his efforts in any other 
direction’.283 
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Ultimately, the existence of an obligation to assign under the hired-to-invent doctrine 
is limited to situations where the employee has a duty to engage in inventive activity. 
It would be unusual for an employer to engage the services of an employee to 
undertake inventive activities for remuneration without having an interest in the 
product of the inventive labour.  
 
(c) Fiduciary-type duty to assign 
 
Under the common law an obligation to assign an invention to the employer may be 
implied as a consequence of the position the employee holds in the company, often 
as an ‘alter ego’ of the employer.284 An example is where the employee is in a 
fiduciary position that imposes obligations of trust and confidence.285 Whether or not 
such an obligation can be implied in the relationship depends on the facts.286 
 
5.3.2.3  Attribution 
 
The requirement that the name of the inventor be included in the application applies 
equally to employee-inventions. The situation before the AIA, therefore, stands in 
that ‘there is no way that an employer can suppress attribution’.287  
 
 
5.3.2.4  Employers’ rights in employee-owned inventions: Shop rights  
 
Even though the employer may have contributed to the development of the invention 
through the provision of resources, the criterion of inventorship for first ownership 
means that any other contribution, for example resources, will not be recognised. 
Further, in the absence of the hired-to-invent doctrine or an express assignment, the 
invention belongs to the employee and the employer has no title to it. The inequity 
which is perceived to result from this lack of recognition of the resource contribution, 
                                                          
284 See, for example, Dowse v Federal Rubber Co 43 F 308 (ND Il 1918). 
285See further van Slyke (n228) 150-1. 
286 See Kennedy v Wright 676 F Supp 888 (CD Ill 1988)  893. See further Domagala (n269) 400. 
287 Dreyfuss (n252) 2000. 
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has resulted in many states acknowledging the employer’s interest in the invention 
through a common-law ‘shop rights’ rule.288 Although shop rights manifest primarily 
in the employment situation, it is a general equitable doctrine that recognises the 
contributions of parties whenever an invention is made and is thus not limited to 
patentable inventions.289 
 
In the employee-invention context, a shop right has been described by the courts as 
 ‘a right that is created at common law, when the circumstances demand it, under 
 principles of equity and fairness, entitling an employer to use without charge an 
 invention patented by one or more of its employees without liability for 
 infringement’.290 Its purpose ‘is to compensate the employer for the resources and/or 
 employee work time which have been utilized in making the invention’.291  
As a common-law doctrine, it has developed through the cases and it is impossible 
to extract a precise set of factors which would warrant a shop right in every 
situation.292  It is in effect, a right to use the invention in the absence of ownership or 
permission from the inventor. Shop rights are not automatically implied into 
employment contracts; the employer must establish the existence of such right under 
the particular state law.293  
 
There is also no single legal basis for shop rights,294 although they tend to be 
regarded as a form of licence295or estoppel.296 In relation to the characterisation as a 
                                                          
288 Some states, California for example, have enacted specific provisions on employee-inventions, 
which in certain cases include a statutory form of a shop right. For more on shop right generally, see 
Anawalt (n266) 8-49; Bobbit (n225) 45-6; for an historical analysis of the development of the shop 
right doctrine see Fisk (n267) 1142-64; Bishop A ‘Employers, employees and inventions’ (1957-8) 31 
S. California Law Review 44. 
289 It is not limited to the employment context. See McElmurry v Arkansas Power and Light Co 995 F 
2d 1576 (Fed Cir 1993) 1583 n15; van Slyke (n228) 147-51; Simmons (n255) 30. 
290 McElmurry (n289) 1580. See also Chisum et al (n268) 488. 
291 Witte & Guttag (n227) 470-1. 
292 See, for example, Orkin N ‘The Legal Rights of the Employed Inventor in the United States: a 
Labor-Management Perspective’ in Phillips 1981 (n1) 154. 
293 Coolley (n266) 59. 
294 See Domagala (n269) 402-03 and the cases therein. 
295 For example McElmurry (n289) 1580-1; McClurg v Kingsland 42 US 202 (1843) 205-06.  
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licence, Merges notes that this may have arisen because ‘[i]n the earlier shop right 
cases, the inventor often appeared to acquiesce in the employer’s use of the 
invention, giving the arrangement the air of an implied license’. 297 However, it is not 
so that there any implied authority is necessary for a shop right to subsist. In the 
case of estoppel ‘the emphasis is whether the employee’s actions, such as 
consenting to employer use, require he or she be estopped from asserting the patent 
right against the employer’.298   Regardless of legal characterisation, a number of 
recurring features can be discerned. The right is personal to the employer and the 
employer may not license or assign it to a third party – although shop rights have 
been held to be transferrable with the sale of a business.299  The employee, on the 
other hand, is free to license the invention to another party. 
 
The genesis of the doctrine, it has been suggested, lies in McGlurg v Kingsland.300  
Harley invented a way of casting rollers and cylinders301 while employed by 
Kingsland. He received weekly wages which were increased subsequent to his 
invention ‘on account of the useful result’.302The invention arose from a number of 
experiments, all conducted in the employer’s foundry and entirely at its expense.  
Harley suggested to Kingsland that it apply for a patent on the invention and buy his 
rights to the invention. Kingsland declined but continued to use the invention. During 
this time, Harley claimed no compensation, nor did he indicate that Kingsland not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
296 See, for example, Wommack v Durham Pecan Co 715 F 2d 962 (5th Cir 1983) 966; Gill v United 
States 160 US 426 (1896); McElmurry (n289) 1580-1 (footnotes omitted). 
297 Merges R Patent Law and Policy (1997) 1221.  
298 Thomas J ‘Who owns the invention?: The rights of employers, employees, and contractors’ (1999) 
62 Texas Bar Journal 1000. 
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shop right. Examples are McKinnon Chain Co v American Chain Co Inc MD Pa 1919; Neon Signal 
Devices Inc v Alpha Claude Neon Corp  WD Pa 1932; California Eastern Laboratories Inc v Gould 
896 F 2d 400 (9th Cir 1990) 402. See also Merges (n297) 1221 and Dreyfuss (n252) 1161. 
300 42 US 202 (1843). For a detailed account of the legal effect of McClurg see Fisk (n267) 1143-50; 
Simmons (n255) 30-2; and Neumeyer (n62) 707-08. 
301 McClurg (n300) 204. 
302 Id 205.  
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use the invention. After he had left the company, Kingsland continued to use the 
invention and Harley sued for infringement.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the court a quo which had 
found that the facts justified ‘the presumption of a license, a special privilege, or 
grant to the defendants to use the invention’.303 
 
The approach in McGlurg was followed in Solomons v United States.304 While 
employed as Chief of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the inventor, Clark, 
invented a self-cancelling stamp for which he sought a patent.  He subsequently 
assigned his rights to another party. The Supreme Court regarded the facts in 
Solomons as analogous to those in McGlurg.305Here the inventor was employed 
when he made the stamp, his research was funded wholly by the employer and he 
used its machinery to craft the stamp. The employer sought his advice as to which 
stamp to use and were informed by him that he would not charge if his stamp was 
adopted.306  
 
Possibly the most influential case on the scope of the shop right has been United 
States v Dubilier Condensor Corp.307 The employees, Dunmore and Lowell, were 
employed  in the radio section of the United States Bureau of Standards where they 
were engaged in research and testing.  During this time they conceived of a number 
of inventions.  They applied for and were granted three patents, which they licensed 
to Dubilier. The US government claimed ownership on the basis of the employment 
relationship with the inventors. The Supreme Court, however, found that the 
employees had not been employed specifically to invent and rejected the claim.  
 
Nevertheless, it found that the government was entitled to use the inventions without 
payment of royalties on the basis that 
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 ‘[w]here a servant, during his hours of employment, working with his master’s 
 materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an invention for which he obtains a 
 patent, he must accord his master a non-exclusive right to practice the invention’.308 
In this case the employees had conceived of and perfected the invention in the 
course of their employment and were allowed to pursue their work in the 
government’s laboratory. 
 
The nature of the shop right doctrine is captured in McElmurry v Arkansas Power 
and Light Co309 where the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the 
decision of the district court which had based its decision on Dubilier. In this matter, 
Arkansas Power and Light Company (‘AP&L’) had hired Bowman as a consultant.310 
AP&L was unhappy with an aspect of their precipitator hoppers, and so Bowman and 
an AP&L employee devised a new level detector system to resolve the problem. 
AP&L installed this new system in all its hoppers, covering all costs associated with 
the installation and testing of the level detector, as well as the materials and 
drawings.311  
 
Bowman patented the invention and subsequently sued AP&L for infringement when 
it used a different contractor to install the technology.  AP&L raised the defence of a 
shop right because Bowman had developed it at AP&L’s facilities and at its expense.   
It claimed that it therefore had the right to reproduce and use the system in its 
business.312 The court found that it had to ‘look to the totality of the circumstances on 
a case by case basis and determine whether the facts of a particular case demand, 
under principles of equity and fairness a finding that a ‘shop right’ exists’.313 
 
The court also noted that the fact that Bowman had conceived of the idea for the 
invention prior to his engagement as a consultant by AP&L, was irrelevant.314 In 
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addition, the argument that there could be no shop right as Bowman was not an 
employee but a contractor at the time of the invention, was unsupported, and that in 
fact the law supported the contrary.315 
 
5.3.2.5  Concluding comments on the United States’ approach  
 
The USA’s approach is restricted to the development of the common law at state 
level, with limited statutory intervention in certain states. At federal level, there is no 
specific statutory recognition of the effect of employment on patent allocation.  The 
general approach is to recognise intellectual contributions to the development of the 
invention by limiting applications to individuals who conceived of the subject matter. 
Employer contributions in the form of resources are not recognised by statute, and 
until recently employers could not apply directly for a patent on an employee-
invention. Although the USA system appears to favour employee-inventors by 
placing them in a position of control over the invention, in reality employers have 
significant opportunity to use the inventions. 
 
Even under the archetypal approach which vests ownership in the inventor, the shop 
rights doctrine serves as a way to enable the employer to nonetheless use the 
invention in the absence of ownership. The doctrine has developed as an equitable 
doctrine to ensure a fair distribution of rights to an invention to which both parties 
have contributed.  However, it is less appealing than ownership as an incentive for 
an employer to invest in the development of inventions because it offers limited 
scope for the employer to exploit it and gain commercial advantage from its use.316  
It is not a property right and its non-exclusivity means that the employer is not able to 
prevent the employee transferring the invention to anyone else.317 Furthermore, the 
fact that it arises only in response to the particular factual situation, means that it is 
not possible to predict with absolute accuracy whether an employer’s behaviour falls 
within the shop right. 
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Although the hired-to-invent doctrine enables a more concrete deviation from the 
standard model, it too is plagued by the vagueness associated with relying on the 
common law. In this case, the determination of ownership depends on ‘whether the 
concept of employment is given a broad or narrow interpretation’.318  
Generally though, most deviations arise as a consequence of private agreements 
which oust the common-law or statutory inventorship approach.319  Orkin notes that  
‘[t]o all intents and purposes the common law has had little recent application for with 
the advent of corporate employers and technically trained employees the assignment 
contract has virtually superseded the common law rights determination’.320  
 
From an incentive point of view, employers will invest in inventive activity if they are 
able to secure a return on their investment.  Where this requires patent ownership, 
the employer must acquire title from the employee-inventor. As the function of a 
contractual arrangement, the assignment of the invention involves a process of 
negotiation between the parties as to the terms of the assignment.  Given the 
prevalence of corporate-initiated inventive activity, the question arises as to why 
there has not been a push from the corporate sector for federal patent law to provide 
for a default employer-owner position when inventions are made by employees.  The 
reason appears to lie in the perceived advantages of contract for both employees 
and employers.  According to Witte and Guttag, the enactment of state or federal 
legislation ‘may interfere unnecessarily with the ability of employees and employers 
to develop contractual relationships which satisfy the interests and desires of 
both’.321  
 
Takenaka and Reboul are of the opinion that this inventor-recognition approach is a 
reflection of the US policy of promoting innovation through inventions. According to 
them,  
 ‘[t]o preserve incentives to invent, US case law prevents employers from taking away 
 property rights in the invention and secures inventor-employees bargaining 
 opportunities with their employers for fair value of the invention. In other words, the 
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 patent policy of innovation promotion through a reward to inventors is implemented 
 through the bargaining between inventors and their employers over a transfer of 
 property right in the invention [sic]’.322  
 
Although it is argued that the employee-inventor holds the right to the invention as a 
bargaining chip, it has been observed that the reality is that ‘most IP rights in the US 
are continually and automatically allocated to employers’.323 From the employer-
perspective, contract effectively brings about the desired deviation. For the 
employee, this unrestricted use of contract places them at a disadvantage if the 
effect of the employment relationship on the bargaining power of the parties is not 
tempered. There is a danger that the scope of the interests they assign to the 
employer and the benefit they derive from an assignment of the invention will not be 
fairly bargained for given that employees are usually in an inferior bargaining 
position. 
 
This concern is very real especially when, as it has been noted, employers almost 
inevitably acquire title to a range of inventions simply as a ‘routine matter’.324 
Concerns over pre-invention assignment agreements have led some states to 
introduce statutory provisions to protect employees from employers’ overreaching. 325 
Cherensky argues that a reason for the prevalence of pre-invention assignments is 
‘that there is, in effect, no market for technical jobs that does not require 
relinquishment of preinvention rights’ and that as a result this ‘market failure has 
eviscerated the policy of individual incentive and recognition implicit in a Patent Code 
that recognizes only human inventors’. 326  In addition, in so far as the common law 
provides for a rule that vests ownership in the employee, the hired-to-invent doctrine 
implies an obligation to assign the invention to the employer, even in the absence of 
an express agreement.   
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In addition to the general concern about the scope of the rights which employers 
claim under contract, a further issue relates to the remuneration which the employee-
inventor receives in exchange for parting with the invention.  Where an employee-
inventor assigns an invention to the employer, there is no obligation on the employer 
to pay the employee specifically for the assignment. It appears that the payment of a 
salary is sufficient and that any unhappiness with the remuneration ought to be 
resolved at the time the parties negotiate the terms of the employment contract.327 
As Orkin notes, ‘[a]n individual’s “employment” or “continuation of this employment” 
has been held by the American judicial system as adequate consideration to support 
a legally binding contract…Generally, courts regard the parties as having equal 
bargaining power and therefore uphold the contract’.328Consequently, any claim by 
employee-inventors for payment related specifically to the invention, would in the 
main be limited to what was agreed to in the employment contract.  
 
Merges justifies the current approach as the most effective one from an economic 
perspective. He argues that ‘the overwhelming verdict from economic theory is that 
the law properly allows employers to take ownership of their employees’ 
inventions’,329and that there are ways to compensate employees for inventions other 
than  ownership – for example, reward programs and the ‘possibility of leaving a firm 
with an inchoate concept, perhaps with venture capital backing, constitutes an 
important counterbalance to the rights of the employer firm’.330 
 
There have been calls for a statutory compensation scheme, mostly to deal with the 
perceived concern that employees are not adequately compensated and hence also 
not incentivised, when employers acquire rights through contract.  The arguments in 
support are usually that a monetary payment would encourage employees to create, 
especially where the employee’s salary may not reflect the value of the inventions to 
                                                          
327 Takenaka & Reboul (n228) 373. 
328 Orkin N ‘Employee invention rights in the Twenty-First Century’(2005) 56 Labor Law Journal 85 
329 Merges (n262) 3. 
330 Id 3, 38-50. 
245 
 
the company; 331 that the employee should be rewarded for the extra work that has 
gone into making the invention; and that the employees should share in the profits 
derived from their intellectual work.332 
 
However, while the US system is not averse to compensation schemes in general, 
and has recognised some in the public sphere in relation to certain groups of federal 
employees, there has not been sufficient support for the introduction of such 
schemes in the private sphere. 333 This does not mean that there have not been 
attempts to introduce them.334 However, as Orkin has commented, proposed reforms 
of federal law to guarantee employed inventors remuneration for their endeavours, 
has ‘failed to become law, and most have suffered a quiet death after little effort was 
made to lobby for their enactment’ with only one bill actually being through a 
congressional hearing’.335 
 
Arguments against compensation schemes include that they have an ‘anti-innovative 
impact’ and fail to factor in the contributions of other employees who do not meet the 
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legal standard for inventorship.336 The difficulty in establishing a uniform practice for 
the country as a whole is also a factor. 337 
 
There have been other suggestions to alleviate the harshness of the current position. 
An example is patent reversion schemes in terms of which a patent will revert back 
to the inventors so that the employee can also reap the benefits of the invention.338  
Orkin suggests that employees – notably engineers and scientists – should embark 
on ‘constructive’ strike action by continuing with their normal tasks but withholding 
their ideas from the employer.339 Bartow similarly calls for collective action which will 
have the effect of incentivising employees in the absence of a change in the law.  
She suggests that employees who would usually be forced to enter pre-invention 
assignments, refuse to do so.340   
 
From this, it is clear that even in a system which until recently was steadfast in its 
recognition of the first-and-true inventor as the first patentee, the realities of the 
employee-invention paradigm have forced compromises – albeit not by statutory 
regulation – at federal level.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The research question is: How South Africa ought to regulate the ownership of 
patentable inventions between employers and employees?  A premise of this thesis 
is that the answer to this question is must align with the purpose of the patent system 
in South Africa. This requires that the recognition of particular persons as default 
right-holders furthers that purpose.  
 
This chapter resolves the research question by recommending a reform of the PA 
1978 to regulate potentially competing claims to the invention by employers and 
employees in a way that furthers the purpose of patents as tools to incentivise the 
individual contributions which are required to make a patentable invention. 
 
The recommendation is the culmination of conclusions as to the suitability of the 
current South African system to regulate the ownership of patentable employee-
inventions, the way in which the ownership of employee-made intellectual property is 
regulated in South Africa outside of the PA 1978, and the experiences of the UK and 
USA systems which offer the experiences of two divergent alternative responses to 
the current South African approach..  
 
 
6.2 SOUTH AFRICA IN THE CONTEXT OF CHAPTER 2: A CONCEPTUAL 
BACKDROP TO THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Chapter 2 was designed to establish a framework within which to consider the 
ownership of employee-inventions. It is within this framework that the employee-
invention issue in South Africa must be approached.  There are three aspects to its 




Firstly, Chapter 2 serves as a representation of the ‘international’ patent regime to 
which South Africa subscribes. As a signatory to the Paris Convention and a 
member of the WTO, South Africa is obliged to put in place a system of patents 
which meets the imperatives of these instruments. However, as explained in Chapter 
2, a measure of flexibility in the implementation means that national systems vary. In 
some cases the instruments are explicit in their meaning and also in how they are to 
be received nationally. In other cases – for example as regards the nature of 
inventorship or first ownership in patents – they are either silent or open to differing 
interpretations.  
 
Internationally, issues relating to ownership of employee-inventions are not 
harmonised. Neither the international intellectual property law instruments, nor the 
international labour fora, have ventured formally to recognise the shift in the patent 
paradigm that the employment relationship has necessitated. It is unlikely that this 
issue will be the subject of an instrument under either the international intellectual 
property or labour fora. This is evident from the current silence from the WIPO and 
the ILO on the matter. There are no international labour instruments which directly 
affect the implementation of patent laws, although they do direct labour law. 
Consequently, the implication of labour law in the allocation of ownership of patents 
occurs at national level.  This means that, like other patenting nations, the 
development of an optimal framework will be directed by domestic drivers. However, 
in all instances the implementation must not conflict with the international 
imperatives, in particular the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
Flowing from this, is the second aspect, namely to establish the type of first-
ownership rule the international system anticipates or is able to sustain. It was 
established that inventorship is at the very least associated with the intellectual 
contribution of a natural person. A patent is granted in exchange for a new, inventive, 
and useful technological advancement. Juristic inventorship requires a strained 
interpretation to create a link with intellectual contribution. The system is not 
concerned with how that invention arose, or with who, other than the inventor, is 
necessary for a further invention. This means that the corporate is not recognised for 
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its resource investment, regardless of the investment being a sine qua non for the 
creation of the invention. 
This affects how the international system can be interpreted to respond to first 
ownership. Inventorship as described, is the only evident touchstone for the grant of 
the patent, and hence, by deduction, for first ownership. The archetypal approach is 
that the inventor is the owner of the patent.  However, this does not eliminate non-
inventors from patent ownership and national systems can decide who to recognise. 
The reason for not doing so at international level relates to the purpose of patents as 
incentives for inventions which are only defined in terms of the intellectual input. 
However, there is no regulation of the legal basis for vesting first ownership in a non-
inventor. As a result, policy considerations outside of patent law may drive the 
inventor’s divestment of ownership. It is at this juncture that labour law policy comes 
into play when the transfer is a consequence of an employment relationship between 
the employee-inventor and his or her employer. This plays out at national level. 
 
Thirdly, Chapter 2 establishes two main premises upon which the thesis operates. 
These relate to the nature of modern inventorship and the construction of the patent 
system as an incentive mechanism. It is assumed that the inventions to which this 
thesis responds are of the types which are made in a corporate environment and 
would not arise without both a resource and an intellectual contribution. Furthermore, 
the intellectual contribution is made by inventors employed by firms which make the 
resource contribution. Where the allocation rule acts as a disincentive to a repeat 
contribution – it being admitted that it is impossible to determine whether a patent 
per se can be the sine qua non for an invention to be made – then the system is less 
likely to meet the incentive mission. So it is about ensuring that neither contributor 
refuses to repeat their performance, whether intellectual or resource-based, solely 
because of the allocation rule. This incentive function is given practical application 
through two mechanisms: the grant of an economic monopoly and attribution. For 
the patent system to act as an incentive to both employees and employers, it must 
allocate these benefits between the parties in a way that does not discourage further 
contributions.  
 
The fourth aspect of Chapter 2 which bears on the conclusions on the South African 
system, is the set of assumptions as to the incentive effect of specific first-ownership 
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and attribution allocations on the willingness of employers and employees to commit 
their intellectual or resource contributions to the inventive activity. These were set 
out as a model framework in 2.5.  In short, the incentive value of ownership of a 
patent and of attribution will vary depending on the circumstances under which the 
invention is made. This is particularly so in the employment context where ownership 
of a patent will not always be the best incentive for another invention under the same 
circumstances. An example is where the invention has been made using the 
employer’s resources but does not fall within the employer’s business interests. Not 
granting ownership of the patent will arguably not deter a similar employer-
contribution provided the employer’s costs are recouped or it derives some benefit 
through alternative means. Similarly, not granting an employee ownership in a patent 
for an invention which he or she has no interest in commercialising or controlling is 
not a disincentive to invent, provided that the employee is adequately rewarded 
through alternative means. It is assumed that the optimal default position is one 





The following conclusions are drawn from Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and together, form the 
underlying basis for the recommended reform of the PA 1978. 
 
a. There is sufficient basis to justify the patent system in South Africa as a tool 
for further innovation as part of the country’s broader goal of economic growth. 
Consequently, the conceptualisation of the system as an incentive mechanism is not 
at odds with the assumption that the patent system aims at innovation. The 
underlying purpose of the system is to contribute to the production and application of 
inventive activity within the broader drive to encourage greater private sector 
investment in innovation. Consequently, amendments which seek to further this goal 
ought to be supported. 
 
b. The patent system makes no specific provision for the allocation of rights to 
employee-inventions through an explicit first-ownership rule which deviates from the 
archetypal allocation. However, the legislature has recognised that in cases of 
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employee-made intellectual property in the context of copyright, designs, and plant 
breeders’ rights, statutory provisions provide a way of recognising the particular 
context which employment creates and its effect on the ordinary first ownership rules 
which would tend to vest first ownership in the employee as the individual 
responsible for the creation. Similarly, in the case of the IPPFRD Act ownership of 
intellectual property - which includes patents - is subject to a statutory provision 
crafted to meet the needs of that legislation. Although these instruments vary in 
approach, the conclusion to be made here is that it would not be anathema for the 
PA 1978 to be amended to take account of employer-contributions. 
 
c. There is precedent outside of South Africa for deviations from the archetypal 
approach which divert first ownership from the employee-inventor to the employer. 
The British system is an example of comprehensive legislative remodelling to 
accommodate employee-inventions. The US system, while relying on common-law 
developments, also offers examples of jurisdictions which have chosen to legislate 
the issue. 
 
d. Attribution plays a role in the incentive function. Its value is independent of the 
commercial value of the patents to employee-inventors and irrespective of the 
commercial success of the patent. Attribution therefore serves an incentive function 
in the sense that even in the absence of an economic reward, there are benefits to 
be derived from association with a patented invention. However, the South African 
patent system does not provide for a clear right of the inventor to be mentioned 
although the identity of the inventor is an indispensable requirement for the 
successful registration of a patent and a patent can be revoked on the basis of 
incorrect inventorship.  
 
Although this right is arguably subsidiary to the ownership of the patent, it has been 
recognised by workers in the ILO meetings as valuable even when ownership of the 
patent resides in the employer. The WIPO Model Laws also recognise attribution as 
something more than simply an administrative entry on the patent application. In the 
UK it has been bolstered by the provision that it may not be waived. The conclusion 
to be made is that even though the employer may not be able to claim attribution 
under the usual inventorship rules, it may create the situation where the employee is 
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unable to enjoy the benefits of attribution. This could arise where the employee 
agrees that he or she will not be mentioned as the inventor. Consequently, in so far 
as it is possible to entrench this benefit, at the very least it ought to be made 
unwaivable. 
 
e. The PA 1978 recognises inventorship as the key determinant of first 
ownership but is silent on what inventorship entails; there is no definition of ‘inventor’ 
and, at best, an ‘invention’ is ‘defined’ in terms of patentability criteria. This 
corresponds to the international approach and to that of the foreign jurisdictions 
considered. It would be highly unorthodox to approach inventorship on the basis of 
anything other than its intellectual elements, for example a resource contribution.  
 
f. Following on from the previous point is that the conclusion to be drawn is that 
the PA 1978, while not expressly excluding juristic persons from being inventors, 
nonetheless is more closely aligned with the conventional wisdom that limits 
inventorship to natural persons. This is because it would require a strained 
interpretation to credit the corporate-employer with the intellectual contribution in the 
absence of the inventor. Neither the UK nor the US approaches have suggested 
anything along these lines either. 
 
g. Although juristic persons are excluded from first ownership on the basis of 
inventorship, PA 1978 recognises that non-inventors, including juristic persons, can 
be first grantees of the patent.  It limits the right to apply for the patent to persons 
who have acquired the right from the inventor.  This means is that non-inventors 
must acquire rights from inventors and therefore, employers can acquire rights to the 
patent from the employee-inventor.   
 
h. The only basis for the employer to acquire the right to apply for the patent is 
through an assignment or rule of law as the basis for the acquisition of the rights 
from the employee-inventor. The patent system does not restrict the basis for the 
acquisition so that the legal relationship giving rise to the acquisition will almost 




i.  The existence of an employment relationship draws labour laws into the 
equation. Where the relationship between the parties exhibits specific 
characteristics, it may attract the provisions of labour law aimed at mediating the 
unequal bargaining power generally attendant upon employment relationships where 
one party is economically dependent on the other on an ongoing basis. It is not 
possible to isolate the allocation of ownership in employee-inventions from the 
effects of the employment relationship on the parties’ freedom to contract. 
 
The PA 1978 while not providing for an ex lege allocation in favour of the employer, 
recognises that employers need to acquire title to inventions from their employees 
and that the basis for the acquisition is an assignment. However, it has introduced 
protective measures to limit the extent to which rights linked to an employment 
relationship can be assigned. In the absence of an explanation or definitions of any 
of the terms in section 59(2)(a) it is almost impossible to regard it as anything other 
than an attempt to impose labour law policy into the PA 1978. Labour laws 
developed as a countervailing force in response to the imbalance in power between 
employers and employees, which characterises work relationships in which one 
party is economically dependent on the other on an ongoing basis. Section 59(2) can 
be interpreted as an acknowledgment that reliance on the contract of employment to 
vest patent rights comes with an inherent risk that the employee needs to be 
protected from contracting on poor terms.  
 
When one considers s59(2)(a) along with similar tendencies in the US and UK 
systems to impose statutory rules to protect employee-inventors from assigning 
inventions for inadequate remuneration, the conclusion is that reliance on common 
law rules to mitigate harshness and to restrict unconscionable contracts, is in the 
patent context, not ideal. In the US even though there are no rules at federal level 
and it is argued that contract in fact places the employee in the position to be able to 
negotiate, some States have introduced statutory rules to protect employees in 
similar situations. In the BPA 1977 the compensation provisions serve to ensure that 





j.  In circumstances where the employer has acquired the right to apply for the 
patent from the employee-inventor, whether or not the employee will be discouraged 
from inventing again is not a consequence of the patent allocation but of the private 
relationship between the employer and employee. In the absence of statutory 
provisions which direct benefits for his or her patentable inventions to the employee, 
the employee’s reward for inventorship becomes a function of the employment 
contract. Therefore, whether the divestment results from an assignment or the 
operation of law, the employee’s only monetary claim against the employer is for his 
or her negotiated salary. This may be formulated in various ways – for example, 
bonuses for patents –  but it remains a function of the contractual arrangement 
between the parties. 
 
The employer is consequently not obliged to offer the employee anything more than 
his or her regular salary for the invention. In this way, whether or not the patent 
system has succeeded as an individual incentive mechanism to encourage the 
employee to contribute again will be determined by whether or not the terms of the 
employment relationship are such that they elicit a further employee contribution. 
Even if the employee is not dissuaded from future inventing, his or her commitment 
to the inventorship enterprise is a consequence of the specific employment 
relationship and not of a default allocation under the patent system. 
 
In the UK system provision is made for employees to claim compensation from 
employers who have been vested with ownership but only to the extent that the 
invention has resulted in an extraordinary benefit to the employer. For the most part, 
the employer’s salary is regarded as sufficient remuneration for inventions. Although 
this is a very limited provision, it does provide a means of tempering any unfairness 
in the terms of the employment contract in so far as the amount of remuneration is 
concerned as it incorporates the benefit of hindsight.  There is no way of being 
certain of the value of  inventions which have yet to be made and consequently, the 
negotiation over salary will not be able to place an actual value on the invention. The 
very nature of patentable inventions is that they are novel and non-obvious – which 





k. There is no patent-specific understanding of employment law and references 
to employment in the patent context require an interpretation aligned to the purpose 
for which it is sought. Employment may, therefore, be one aspect in determining 
whether or not the employer is entitled to the employee-invention, or it may serve to 
protect the employee from losing the invention to the employer.  In the copyright, 
plant breeders’ rights, and to some extent, the designs legislation, there are 
references to employment as the basis for the acquisition of rights by the employer.  
In the designs and patents legislation, employment features to a different end as 
well, namely to protect the employee from agreeing to pre-assign inventions 
unrelated to the employment relationship. In neither case, are any of the 
employment-related terms, for example, ‘course of employment’, ‘course and scope 
of employment’, ‘contract of service’ and the like, defined. 
 
It is not possible to simply assume that guidance can be sought in ‘labour law’ 
generally.  There is no single interpretation of employment-related terms which fits all 
cases. In fact, there is no single standardised ‘labour law’ that can be used in all 
contexts to resolve employment-related issues.   For example, references to 
employment as a purely contractual construct are no longer definitive of the modern 
employment relationship and hence also the context in which inventions are made. It 
has been shown that in the context of the BCEA and the LRA for example, statutory 
regulation will be implied in work arrangements which do not necessarily conform to 
the contractual model.  In addition, it is recognised that the employee’s duties may 
change from what was expressly stipulated at the start of the employment contract 
based on what he or she actually does as part of the job.  Consequently, references 
to statutory and common-law interpretations of employment-related terms must be 
cognisant of the context, in particular the policy considerations which inform the 
purpose of using an employment-related concept. 
 
Under the British law the approach has been to introduce definitions into the patents 
legislation, albeit to incorporate labour statutes. In addition, it is accepted that the 
term ‘normal duties’ for example, requires an interpretation unique to the legislation 




l.  The PA 1978 does not recognise investment or any other, non-intellectual 
contribution.  Furthermore, the Act does not provide for alternative forms of 
recognition other that ownership for the employer.  In the US employers have 
recourse to the shop-right doctrine in many States.  In that context though the basis 
for the doctrine is equity, not the incentivisation of inventive activity – shop rights do 
not only arise in the employee-invention context.  It is compensatory in that it puts 
the employer in the position where it can recoup its resource contribution. However, 
as a non-exclusive right less than ownership, it has too many disadvantages to 
function as an incentive for the employer.  
In South Africa the employer will likely be left to rely on unjustified enrichment to 
recoup its contribution. 
 
m. As regards acquisition by operation of law, it is shown in Chapter 3 that in the 
absence of an implied statutory allocation, this is left to the common law. In South 
Africa it is not possible to state unequivocally whether there is an implied common- 
law rule on which the employer can rely to claim ownership of the employee-
invention in the absence of an assignment. Furthermore, even if there is an implied 
rule, the dearth of clear judicial guidance makes it impossible to formulate the rule 
with any accuracy so as to anticipate the varied inventorship scenarios within the 
employment context. In many instances it appears that a tacit term is a more likely 
basis for employers to claim ownership in their employee-inventors’ inventions.  
However, a tacit term in contract does not transfer rights and would only serve as the 





South Africa needs to acknowledge the employee-invention paradigm as the 
prevailing norm in the patent context by recognising that the contributions essential 
to the development of a patentable invention are not limited to individual intellectual 
effort. Technological innovation on a scale necessary to further the knowledge 
economy depends unequivocally on both investment by corporations and on the 
intellect contribution of individual inventors. It was shown in Chapter 3 that the 
current system which relies heavily on the common law to deviate from the default 
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position to pass ownership to the employer, does not align with the incentive function 
of patents.  It is the PA 1978 be amended to resolve the concerns and to avoid the 
reliance on private ordering through the employment contract. The advantage of a 
statutory approach is that it can be crafted to respond to both the patent and labour 
policy concerns which must be taken into account.  In this respect, the British 
approach is to be favoured over the US reliance on the common law. 
 
The proposed new legislation is a response to the conclusions which have been 
drawn.  The key principles underlying the recommendations are as follows. 
 
Firstly, in cases where the incentive function is best served by vesting ownership in 
the employer, it is recommended that a first-ownership rule be used to vest 
ownership directly in the employer. This rule should be clear as to the circumstances 
under which the employee will not be the first owner of the invention. 
 
Secondly, where it is necessary to use terminology commonly associated with 
employment in the patent context, care must be taken to ensure that the use aligns 
with the purpose of the patent system. Consequently, it should not be necessary to 
look outside of the system to define terms, unless specifically directed to do so. The 
use of terms which feature in multiple contexts with different underlying purposes, 
should be replaced with new terms devoid of such association, or should be 
accompanied by guidance on how they are to be interpreted. The British approach of 
including specific definitions to guide the interpretation of employment-related terms 
is recommended. 
 
Thirdly, the current approach of limiting inventorship to natural persons who devised 
the inventive concept must be retained.  Further the PA 1978 should include an 
express right for the inventor to be mentioned.  Even though this may in practice 
amount to little more than the current situation of identifying the author on the 
specification, attribution plays a valuable incentive role for inventors who will not 
necessarily remain bound to a particular employer. This right must vest in the 




Fourthly, where employees are not vested with default ownership, they should be 
adequately remunerated to ensure that the lack of ownership does not disincentivise 
a further intellectual contribution.  It is not recommended that there be a general 
compensation clause in such instances but that any payment in addition to the salary 
must be linked to the incentive function.  Here the role of the employment contract as 
a driver of inventive activity must be considered in light of the salary the employee 
has negotiated under the employment contract. This amount ought to cover the 
performance of duties from which an invention would be foreseeable.   However, 
where the invention proves to be of greater worth than could have been anticipated 
when the contract was concluded, a ‘top-up’ payment should be obligatory. Since the 
invention is actually initiated by the employer in this context, it is not ownership which 
drives the inventor, but rather adequate compensation for the effort. In many 
instances, given the same circumstances, the employee would invent again without 
the prospect of ownership because his or her motivation is determined by the 
employment obligations set by the employer. 
 
Finally, provision should be made to ensure that employee-inventors are able to 
bargain robustly with employers over inventions which do not fall under the default 
first-ownership rule. The aim should be to facilitate freedom of contract, and so it 
should not restrict either party’s freedom to negotiate on terms which best suit it.  
 
In conclusion, the PA 1978 should be amended by the addition of section 27A the 
deletion of section 59(2)(a), and the development of a set of Guidelines to assist in 
the application of the provision: 
 
27(A)(1) (a)    Where during the subsistence of an employment relationship, an 
  invention arises as a consequence of the duties the employee is  
  obliged to fulfil, and that invention is one which could have been  
  expected to result from the employee’s efforts, the rights in the  
  invention vest in the employer.  
 
 (b) Where an invention belongs to the employer in terms of (a), the 
employee must receive a fair and reasonable remuneration based on 
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the value the employer derives or expects to derive from the invention 
for the duration of the patent.  
 
  (c)  In the absence of agreement between the parties, either party 
  may apply to the Commissioner of Patents or a court to determine  
  whether the remuneration the employee is entitled to in (b), is fair and 
  reasonable.  Such application may be made at any time and more than 
  once.  
   
 (d) The inventor has the right to be named as such  in the 
  patent. This right is not transferrable and may not be waived. 
 
27(A)(2)  Any agreement between parties to an employment relationship in terms 
 of which the employee agrees to assign to the employer inventions yet 
 to be made, is invalid. 
 
27(A)(3) (a) Any agreement to assign ownership or transfer any rights in an 
 invention not falling within s 27(A)(1) shall be invalid unless it provides 
 for a fair payment to the employee.  
 
  (b) An employee who disputes the fairness of the payment in 
   s27(A)(3)(a) may approach the Commissioner of Patents   
  make an order for a fair payment. 
 
27(A)(4) Where the parties are subject to a collective labour agreement 
 which deals with ownership of an invention made by an employee and 
 related matters, the  terms of the collective agreement shall apply only 
 to the extent that they are more favourable to the employee than any 
 term in the employment contract. 
 
27(A)(5) The Minister must publish Guidelines for the interpretation of sections 







The Guidelines which must be developed by the Minister should relate to the 
following, amongst other concerns which may arise: 
 
1. The reference to an ‘employment relationship’ is to employment as understood in 
the context of the BCEA and LRA. This will ensure that it is wide enough to apply to 
those work relationships in which the employee is in a weaker bargaining position 
and also to provide sufficient opportunity for employers to rely on the provision where 
appropriate. This will result in a broader group of inventions to be considered when 
applying the provision. 
 
2. In calculating a fair and reasonable remuneration, factors to be considered include 
the usual salary of the employee, the nature of the industry, whether inventions of 
the type are a regular occurrence in the industry, the relative value of the profit 
derived from the invention, the contributions of other employees to the development 
of the inventor, amongst others. The aim is to ensure firstly that the bargain struck 
between the parties is fair in the sense that it has taken into account the value of the 
employee’s contribution to the employer. It is only with hindsight that this is possible. 
Secondly, it must be reasonable for the employee to receive the amount, in light of 
the contributions of others, for example. 
 
3. The provisions of section 27(A) apply to patentable inventions only.  
 
4. A fair payment in the context of section 27(A)(3)(a) would not include the salary 
which the employee receives from the employer, or the contributions of other 
employees. However, the contribution of the employer will be relevant here, for 
example, where it has provided the resources.  The purpose of this provision is to 
mitigate the inequality in bargaining power between the employer and employee so 
that the employee is able to negotiate with the strength of an independent inventor. 
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